WHY WAS 'COMMUNISM BETTER'? RETHINKING INEQUALITY AND THE COMMUNIST NOSTALGIA IN CENTRAL EUROPE

Abstract

More than twenty years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Central Europeans are past their transitions and have well-functioning economies. Yet, judging by their lingering communist nostalgia, they have failed to notice. Neo-liberal economists argue that transition results in higher inequality, and that economic liberalization widens the gap between the losers and the winners. Through a comparative analysis of Czechoslovakia and Slovakia, this article suggests that it is not inequality per se but a perception of inequality - whether accurate or skewed - that may aggravate domestic tensions in post-communist Central Europe. I propose two factors through which such perception may arise: 1) the nature of domestic political institutions, and 2) the growth of information and communication technology associated with globalization.

Headnote

More than twenty years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Central Europeans are past their transitions and have well-functioning economies. Yet, judging by their lingering communist nostalgia, they have failed to notice. Neo-liberal economists argue that transition results in higher inequality, and that economic liberalization widens the gap between the losers and the winners. Through a comparative analysis of Czechoslovakia and Slovakia, this article suggests that it is not inequality per se but a perception of inequality - whether accurate or skewed - that may aggravate domestic tensions in post-communist Central Europe. I propose two factors through which such perception may arise: 1) the nature of domestic political institutions, and 2) the growth of information and communication technology associated with globalization.

Key words: Central Europe; transition; communist nostalgia; inequality; institutions; globalization.

1INTRODUCTION

In the early 1990s a wave of nostalgia swept across post-communist Europe. As economic hardship, cultural displacement and political turmoil overshadowed the excitement from newly re-acquired political freedoms, "communism was better" echoed from Prague to Bucharest to Moscow (Boyer 2010, 17). As of today, most of the former Soviet republics and satellites are past their transitions and have well-established, functioning capitalist systems. Their economies have grown, the standard of living has increased and, in some countries, the purchasing power has about tripled (Statisticky Urad SR 2015). Yet, European voices nostalgically reminiscing on the communist past have not ceased (Pew Research Center 2009; see also Pew Research Center 2011; Masci 2017). Why, despite improved economic conditions, do the citizens of postcommunist Europe believe that they are now economically worse off than they were during the Soviet regime?

From the prevailing neo-liberal perspective, transition is expected to diminish incomes, increase poverty and inequality, and bring widespread unemployment, all of which is likely to culminate in public disillusionment with the new, democratic regimes (Milanovic 1998, 6-11). However, although applicable to Europe's transitional years, these economic justifications come short of explaining the discontent during the post-transitional period of economic boom and relatively low income inequality in some Central European states (World Bank 2014). Therefore, this article has two main objectives. The first is to suggest an alternative explanation behind the occurrence of European communist nostalgia, and particularly the second wave in the 2000s. Twentyfive years ago, the post-communist transformation was only one of the three major processes that shaped Europe - along with globalization and technological innovation (Kolodko 2003, 5-6). The impacts of these global forces on the presence of the communist nostalgia need to be assessed in conjunction with the post-communist transformation.

Some causal links between globalization and domestic public discontent can be found in the exiting literature (Rodrik 1997, 2011; Stiglitz 2002). These studies emphasize the role of inequality in domestic social tensions. However, I argue that inequality is unlikely to cause tensions if it is hidden from the public eye. It is more likely that perceptions of inequality play a more important role in public discontent. Since public perceptions are difficult to measure (Perla 2011), I focus on factors that may or may not enable certain perceptions to appear and spread. An examination of two cases - former Czechoslovakia and one of its remnant states, Slovakia - reveals two likely factors: 1) the nature of domestic political institutions, and 2) the growth of and increased access to information and communication technology, relatively unrestricted by democratic institutions.

Therefore, the second objective of this article is to highlight the role that domestic political institutions play in shaping public perceptions. The existing studies of the communist nostalgia (Boym 1995; Creed 2010; Todorova 2010; Gherhina and Klymenko 2012) do not offer such institutional perspective. Furthermore, although the literature on domestic political institutions is vast, the ability of these institutions to mold people's perception has not been studied or emphasized enough (Hall and Taylor 1996; Franicevic 2004). Such ability can be discussed beyond the context of European communist nostalgia.

