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Wang examines Taiwan's foreign relations under Lee Teng-hui's twelve-year rule of the island country. The analysis shows that Taiwan's "pragmatic diplomacy" originated from Lee's determination to break the international isolation imposed by Beijing as well as a combination of domestic and international factors. It appears that Lee has set a permanent course for Taipei's foreign policy and the quest for Taiwan's legitimacy will continue in the years to come.
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Abstract
This study aims to examine Taiwan's foreign relations under Lee Teng-hui's twelve-year rule of the island country. The analysis shows that Taiwan's "pragmatic diplomacy" originated from Lee's determination to break the international isolation imposed by Beijing as well as a combination of domestic and international factors. By creating a complex functional interdependence through foreign aid programs, trade and investment, arms purchases, and the exercise of informal diplomacy, Taiwan has maintained a high profile in the international community and its de facto independence generally has been recognized. It appears that Lee has set a permanent course for Taipei's foreign policy and the quest for Taiwan's legitimacy will continue in the years to come. To avoid possible cross-Strait military conflicts, the international community can act as a restraining factor against any aggressive response by Beijing. For its part, Taipei needs to avoid being perceived as unduly provocative lest it be blamed as a "troublemaker" or forced into unequal negotiations with Beijing where its fate would be beyond its control.
When Lee Teng-hui succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo as the president of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1988, he was facing a daunting task of relieving the island country from the international isolation that defined Taiwan as an "international orphan" or "pariah state." Employing a new foreign policy known as "pragmatic diplomacy" (wu-shi wai-jiao), the Taipei government under Lee's leadership started to challenge the "one-China" policy as it previously had been understood within the island as well as in the international community. In an attempt to alter the widely received notion that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China, the essence of "pragmatic diplomacy" is to seek a new framework in which the island can be treated as a distinct and separate state from the People's of Republic of China (PRC).
During Lee's twelve years in office, his efforts at asserting Taiwan's de facto independence and sovereignty irked Chinese leaders. Considering Lee's attempt an unacceptable bid for separation aiming to create "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan," Beijing repeatedly warned that it would use military force should the island country declare itself independent. Cross-Strait relations deteriorated sharply after Lee's successful visit to the US in 1995, culminating in Beijing's provocative missile tests and live fire military exercises. Thanks to President Clinton's decision to dispatch two aircraft carrier battle groups to the vicinity of Taiwan, the crisis did not escalate into an all out war. Chinese leaders' radical response to what they perceived as Taipei's attempt at secession, however, has threatened the regional stability in East Asia and the prosperity of the most dynamic area in the international economy. Lee's efforts at redefining Taiwan's international status, therefore, has had important implications for the international community as a whole and the United States in particular, as the latter, during the Lee era, kept an ambiguous commitment to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.'
This study aims to examine Taiwan's foreign relations under Lee Teng-hui's twelve-year rule of the island country, with a specific focus on the implementation of "pragmatic diplomacy." The following research questions will be addressed: What were the factors contributing to the development of Lee's foreign policy strategy? How did the Taipei government designed and implemented this "pragmatic diplomacy," and what were the effects of this foreign policy on Taiwan's international status? The answers to these questions not only will assess the effectiveness of Taipei's "pragmatic diplomacy" initiated by Lee, but also will provide important policy implications for cross-Strait relations and regional stability in East Asia.
