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All war is inherently about changing human behavior, with each side trying to alter the behavior of the other by force of arms. Success requires the ability to outthink an opponent and ruthlessly exploit the opportunities that come from positions of relative advantage. The side that best understands an operational environment learns and adapts more rapidly and decides to act more quickly in conditions of uncertainty is most likely to win.
-ADRP 3-0, Operations
Arguably, information operations (IO) is one of the most misunderstood and misused terms in JL m.Army doctrine, to the point where it has largely become a ubiquitous term of reference that lacks the necessary clarity of purpose and application for the majority of the Army. I am sure that if several Army leaders and soldiers were asked to define information operations in their own words, one would receive several differing- and often conflicting-interpretations. Multiple changes to Army doctrine concerning information operations after it emerged as a concept from Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W) over twenty-five years ago have contributed to this confusion.1 The definition of IO has changed three times in the last eleven years alone: from C2Ws focus on five core capabilities, to information engagement (2007), to inform-and-influence activities (2011), to its current incarnation focusing on information-related capabilities (2016). As the Army shifts its doctrinal focus to large-scale combat operations (LSCO) against peer and near-peer adversaries, the purpose of Perceptions Are Reality is to help leaders and soldiers visualize and understand IO through the lens of historical case studies.
In both joint and Army doctrine, IO is defined as "the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own"2 In more general terms, IO supports the commander's ability to achieve a position of relative advantage through activities in the information environment (the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions) to influence the adversary's will to fight; to disrupt, corrupt, or usurp its capabilities to collect, process, and disseminate information; and ultimately to manipulate (deceive) or disrupt an enemy decision-maker's understanding of the operational environment. Field Manual 3-0, Operations, does a very good job describing the broad...