I unfold my arguments in the following five sections. First, I provide an overview of the communist nostalgia that occurred in Europe in the 1990s and the 2000s. I focus on the definition of the phenomenon, its manifestations and the prevailing explanations of its roots. I then suggest an alternative explanation for its occurrence. I discuss some possible links between domestic political institutions, the proliferation of information and telecommunications technology, public perception of inequality, and domestic stability. The last section contains concluding remarks as well as some broader implications of my arguments. This article is not meant to present a full-fledged theory of the communist nostalgia; instead, it is a plausibility probe meant to inspire further scholarly discussion.

2EUROPE'S COMMUNIST NOSTALGIA

The communist nostalgia has been evident among the populations of both the former Soviet republics and the Soviet satellites in the 1990s as well as the 2000s (Haerpfer 2002; Ekman and Linde 2005; White et al. 2005; Wike 2010; Dragomir 2011; Gherghina and Klymenko 2012). What is this nostalgia? How has it been manifested, and why is it still echoing across Europe?

In general, nostalgia is understood as a type of memory, a re-creation of the past that goes beyond mere recollection (Wilson 2005; Creed 2010). Normally, nostalgia has an emotional basis, but as Ekman and Linde (2005, 356) show, the concept goes beyond "a mere sentimental longing for the good old days"; it has political, ideological, socio-economic and personal dimensions. Feelings, memories, experiences, and worldviews influence personal assessments of the new situation as compared to the old one (Boym 1995, 151). Communist nostalgia in particular is based on selective images of the past and retrospective evaluations of life under communism as compared to post-communist (often) socio-economic situation (Ekman and Linde 2005, 357). It has two general characteristics: public discontent with democracy and concurrent public longing for communism. For example, in Poland, the 'good old days' of communism were those of stable jobs, financial security, free medical care, social cohesion and the "culture of equality" where the weakest and the poorest were not left behind in the race to prosperity (Esche et al.). The Czechs long for lower food and gas prices, equal wages, stable employment as well as less waste, and fewer accidents and disasters (Lysonek et al. 2009). The Slovaks believe, among other things, that the prices of commodities were lower during communism (Novy Cas 2009; Odkladal 2014). Many of these feelings and memories of the 'good old times' have been proven inaccurate (Netik and Kovalik 2008; Odkladal 2014). This disparity between the socio-economic reality and public perception is particularly apparent when comparing the two waves of nostalgia - in the 1990s and the 2000s.

In the 1990s, most of the post-communist countries in Europe experienced shocks to their economic and social well-being (Henderson and Robinson 1997; Berend 2007). The first wave of disillusionment with the new regime and the longing for the old one was therefore not surprising. Common characteristics of post-communist European states included poor economic performance, a rise in inequality, privatization through which many former communist elites pillaged the formerly state-owned assets, fees for previously free government-provided services, a rise in unemployment, organized crime and poverty, spread of alcoholism and drug abuse (Milanovic 1998, 40-59; Vassilev 2011).

However, the economies of most of the post-communist European states have now reached the level of development comparable to the Western countries (Shleifer and Treisman 2014). Economic progress, compared to the communist years, is apparent. Between 1998 and 2003, there was a resurgence of growth, an increase in real wages, and a significant decline in poverty among the countries of transitional Europe (World Bank 2005). Throughout the 2000s, people's living standards have increased. Inequality levels that initially shot up in the 1990s have been stabilized, and are now considered to be lower than in other comparable economies (Shleifer and Treisman 2014). Given the improvements in social and economic well-being of Europe's post-Soviet states, the presence of the communist nostalgia in the 2000s is puzzling. Some scholars have attempted to shed light on the roots of this phenomenon.