Pressure and Opportunity for Change
Taipei's "pragmatic diplomacy" has its origin in Lee's determination to break the international isolation imposed on Taiwan by the Beijing government. In an interview with a Japanese newspaper shortly after Lee was sworn in as the ROC president, Taiwan's new leader made his intentions clear:
"Any sovereign nation will take flexible measures in order to defend its own national interests and to participate in international activities .... The ROC is currently suffering from the international isolation imposed by the Chinese Communist authorities and their ruthless attacks . . . . Therefore, we will continue to strengthen bilateral relations with diplomatic allies and to establish and strengthen the substantive relations with non-hostile nations in the areas of economy, culture, and technology. The ROC will also actively participate in international organizations and activities in order to share international responsibilities and enhance [the ROC's] international status."2
Indeed, since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the Beijing government has never abandoned the idea of "unifying Taiwan with the motherland" under the framework of "one China" and it has acted aggressively to further that goal. The 1970s saw a shift of China's strategy toward Taiwan away from a reliance on "military liberation" to a wave of "peaceful initiatives." In attempting to force Taipei into acceptance of its unification formula, known as "one country, two systems," Beijing has isolated Taiwan internationally and has backed up its claim over the island with the threat of military force. Insisting that there is only one China in the world and that Taiwan is a part of China, Beijing leaders maintain that the island has no legal right to establish diplomatic relations with foreign countries or to participate in any international organizations. Over the years, the growing importance of the PRC in international affairs and the ROC's own inflexible foreign policy have led many countries, including the US, to accept or acknowledge Beijing's "one China" policy and break relations with Taipei as a necessary condition for establishing formal ties with Beijing. The number of Taiwan's allies dropped significantly in the 1970s and 1980s, and the island country was expelled from many international organizations, including the UN. By 1988, the year Lee succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo as the ROC president, merely twenty-two countries recognized Taipei. With the exception of Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and South Korea, most of Taipei's diplomatic allies were insignificant international players.3 At the same time, Taiwan's official membership in international organizations had dwindled to only eight. These developments threatened the island's continuing existence as an independent and sovereign state, and a change in Taiwan's foreign policy strategy was clearly in need.
Ironically, Taiwan's increasing diplomatic isolation coincided with a period of rapid economic and political change on the island. During the period between 1970 and 1990, Taiwan's economy underwent significant structural change through rapid expansion of the manufacturing sector. Its gross domestic product (GDP) grew rapidly at a rate of about 9 percent per year as the island became the fifteenth largest trading nation. Also being one of the largest economies in the world, Taiwan has ranked among top holders of foreign exchange reserves. The economic success of Taiwan has propelled it firmly into the position of the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs), a rare success story in post World War II development experience.4 The island country's lack of international standing simply could not match its status as a world-class economy. Frustrated by Beijing's imposed isolation, Taiwan's citizens have demanded that the government seek ways to rejoin the international community.
Meanwhile, the rapid democratization unleashed by Chiang Ching-kuo in the mid-1980s had made previously banned and suppressed ideas during the years of authoritarian rule now constitutional rights protected by law. As many exiled advocates of Taiwanese independence were allowed to safely return to the island, foreign policy was no longer a domain dictated by the few in the ruling Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT). The strongest competitor to Lee's governing party in Taiwanese politics was the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Since its inception in 1986, the DPP has openly pushed for Taiwan independence, including the dropping of all claims to territory across the Taiwan Strait and declaring the island an independent country. Since the adoption of a plank on Taiwanese independence in 1991, about onethird of the electorate has felt that the DDP's platform has provided a viable alternative for the country's future.6 As the island country transformed itself into a democracy, the ruling KMT under Lee's leadership had to respond to the demands of its citizens.
Finally, Lee's succession to power was at a point of historical transition as the collapse of the former Soviet Union signified the beginning of an end to the strategic collaboration between the US and the PRC since the signing of the 1972 Shanghai Communique. Beijing's communist ideology, the authoritarian nature of governance, the lack of respect for human rights, and the emergence of an expansionist nationalism in China have now led many in America to consider the Middle Kingdom a threat.7 As US-Sino relations entered a new era, differences between the two major powers provided opportunities for Lee's attempt to seek a change in Taiwan's international standing.
In general, Taiwan's "pragmatic diplomacy" under the Lee administration originated from his determination to change the island's international status and a combination of domestic and international factors that made such a change necessary and possible.