Some sociological studies suggest that transition causes a "trauma of deindustrialization" (Todorova 2010, 5). The collapse of totalitarian states created social vacuum in post-Soviet Europe where the new regime was blamed for the harshness of the new conditions, while the old regime was mourned (Creed 2010). Nostalgia for the past is then seen as a way of reaching backward and seeking to find the lost balance (Boym 1995, 150). Others argue that the root of the nostalgia is the initial socialization of people into a particular political culture and identity (Gherhina and Klymenko 2012). During the decades spent under the communist regime, individuals formed certain values and orientations within a specific institutional and social setting. These entrenched attitudes, formed over long periods of time, are difficult to dislodge. The nostalgia is thus less about people's negative feelings toward the new regime and its shortcomings, and more about a strong identification with the past regime and its values. These sociological explanations, however, fail to clarify why the 'good old times' of communism are discussed and scrutinized predominantly in terms of socio-economic well-being (Gherghina 2010; Farghali 2013).

Neo-liberal economists argue that transition increases social costs and results in lower incomes, higher inequality, greater unemployment and subsequent social discontent (Milanovic 1998; Holscher 1999). Overall, inequality has been associated with the communist nostalgia quite prominently, with some scholars arguing that increases in inequality in the post-Soviet period are "the strongest determinant of change in the vote for Communist parties" (Uslaner 2010, 113). Growth in inequality has been linked to the major global forces of the 1990s: trade liberalization, marketization and globalization (Hurrell and Woods 1999; Stiglitz 2002; Rodrik 2011). Yet, these forces' sustained negative effects on income inequality can only cause public discontent if the public is aware of the existing social disparities. As I argue in the next section, domestic political institutions may have a crucial role in both creation and maintenance of public perception of inequality.

3PERCEPTION OF INEQUALITY IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE: SOME THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS

In post-communist Europe, increases in inequality and poverty have gone hand in hand, putting pressure on transitional governments (Franicevic 2004, 221). Accordingly, as discussed earlier, rising inequality has been linked to domestic destabilization as well as the communist nostalgia. However, inequality in some Central European states rose only marginally at the onset of transition in the 1990s, and then stabilized at relatively low levels toward the end of the first decade of the 2000s. How then can inequality be linked to growing discontent in these states? Among the countries of transitional Europe Slovakia best illustrates this puzzle.

As seen in Table 1, Slovakia was the only country in post-communist Europe where inequality actually decreased in the early 1990s. In all other countries, we see a leap in inequality, from a marginal increase in Central Europe (Poland, Hungary) to more than a two-fold increase in Eastern Europe (Russia, Ukraine). Yet, the voices dissatisfied with the new regime and longing for the old one were equally present in Slovakia as anywhere else in post-communist Europe. These voices not only prevailed but kept getting louder over the next decade, in which Slovakia saw economic growth so rapid that it earned the small country a nickname 'the Tatra Tiger' (Pravda 2008). Furthermore, the peak inequality under the Czechoslovak communist regime was in fact higher than inequality in transitional and post-transitional Slovakia (Gerbery 2010; Kahanec et al. 2012, 11). Nowadays, Slovakia boasts one of the lowest levels of inequality among the EU member states (Gerbery 2010, 26). I posit that misperceptions of the ordinary Slovaks may be in large part responsible for this empirical puzzle.

Perceptions, or interpretations of reality, determine the world we live in. (Mis)perceptions have an important place in domestic and international politics; they have been shown to affect actions of policy-makers, including decisions concerning war and peace (Jervis 1968; Post 1991). (Mis)perceptions also affect ideas, choices and actions of ordinary people, and consequently, their participation in public life as well as their views of public institutions (Franicevic 2004, 224). Perceptions about one's own socio-economic well-being are based on subjective comparisons with others (as well as with past experiences and/or future expectations) (Franicevic 2004, 226; Alam et al. 2005, 15). How do these perceptions arise? And what are the mechanisms through which perceptions of inequality may spread?

Here I focus on the creation of the perception of the 'good old times' of communism and particularly as it relates to socio-economic (in)equality. I argue that political institutions may play an important role in this process - whether directly, through specific policies, or indirectly, through enabling the environment in which certain perceptions may take hold easier than others. Specifically, messages that the public receives through the media and other means of mass communication have a significant effect on public opinion (Perla 2011). In the context of post-communist Europe, the perception of inequality is likely to arise, spread and persist due to two main factors: 1) the enabling characteristics of democratic political institutions, and 2) a massive growth in access to and the use of information and communication technology.

In general, institutions are legal and regulatory frameworks that reduce transaction costs and uncertainty, provide information, set standards of behaviour, facilitate communication and induce compliance with the set rules (Hall and Taylor 1996). In domestic politics, institutions channel voters' interests both domestically and internationally; they either concentrate or diffuse authority (Weaver and Rockman 1993; Harrison and Sundstrom 2007). Domestic political institutions, however, are also capable of shaping human perception; they can construct and reconstruct inter-group relationships in a relatively short period of time (Dumitru and Johnson 2011). It is therefore conceivable that the state, and particularly a certain type of state's domestic political institutions, can shape public perceptions of inequality. The radical institutional transformation in post-communist Europe draws particular attention to the role of democratic vs. non-democratic institutions in shaping popular perceptions. An examination of communist Czechoslovakia and its totalitarian practices suggests that the perception of inequality is more likely to arise among the citizens of democratic than non-democratic states.

4NON-DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC PERCEPTION: CONTROL, COERCION AND PROPAGANDA IN COMMUNIST CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Czechoslovakia's communist regime was one of the most authoritarian regimes of the Soviet bloc (Zavacka 2004). When the communists took power in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, the existing pluralistic system morphed into the monopoly of power of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. The Party became the sole authority with unlimited political power and control over the national ideology, which was ruthlessly enforced (Koleckova 2010, 18). Czechoslovakia's earlier economic successes2 faded under the Soviet rule. Between 1949 and 1989, the Party exerted absolute control of the national economy; it suppressed market mechanisms, established a single-sector economy, and began the Soviet system of planning (Prucha 1995, 63). Heavy industry was prioritized and, one-sided external economic relations were maintained (with the USSR and the members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) (Evanson 1985, 249). On one hand, the socialist system resulted in a high rate of employment. On the other hand, it caused a long-term internal economic disequilibrium, with a decreased standard of living, chronic scarcity, and soaring prices of consumer goods (Smith 1998).

Yet, in accordance with the communist ideal, Czechoslovakia supposedly boasted one of the highest rates of income equality in the world (Sojka 2003, 64). Wages were centrally determined and strictly controlled, with mechanisms in place that prevented large increases in wage disparities among groups. High upward social mobility and non-exclusive elites made it possible for many proletarians to occupy bureaucratic and leadership posts, which contributed to an overall egalitarian image of Czechoslovakia (Evanson 1985, 225). In reality, however, the distribution of incomes was linked to party privileges, and there was a flourishing black market and considerable hidden unemployment due to the inefficient use of labour (Sojka 2003). Yet, the ideal of equality was broadly voiced and reinforced through propaganda, used as a means of both control and coercion (Kaplan and Tomasek 1994, 50).

In the beginnings of the Czechoslovak communist regime, in the so-called era of normalization, the communists put large effort into developing widespread, farreaching ideological apparatus, which they wanted to use to gain maximum control over political, cultural and social life in Czechoslovakia. The government's objective was twofold: to ensure the society's material well-being, and to eliminate material and social inequality (viewed as unjust and harmful) even through force, restrictions or limitation/destruction of personal freedoms (Joch 2006). The Czechoslovak Communist Party vehemently promoted socialist values, including "utopian concepts of equality, unity, and brotherhood" (Velkova 2013; Pancheva-Kirkova 2013). Through the national broadcast, newspaper and television, the Party disseminated brochures and various information materials with ideological themes.3 The means of communication were also used to control the population and isolate it from the West (Kaplan and Tomasek 1994, 50-62). For example, the Czechoslovak national broadcast established a system of "radio-defence" against external (i.e., Western) broadcasting (Behal). Furthermore, in an attempt to prevent Western values from seeping in, the communists gradually eliminated social organizations (especially those headquartered in the West such as the YMCA) and university student groups (Kaplan and Palecek 2003, 18-19).