Pragmatic Diplomacy: Design and Implementation
The core idea of "pragmatic diplomacy" is to develop all possible contacts, including diplomatic, economic, or cultural relations, with any country, even if it has diplomatic ties with the PRC. Specifically, "pragmatic diplomacy" calls for: 1) the advancement of formal diplomatic ties, 2) the establishment and promotion of substantive relations with nonhostile nations, and 3) active participation in international organizations and activities.' To achieve these objectives, the Taipei government under Lee's leadership undertook the following approaches:
1. THE PURSUIT OF "DUAL RECOGNITION": When Chiang Kai-shek and, later, his son Chiang Ching-kuo ruled Taiwan, the principle of "one China" was taken as a given. The issue at stake was not whether there was only one China, but whether they could claim to be the sole legitimate rulers of the "Middle Kingdom." As a result, the Chiangs rejected any possibility of "coexistence" of both the ROC and the PRC in the international community. Even when the balance of advantages clearly shifted toward Beijing in 1971 as the "Question of the Representation of China" was voted on in the UN, Taipei steadfastly opposed the "dual representation" proposal sponsored by the US.9 While the principle of "one China" and hence noncoexistence met the self-justified sense of morality in rhetoric, it entrapped Taiwan in a self-limiting diplomatic situation for many years to come. Although Taipei showed some flexibility in its foreign policy stand in the mid-1980s,Io these relatively flexible responses were described by some scholars as "damage control" rather than as bold initiatives in Taiwan's international relations.ll Therefore, the "one-China principle" was like a strait-jacket imposed on Taiwan as it gradually lost its international legitimacy as an independent country. To escape from the limitations imposed by the "one-- China principle," Lee's implementation of "pragmatic diplomacy" started with redefining Taiwan's identity in the world community and, hence, laid the ground for "dual recognition."
In May 1991, Lee declared the end of "the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion," which signified 'Taipei's official recognition of Beijing's rule of the Chinese mainland. The declaration also represented Taipei's formal renouncement of its sovereign claim over the Chinese mainland, which had been deemed an enshrined mission by the Chiangs. This self-denial of sovereignty over the Chinese mainland effectively asserted that Taiwan was a de facto independent state because, just as Taipei did not rule the Chinese mainland, Beijing did not rule Taiwan. To balance between the KMT's long-held position in favor of a "one-China" policy and the popular call for rejoining the international community, Lee proposed that there should be two states within the framework of "one China." As the Chinese mainland under Beijing's rule was known as the PRC, the island country should be recognized as the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROCOT). While this "one country, two equal political entities" or the "one divided China" approach promised an eventual unification of Taiwan with the Chinese mainland, it demanded equal international standing for the ROCOT and the PRC.12 Lee therefore urged Beijing as well as the international community to "accept the reality that, within overall Chinese boundaries, there exist two political entities which exercise jurisdiction over two separate parts of China."13
Lee's announcement effectively signaled that Taipei would no longer consider the battle over diplomatic recognition with the PRC a "zero-sum" game and would actively pursue the expansion of Taiwan's "international space." Indeed, even before Lee's formal announcement ending civil war with the PRC, Taipei already had signaled its willingness to accept the principle of "dual recognition," as the 1988 establishment of diplomatic relations with Grenada, a state then still having formal ties with the PRC, exemplified. Similar cases involved Liberia (1989), Belize (1989), and Niger (1992) which recognized the ROCOT while maintaining official ties with the PRC, until Beijing broke diplomatic relations with them. As Table 1 shows, Taipei's active pursuit of diplomatic relations without regard to whether the country in question had formal ties with Beijing substantially expanded the number of its diplomatic allies. Lee's "dual recognition" strategy therefore underlined his view that cross-Strait contacts should be treated as "special state-to-state relations" (te-shu de guo-yu-guo de guan-xi).14 However, none of the countries attempting dual recognition was able to maintain diplomatic relations with both Taipei and Beijing because the latter soon broke official relations with them once they recognized the former. Chinese leaders could not tolerate even Taiwan's exchange of consulate generals with Latvia in 1992, and soon retaliated by recalling its ambassador from the Baltic State.ls These cases show that the Lee administration's attempt at pursuing "dual recognition" in the international community was impossible due to Beijing's quest for absolute legitimacy.
2. THE USE OF INFORMAL DIPLOMACY: Unlike other countries' diplomatic practices relying on government-to-government exchanges, Beijing's imposed isolation forced Taipei to use primarily "unofficial" means and agencies to engage in diplomatic activities. The use of informal diplomacy by the ROC government to develop and enhance bilateral relations started with Japan. When the Japanese government shifted its recognition to Beijing in 1972, it initiated an arrangement by which Taipei and Tokyo exchanged unofficial offices that were staffed by diplomats whose official status was temporarily suspended. The establishment of the "Association of East Asian Relations" and the "Interchange Association" by Taipei and Tokyo, respectively, allowed both countries to continue to enhance their economic, trade, and cultural exchanges in the absence of formal political ties. This arrangement, later referred to as the "Japanese formula," was soon duplicated in other countries, including the Philippines and the US, to maintain substantive relations with the ROC after the transfer of diplomatic recognition to Beijing."6 Such arrangements not only enabled Taiwan to maintain substantive relations with countries with which it did not have official ties but also allowed the island country to establish "beachheads" so that future relations with the countries in question could be upgraded.
The Taipei government under Lee's leadership worked diligently to expand such "unofficial" offices in foreign countries and to upgrade its substantive relations with them. By 1999, Taipei had established a total of ninety-eight representative/ administrative offices in sixty-three countries, up from sixty-six offices in forty-three nations ten years before. Reciprocally, forty-seven countries which did not have diplomatic relations with the ROC set up fifty-three representative offices in Taiwan." Meanwhile, by the mid-1990s, the majority of Taiwan's missions had been named "Taipei Economic and Cultural Office" or "Taipei Representative Office," while some of them even had the "Republic of China" as part of their official titles." Such name changes represented a significant achievement in Taiwan's foreign relations as Taipei's representative offices frequently bore names that showed no apparent relation with Taiwan in the late 1980s, and many of them were designated as "trade missions" or "cultural offices" to show their unofficial nature.19 The mere appearance of "the ROC" and "Taipei" in the names of Taiwan's missions abroad frequently indicated not only an upgrade of the bilateral relations with the host country but also the independent national identity of Taiwan in the international community.
Such a practice of informal diplomacy has been extended to Taiwanese leaders' visits to foreign countries. Due to Beijing's imposed international isolation, presidents of the ROC have not been able to conduct official tours to foreign countries since former President Yen Chia-kan's visit to Saudi Arabia in 1977. For Lee, to have his travels labeled as "official visits" was not as important as his being able to "walk out" of the island and therefore to make Taiwan internationally visible. Lee's determination, therefore, led to a series of overseas visits by Taiwanese leaders using all kinds of unofficial names. For instance, only a year after he succeeded Chiang in 1988, Lee conducted a three-day "private visit" to Singapore. His 1994 "vacation" tours of three South Asian countries, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, none of which officially recognized the ROC, was conducted only weeks after then Premier Lien Chan's "unofficial" visit to Malaysia and Singapore.20 The most notable example of Lee's pragmatic diplomacy in action was a "private visit" to his alma mater, Cornell University, in the US, which promoted Beijing leaders' angry responses leading to the 1995-96 missile crisis in the Taiwan Strait.
Informal diplomacy also has been used by Taipei for inviting prominent foreign politicians to visit Taiwan. Under pressure from the PRC, foreign leaders from countries having no diplomatic ties with the ROC were not willing to pay visits to Taiwan for fear of offending Chinese leaders. To counter Beijing's imposed isolation, the Taipei government under Lee's leadership actively invited congressional/parliamentary leaders and former government officials to visit Taiwan for political exchanges. During 1997, for instance, more than forty Congressional leaders and former high-ranking officials from the US visited Taiwan, including then Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, former Senator Bob Dole, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, and nine state governors. In 1998, the first lady of the Czech Republic, Madame Dagmar Havlova, was invited to visit the ROC, even though Prague did not have diplomatic ties with Taipei.21 These "unofficial visits" by foreign dignitaries helped Taiwan to expand its international contacts.