Aside from their everyday lives being subjected to strict government control, the Czechoslovak citizens were coerced to conform to the communist/socialist values, being forced to do anything from participating in public parades to monitoring their neighbour's behaviour in search of so-called 'class enemies' (McIntosh and MacIver 1992, 379). Political processes with the "enemies of the regime" were nationally broadcasted and widely publicized (Kaplan and Palecek 2003, 207). Forced labour camps and prisons waited for those who did not conform. Police informers and arbitrary arrests were not unheard of (Evanson 1985, 249). The use of coercion by the Czechoslovak government was widespread and most severe in the first years of the regime as the communist elites attempted to stifle non-compliance. In later years, the government increasingly relied on propaganda to keep any potential disobedience at bay.

In Czechoslovakia, propaganda was an intentional attempt to manipulate attitudes, opinions and actions. As an act of communication, it used words, images, monuments, clothing style, gestures, music, and movies (Zavacka 2002, 439). It was meant to introduce the public to a set of ideas that were presented as exclusive: for example, the existing domestic political system is the best possible one; the existing domestic political system is economically more efficient than others; all the presented information is true and valid; who denies the validity of the presented reality is an enemy of the society; an enemy of the society must be shamed or eliminated (Zavacka 2002, 446). Censorship was an important element of the communist propaganda.

Censorship was strict and seeped into almost every aspect of people's lives; it relied heavily on spreading "null information" where an 'inappropriate' event was treated with silence, and as such it 'never happened' in the eyes of the public (Kaplan and Tomasek 1994, 34; Zavacka 2002, 446). For example, through withholding information, the Czechoslovak government created a perception of low crime rate, which, incidentally, is one of the main characteristics of the 'good old times' of the Soviet regime (Zavacka 2006, 127). Unemployment, alcoholism, epidemics, suicides, major road accidents, tragedies and even natural disasters were all issues that 'did not exist' in Czechoslovakia (Zavacka 2006, 127 and 131). Censorship and propaganda were also meant to stir up the revolutionary potential of the working class; they served as a bridge between ideology, politics and the public (Knapik 2012-2014, 5). The overall goal was to minimize wrong interpretations of communism and reprove other ideologies as well as the proponents of democratic values, the Catholic Church, entrepreneurs, and artists (Hola 2010, 30). As Kaplan and Palecek (2003, 18) write, "the monopoly of truth was one of the conditions for maintaining the monopoly of power."4

The Czechoslovak Communist Party was quite successful in achieving these objectives. Propaganda seeped into all aspects of the Czechoslovak society, shaping the way the public viewed the ideology and their everyday lives. Through culture, arts and mass media, especially television, radio and theatre (all controlled by the Party), the citizen's priorities, values and perceptions were steered toward party allegiance, unity and social equality (Hola 2010; Koleckova 2010). Intentional and perpetual selection of information protected the communist ideology and instilled the socialist ideas into the worldviews of the Czechoslovak population (Hola 2010, 31). As a result, Czechoslovakia was widely perceived by its citizens as an egalitarian society. In interpersonal comparisons, such perception was unlikely to instigate social discontent due to socio-economic disparities - first, because inequality officially did not exist, and second, because the government's authoritarian means of information control prevented the Czechoslovak citizens from comparing their well-being with that of the Western capitalist democracies. Post-communist Czechoslovakia, however, was very different.

5DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS: POLITICAL FREEDOMS, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND ICT IN POSTCOMMUNIST SLOVAKIA

The fall of communism left Czechoslovakia in political and economic disarray. The new Czechoslovak democratic regime aimed at transforming the socialist economy to a market-based one, mainly through privatization and trade liberalization. The economic transition resulted in a drop in Czechoslovakia's gross national income and real wages (Brada 1991). A reform of the banking system caused a financial crisis in the business sector. Price liberalization led to an increase in prices of food and energy (Brada 1991). By the end of the year, the unemployment rate soared (from 3% to 12%) (Madudova 2012, 35). Diverging approaches between the Czech and Slovak politicians to the solutions for these economic problems are believed to be one of the main factors that fuelled the 1993 dissolution of Czechoslovakia (Leff 2000; Pavkovic and Radan 2007).

The 'Velvet Divorce' sent the Czechs and the Slovaks on separate economic paths. After what some call the "failure of transformation", the Czech Republic's leading Civic Democratic Party turned toward neo-liberal market reforms, and put the Czech economy back on track, on its way to the European Union (Sojka 2003, 54). The Czech Republic received millions of US dollars in foreign direct investment (FDI) and paid off all its debt to the IMF four years before it was due (Velkova 2013, 29). Slovakia's story was different.