3. AN EMPHASIS ON ECONOMIC INCENTIVE: As one of the four Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) in East Asia, the Taipei government under Lee's leadership employed its economic strength to gain friendship and to expand Taiwan's international visibility. There were two major components in Taipei's economic diplomacy. The first one was Taiwan's foreign aid program.22 In addition to technical and agricultural missions that were traditionally employed by the Taipei government, bilateral financial loans, grants, and contributions to multilateral organizations were added to the list of provisions. Through the establishment of the International Economic Cooperation Development Fund (IECDF) in 1988, the Lee administration used these economic resources to consolidate existing official ties, to strengthen substantive relationships, and to gain new diplomatic allies. For instance, to consolidate existing diplomatic ties between Taipei and Pretoria, Taiwan offered a $60 million low-interest loan to South Africa in 1991. In his official visit to four Central American countries in 1994, Lee offered Nicaraguan President Violeta Chamorro new loans worth $30 million and agreed to write off almost $17 million in past debts. He also extended an undisclosed amount of new aid to Costa Rica.23 To strengthen substantive relations with countries which did not have diplomatic recognition of the ROC, Taipei offered $200,000 aid to the Philippines (in 1990), ten thousand tons of rice to Russia (in 1992), and $20 million and $10 million loans to Poland and Latvia, respectively (in 1994).
As Table 2 shows, by engaging in what has been called "dollar diplomacy" or "silver bullet diplomacy," Taipei targeted a series of small, poor, and less developed countries and "bought" diplomatic relations from ten of them following 1988. A 1999 example was the establishment of diplomatic relations between Taiwan and war-torn Macedonia. Taipei offered a $160 million foreign aid package to the Balkan nation in return.24 Other examples include Gambia's transfer of diplomatic recognition from Beijing to Taipei in 1995, which coincided with a $35 million aid package. After Senegal's decision to drop Beijing in favor of Taipei for the third time in 1996, it received hefty foreign aid from Taiwan. Indeed, all countries that have established diplomatic relations with Taipei since 1989 have received grants, loans, or aid in varying degrees.
In addition, Taipei under Lee's leadership also attempted to be involved in multilateral contributions to raise Taiwan's international profile. In September 1991, Taipei worked with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, donating $10 million to set up the Taipei China-European Bank Technical Cooperation Fund to assist Central and Eastern European countries with economic development. Taipei's generous pledge of $300 million in aid for Kosovo refugees and reconstruction of the Balkans in 1999 also attracted international attention, although the pledge was turned down by the EU and the World Bank due to Beijing's pressure.26
The second important weapon in Lee's economic arsenal was Taiwan's power of trade and investment. When Lee took the reigns of the Taipei government in the late 1980s, the island country already had intense economic exchanges with key countries in the world. Its total trade with the United States, Japan, and European countries was over $80 billion in 1989.27 As Taiwan's foreign trade and investment abroad continued to grow in the 1990s, Lee's administration used these economic resources as a diplomatic tool by guiding their directions through government policies and funds toward areas it deemed necessary.
Through the expansion of trade and investment, Taipei consolidated existing official ties with its diplomatic allies. Taiwan's business presence in Latin American and Caribbean countries was a typical example in this respect, as many governments in the region wanted investment dollars in return for their diplomatic loyalty.28 Similarly, trade and investment also improved Taiwan's substantive ties with its trading countries and raised the island country's international recognition. Thus the effect of Taipei's "Southward Investment Strategy" (nan-- xian zheng-che) implemented in 1993 was clearly visible. Bringing with them the promising benefits of Taiwanese trade and investment, Lee and his prime minister, Lien Chan, made breakthrough "unofficial" visits to the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand over the New Year period of 1993-94, despite Beijing's strong objections. Even though none of these countries had diplomatic relations with Taipei, the two Taiwanese leaders were treated in manners that were suitable for state guests and were greeted by leaders of the host countries 29 Lee also used trade and investment with Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) and with the former Soviet Union to expand Taiwan's international space. While the extension of contacts with communist states itself was considered a breakthrough in the ROC's foreign policy as Taipei abandoned its long-held ideological dogma of anticommunism, these economic contacts led to the establishment of political ties through the exchange of representative offices between Taiwan and Hungary (in 1990), the Czech Republic (in 1991), Poland (1992), and Latvia (1991).31