In the Slovak Republic, Vladimir Meciar's Movement for Democratic Slovakia committed to a more cautious programme of economic reform. Diverging from the neo-liberal model of transition, the government determined Slovakia's economic and industrial policy. Privatization occurred, but the process was corrupt, long and difficult for foreign investors (Aktuality 2008). However, after the removal of Vladimir Meciar from the office in 1998, Slovakia received massive inflows of FDI into its steel and automotive industries (Hoskova 2000; Panis 2012). The following years were characterized by a drop in the unemployment rate and a solid economic growth that turned into a rapid one after Slovakia's entry into the EU in 2004 (Tupy 2006). Despite the earlier curtailing of social handouts (in the late 1990s), the government's social policies have been generous (especially with the aid of EU's social fund) (Elster et al. 1998; Tupy 2006; Bednarik 2012; Beblavy). In 2009, Slovakia entered the Eurozone as the global recession caught up. However, the recession was short, and nowadays the Slovak economy is still considered a tiger economy in Central and Eastern Europe (Fidrmuc et al. 2013). Yet, the Slovak governments have been unpopular, and the public disillusionment, noticeable in the 1990s, has prevailed well into the 2000s. The perception of inequality among the Slovaks may have played a role in this discontent. The democratic nature of Slovakia's post-communist institutions has likely allowed for such perception to arise, spread, and flourish.

In the post-communist transitional states, the democratic institutions have acted in an enabling fashion, allowing the civil society and the media to shape public perceptions. While the communists coerced the Czechoslovak society into "an undivided and unquestioned ideological unity", the Slovak postcommunist regime established a system of governance based on political and personal freedoms and active civil society (Shkolnikov and Nadgrodkiewicz 2010, 79). The socialist propaganda heralding equality no longer exists in Slovakia. Political rights such as the right to free speech and expression, the right to sign petitions and protest peacefully, and the prohibition of censure are guaranteed by the Slovak constitution (Verejny Ochranca Prav). These rights allow Slovaks to voice their opinions freely, albeit perhaps subjectively.

Public opinions may not accurately reflect the reality, but they can facilitate inter- and intra-group comparison that can then lead to (mis)perceptions about one's relative economic status. The proximity of Central and Eastern Europe to the rich Western neighbours has shaped the way in which the post-communist populations view their own economic well-being (Holscher 1999, 170). The elimination of the communist control, coercion and propaganda made it possible for Central and Eastern Europeans to compare their well-being with that of their richer Western neighbours. Such cross-border comparisons, even if they fail to accurately reflect the reality, may instill a feeling of injustice among the populations of those states that are worse off relative to other states. Such feelings exacerbate social tensions. Inter-personal and inter-group comparisons (whether cross-border or internal) are easy to spread. For example, civil society organizations that have sprung up across post-communist Europe provide venues and opportunities for voicing, sharing and even shaping public perceptions and feelings.

In Slovakia, democratization has enabled the growth and spread of civil society (Malova 2008, 353). Protests were the basic form of public participation in the early 1990s, and some of them drew over ten thousand people to the streets (Malova 2008). The purpose of these gatherings was largely related to the issues of the national agenda; however, later surveys suggest that protesters tended to switch to voicing their concerns with the deteriorating standard of living (Stena 1992). In the late 1990s and 2000s, the Slovak civil society moved away from protests and petitions and toward educational programs and campaigns (Malova 2008). These groups drew attention to the government's failures in political, economic and social spheres. By doing so, they have managed to spread their views among ordinary Slovaks.

The activities of the civil society, and particularly the mobilization of resources and the establishment of connections with the public resulted in a formation of a large civic community with shared understandings and beliefs. The leaders of the Slovak civil society have been able to utilize these connections and networks to spread the ideas that the public is eager to believe. An example is 'Protest Gorila', a series of demonstrations that initially began in early 2012 as a display of discontent with the corrupt government, but later turned into open dissatisfaction with income inequality in the country (Marusiak 2012). However, as discussed earlier, Slovakia is one of the most egalitarian states in Europe. Although some public comparisons may be based on accurate interpretations of reality, some are likely to be skewed or intentionally manipulated for specific purposes - commercial or political (Kus and Piskozub 2012, 14; Luha 2014). Various interest groups may deliberately or unwillingly create, spread, and maintain distorted public perceptions. An increased access to new information technology has an important role in this process.