The use of the "Six-year National Development Plan" as bait to expand economic and political relations with foreign countries was another example of Taipei's ingenious use of its economic strength. Recognizing the enormous commercial opportunities offered by its grandiose $300 billion infrastructure program, a stream of foreign visitors, including former French president Vlery Giscard d'Estaing, former German chancellor Helmut Schmidt, and former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, visited Taiwan to "express friendship" and lobby for contracts. Indeed, following the inaugural visit by the French minister of industry in January 1991, in less than two years, more than fifty European and American officials ranked at the vice-minister level or above paid visits to Taipei.32 While many of these foreign visitors bluntly admitted that their true intentions were to get contracts on the Six-Year National Development Plan and that their visits to Taiwan did not imply anything more than commercial interests, the decade-long unspoken tradition of no high-level official contacts between Taiwan and Western countries was broken.33
An added benefit of this economic diplomacy was the diversification of Taiwan's economic interactions throughout the world and a reduction of the island's economic dependency on China. After Taipei lifted the ban on cross-Strait economic exchanges, the two-way trade between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland increased from $956 million in 1986 to $8.7 billion in 1993, and the share of cross-Strait trade in Taiwan's total foreign trade increased from 1.49 percent to 9.32 percent during the same period.34 The Taipei government long feared the danger of Taiwan's increasing economic dependency on the Chinese market which could increase Beijing's political leverage in cross-Strait conflicts. As Taipei's policies encouraged Taiwanese businesses to trade and invest in countries other than China, mutual trade and investment with CEECs and Southeast Asian nations increased dramatically. Bilateral trade between Taiwan and the CEECs increased threefold from $288 million to $865 million in less than ten years,35 while the value of Taiwan's trade with Southeast Asia exceeded $24 billion in 1998. The island country is now a major investor in the region with a total investment of $39 billion. Thus, the share of cross-Strait trade in Taiwan's total foreign trade has been held steadily to about 10 to 11 percent during the past seven years, even though the volume of cross-Strait trade continued to rise throughout the 1990s to a record $31.3 billion in 2000.36
4. STRENGTHENING NATIONAL SECURITY THROUGH ARMS PURCHASES: The Taipei government under Lee's leadership also used its enormous economic resources for arms acquisitions. As the international arms market became a buyer's one after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, Taipei was able to expand the list of shopping countries from the United States to many European countries, including France, Germany, and the Netherlands.37 Unlike its enormous difficulties in the 1970s and 1980s, Taipei gained some leverage in arms acquisitions in this competitive market and thus scored several major successes. The highly publicized deals to purchase sixty French Mirage 2000s and 150 American F-16 fighter jets in 1992 are frequently cited examples." Taipei was also able to acquire six Lafayette-class missile frigates from France and six Knox-class frigates from the United States for its naval defense" and was almost successful in acquiring submarine-building technology from the Netherlands in 1993.40 In addition, as Table 3 presents, Washington sold or licensed to produce in Taiwan a wide range of weapon systems, including E-2C "Hawkeye" air-- warning aircraft (AWACS), M-60 main battle tanks, and a variety of air-to-air, surface-to-air, and antiship missiles.41 Taiwan's enormous expenditures for weapons, as shown in Table 4, made the island country one of the world's top arms purchasing states during Lee's tenure as president.
Probably the most significant event of all was Taipei's attempt to participate in the US-devised Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system after the 1995-96 missile crisis during which Beijing's missile tests severely disrupted the island's economic and social order.42 Beijing's missile threat to Taiwan is real and imminent because China has deployed a large number of short-range ballistic missiles in Fujian province opposite Taiwan and is adding about fifty a year.43 A report in 2000 by the US Defense Intelligence Agency indicated that these offensive M-9s and M-11s could knock out most of Taiwan's military bases with little or no warning.44 Beijing's strong reaction rendered Taiwan's direct participation in the TMD program problematic. Instead, the Lee administration requested to purchase four Arleigh Burke-class destroyers equipped with the highly advanced AEGIS battle management system in its 2000 arms acquisition list. In addition to their highly advanced weapon systems, Taipei hoped that, through the acquisition of AEGIS destroyers, it would become a de facto partner in the US-proposed TMD system and could form an implicit military alliance with both the US and Japan. This would increase the military costs that China would have to bear in mounting an attack on the island. Even if Taipei did not gain TMD protection, were Beijing to launch a missile attack before the system was completed, Washington would be likely to come to Taiwan's aid and this would be of tremendous security assistance to the island country.
Indeed, Taipei's objectives in the arms market are not limited to military, technological, or economic ones. It also has its political considerations. As one observer has noted, "[fln addition to weapons and technologies, Taiwan enters the arms market seeking friends, influence, and international legitimacy."45 All of which would render Beijing's military attacks on the island costly.
5. THE PARTICIPATION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: Following Taipei's withdrawal from the UN in 1971, one effect of Beijing's imposed diplomatic isolation was to restrict Taiwan's participation in international organizations. Chinese leaders have been particularly sensitive to Taipei's membership in international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) of which only sovereign states are members. By the late 1980s, while Taipei was able to participate in 752 international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), it retained membership in only ten IGOs.46 Taiwan's limited membership in international organizations was not kept easily as Taipei struggled with Beijing's continuing attempts at seeking names that would imply that the island country was a part of China. For instance, under pressure from Beijing in 1983, the International Olympic Committee changed Taiwan's membership in the Olympic Games to "Chinese Taipei," and imposed a newly designed "Olympic Flag" rather than letting athletes bear the national flag of the ROC. Similar struggles occurred in other INGOs and IGOs, including the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Taipei's official policy in the 1980s was to make a distinction between nongovernmental and governmental organizations. It tolerated the name change in the former, as in the Olympic Games, but rejected the alteration of its official designations in the latter, as shown by its withdrawal from the Interpol and boycotting of the ADB annual meetings in 1986 and 1987.47
After Lee succeeded Chiang as president, he took the view that the substance of independent membership mattered more than the formalism of the name.48 Claiming that the ROCOT needed to be internationally visible, the Taipei government actively pursued all opportunities to participate in international organizations and activities. Thus, Taipei resumed its attendance of ADB's annual meeting in 1988 and joined the APEC under the name of "Taipei, China" in 1991. Taiwan also applied for memberships in GATT/WTO (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization)49 in 1990 under the name of "the Separate Tariff Territories of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu Islands."
The most daring move by the Lee administration to expand the ROCOT's "international space" was its repeated attempts at UN membership, beginning in 1993.50 This foreign policy initiative and many of its justifications were co-opted from the then opposition DPP and, therefore, received wide bipartisan support on the island. Specifically, Taipei based (and has continued to base) its claim that the Republic of China has been a sovereign state since its foundation in 1912 and remains so to this day, having continuously maintained a permanent population, defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states. Since the Beijing government never has exercised control over these territories since its establishment in 1949, it can hardly claim representation of the island's twenty-one million people at the UN. In addition, the ROC has a strong and well-developed economy and holds the second largest foreign exchange reserves in the world. As a nation with the world's twelfth largest economy and fourteenth largest trade volume, the ROC has become a vital part of a growing global trade network. Therefore, Taipei has asked the international community to recognize the ROC as an independent and sovereign state alongside the PRC.51
The Effects of Pragmatic Diplomacy
After more than a decade-long implementation of "pragmatic diplomacy," Taipei has been able to maintain, and in fact increase, its number of diplomatic allies. As Table 5 demonstrates, the number of countries that recognized Taipei increased from twenty-two in 1988, to thirty-one in 1996, and fell to twenty-eight in 2000. Some have argued that the sheer number of countries that have formal ties with the ROC is just a matter of "saving face" since the majority of Taipei's allies are politically insignificant actors in the international community since Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and South Africa switched their diplomatic recognition to Beijing.52 Because a capacity of entering into relations with other states is one of the essential qualifications of statehood, in addition to a permanent population, a defined territory, and a government, the size of this "number" has become an indicator of the island country's international as well as domestic legitimacy. As noted, through handsome foreign aid programs, Taipei was able to "buy" diplomatic ties from many so-called micro-states with tiny populations, such as Nauru and Tuvalu, each with little more than 10,000, people and Saint Christopher and Nevis with a population of 42,500. Since about ten of those countries that recognize the ROC have a total population of no more than one million, or less than half of the population of Taipei City, Taiwan could pay them off indefinitely, if necessary. The inability of Beijing's leaders to completely stop Taipei's controversial but effective foreign policy strategy may explain their angry denouncement of its "dollar diplomacy" even though they also have used monetary incentives to consolidate China's ties with developing countries.53