The proliferation of information and communication technology (ICT) offers the public a nearly unlimited and rapid flow of information (Tokarova 2002; Samli 2002). New technologies allow almost immediate communication and information sharing among individuals and groups from across the globe. The networks enabled by the Internet provide opportunities for circulating information through e-mail lists, news releases, blogs and various websites. However, the availability of data does not automatically translate into its accuracy and/or equal access to all (Samli 2002, 60). With more data, people's ability to effectively locate, sift through, accurately evaluate, and effectively use the available information deteriorates. We have a limited attention span and are prone to choosing and remembering certain information that fits our existing views and situations (Jervis 1976). The inevitable selection process that comes with vast amounts of data may fuel misinformation, misperception and discontent. For example, if the Slovaks are convinced that others are better off in terms of their social and economic well-being, they may be more likely to pay attention to the information that highlights socio-economic disparities, regardless of the information's context, source or purpose. Such information, in turn, may fuel Slovaks' disillusionment with their own socio-economic situation and, by extension, their government. Furthermore, wide availability of data gives rise to more opportunities for inter- and intra-group comparison that may shape perceptions of inequality. The global nature of the ICT, and especially the Internet, significantly increases the likelihood of such comparisons reaching well beyond limited local circles (Kolodko 2003, 10).

Psychological studies have shown the ability of the media to facilitate social comparison, which then (negatively) shapes public self-identities and selfevaluations (Milkie 1999; Chia and Gunther 2006). In the Slovak case, the roots of the spreading perception of injustice and inequality are not as much in statistical analyses or academic studies as in the recurrent messages fed to the public by the Slovak mass media that are free from the government control (Skolkay). The tabloidization of the news after 1989 resulted in a considerable increase in popularity and demand for entertaining and breaking news about celebrities, politicians, and other individuals of interest.5 The spotlight on such individuals is often a source of discontent and frustration among the Slovaks. For example, popular newspapers tend to run stories that highlight the 'unfair' wealth of the rich (e.g., Slovak hockey players who work overseas) in contrast to the standard of living of the rest of the population (Rynik 2013). A particularly favourite media topic is the comparison of Slovak wages with those in other industrialized countries (Mihalko 2012; Horvathova 2013; Finanza). Social media are also influential conveyors of such information, producing unhappy memes, blogs and posters, and running discussion groups. Growing access to an increasing number of media sources, and especially through mobile communication and the Internet, facilitates the spread of inter-and intra-group comparisons, which may be skewed or taken out of context.

Over the past two decades, Slovakia has experienced a remarkable expansion of its telecommunication sector (Prochazka 2004). In 2015, Slovakia's active cell phone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants reached 123.07 (Ministerstvo Dopravy a Vystavby SR). There were about 6.7 million active subscriptions (the population of Slovakia is about 5.4 million), with land coverage of 92% and population coverage of 100% (Ministerstvo Dopravy a Vystavby SR). The need for connection is palpable in the Slovak society. Even the ads for communication devices perpetuate the message of networks and information sharing - "Zazime to Spolu," meaning "Let's Experience It Together" (Telekom 2009). Slovakia has the highest Internet penetration rate in Central Europe and one of the highest in the world (83.1%), with 4.5 million users (about 83% of the total population) in 2017 (Internet World Stats; see also TASR 2013). During the last decade, the Internet speed grew 400-fold, and recently, free Internet has been enabled on buses in Slovakia's major cities (SITA 2012; Webnoviny 2013). There is no (known) Internet censorship in Slovakia aside from monitoring hate speech. Diverse interpretations of reality with a varying degree of accuracy are easily accessible to the majority of the Slovak population. The specific type of information that individuals access, interpret and use, and the extent to which such interpretations affect the overall level of social discontent and fuel the communist nostalgia should be a subject of further study.

6CONCLUSION

In the 1990s post-communist Europe, the hopes that transition was going to be easy and quick dissolved in political, social and economic turmoil. The subsequent nostalgic reminiscing about the communist regime was perhaps not so surprising. However, the communist nostalgia did not cease once the European countries completed their transformations from totalitarian to democratic states, and from centrally planned to market economies. The prevalence of this sentiment in countries that experienced rapid socioeconomic improvements is particularly puzzling.

In order to understand the persistence of the communist nostalgia in postcommunist Europe, I critically re-evaluated the linkages between institutions, economic growth and social discontent. Adding the effects of globalization to the economic explanations of the communist nostalgia and borrowing from sociological and psychological studies that view nostalgia as a perceptual phenomenon, I suggested revisions to the links between globalization and transition, inequality and social discontent. Contrary to the prevailing views, I argued that the main source of domestic tensions may not be inequality per se but a perception of inequality. This perception may be based on reality or it may be skewed.

Using the cases of communist Czechoslovakia and post-communist Slovakia, I suggested how domestic political institutions and the proliferation of and access to information and communication technology may shape society's interpretations of reality. In Czechoslovakia, the authoritarian means of information control created and maintained a certain image of the state and society. Over the duration of the communist regime, this image was likely internalized and later difficult to dislodge, especially among the older population. The removal of the regime and its authoritarian means of control revealed a new reality where unemployment, suicides, accidents, disasters and inequality were no longer 'non-existent'. It is conceivable that the nostalgia is not about the ability of the communists to take a better care of their population, but about their successful creation of an image of a society that only existed in the minds of its citizens.

In addition, unlike in authoritarian regimes, in democracies people possess political rights that enable participation in public life. Communication is at the core of public interactions and activities. In the post-communist states (as well as elsewhere), the Internet has become a crucial communication means that allows the dissemination of a large variety of information without the middle step (i.e., the censorship) (Stefancik 2012, 124). The wide availability of data and limited government control, however, may not contribute to domestic stability. To the contrary, given our cognitive limitations and the diverse objectives of those who create and spread certain information, people's interpretations of reality may become distorted. Consequently, these misperceptions may fuel public disillusionment, and undermine domestic stability. They may also be at the root of the lingering communist nostalgia.

European communist nostalgia has at least two broader implications for today's democracies. First, this article suggests that access to and sharing of information entails power - the power of the information creators, providers and recipients. A wrong message that gives rise to misperceptions may have devastating consequences for any government, institutions, groups or population. States, however, can shape the perceptions, beliefs and feelings of their populations even without the authoritarian means of information control. For example, targeted press releases as well as education and awareness campaigns may ease domestic discontent by correcting some of the most pertinent and destabilizing public misperceptions.

Second, the communist nostalgia is becoming a worrisome phenomenon across the European Union and the Western world in general. Some European countries have passed legislations that ban the use of all communist symbols, while others are pushing the EU for criminalizing the trivialization of the activities and crimes of the totalitarian governments (Kramer 2014). Should the West be worried that a resurgence of the communist ideas may throw the world into another ideological conflict? In light of the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, it may be easy to be alarmed by the growing public disillusionment with democratic regimes and the echoing voices reminiscing about 'the good old times' of communism. However, before letting the 'red paranoia' overtake us, we should pay closer attention to where the communist nostalgia may have come from and whether it poses any real threats to Europe's democratic stability. Otherwise, any crackdown on the communist nostalgia may undermine the very democratic values that Europe's post-communist governments were built on.

Footnote

2 Among its Central European neighbours, Czechoslovakia was viewed as "an island of stability"; it was one of the ten most industrially developed countries in the world until the communists established a Czechoslovak totalitarian regime. See Prucha (1995, 41).

3 See the documents in Narodni Archiv Praha, Kancelar Tajemníka UV KSC Oldricha Svestky, fond KSC - UV 1945-1989, c.f. 1261/0/70.

4 All translations are my own.

5 For example, the readership of the tabloids in Hungary grew from zero in 1989 to 786,000 in 2000. Similar trend is apparent in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the Baltic states. See Kus and Piskozub (2012, 24).

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