Taipei's annual bids to join the UN and IGOs have little chance of success considering Beijing's powerful influence in the international community. These attempts, however futile they may seem, have served propaganda purposes as they publicized Taipei's claims that the ROCOT is an independent and sovereign state and deserves a right to participate in the world community. Through annual applications for UN membership, Taipei has put the Beijing government on the defensive and created opportunities to engage Beijing in public debate about the so-called "Taiwan question." However, Chinese leaders have refused to participate lest it provide Taipei with international legitimacy.54 As Taipei's bids for IGO membership have little to lose but enjoy significant domestic support, one can expect that this foreign policy initiated by President Lee will continue. Indeed, the DPP government has launched two campaigns for membership in the UN since Chen Shuibian's swearing in as Taiwan's president.55
Probably the most important effect of Lee's "pragmatic diplomacy" is the creation of Taiwan's increasingly complex interdependence with the international community. Despite the fact that it was recognized diplomatically by only about thirty countries throughout the 1990s, Taiwan has maintained trade and investment relations with more than one hundred nations around the world. Its "unofficial" representative offices have spread across the globe and perform the functions of embassies in all but name. Through arms purchases and negotiations, Taipei was able to build a web of relationships with the Western industrialized countries. As China is increasingly open to and thus connected with the international community, the creation of these complex and interdependent relationships by Taipei constitute what has been called "situational deterrence." That is, "[a]n assault on Taiwan would harm the PRC economically and damage Beijing's relationships with Taiwan's global network of political and economic partners."56
Finally, as a result of the emphasis on the ROC on Taiwan along with the creation of a political label known as "New Taiwanese" in an attempt to transcend ethnic boundaries and reduce ethnic tensions,57 Lee's "pragmatic diplomacy" significantly changed Taiwanese citizens' national identity. Survey results show that more than 40 percent of the island's citizens considered themselves Taiwanese in 2000, a substantial surge from 16.7 percent in 1992. By contrast, the percentage of people who saw themselves as Chinese dropped from 44 percent in 1992 to about 14 percent in 2000.58 This change in national identity signifies the revival of the long-suppressed Taiwanese nationalism which is in direct conflict with the Chinese nationalism upheld by the KMT government under the Chiangs' authoritarian rule. In the terminology of Chinese nationalism, the word "China" is a term that represents a culture, a nation, and a state. To be Chinese implies not only belonging to a particular ethnic and cultural group, but also to the political identity of the Chinese state known as Zhong-guo. Proponents of Chinese nationalism consider Taiwanese to be Chinese and Taiwan an integral part of China. The eventual unification of the island with the Chinese mainland is thus regarded as both natural and inevitable. Those who espouse Taiwanese nationalism, by contrast, challenge the idea that Taiwan is a part of China. They argue that the century-long separation of Taiwan from the Chinese mainland has created a Taiwanese culture distinct from that of the Chinese mainland. Consequently, they reject the idea that Taiwan and China are one nation and that all Chinese must be ruled by a single government within the same state. The revival of Taiwanese nationalism along with rapid democratization on the island have led to strong support for the Taiwan independence movement, especially among DPP members. These developments were perceived by Beijing leaders as Lee's malicious attempt to split Taiwan from the "motherland."59
Despite the fact that some of these effects may have contributed to international recognition of Taiwan's de facto independence, Lee's foreign policy strategy had its limitations. The key objective of "pragmatic diplomacy" was to escape the straightjacket of the "one China" principle so that Taiwan's de jure independence and sovereignty could be recognized by the international community. With asymmetric national power across the Taiwan Strait and Beijing's unyielding stand on "one China," Taipei was able to solicit only a few states for official ties and most of them were politically insignificant, providing little more than symbolic help to Taiwan's quest for international legitimacy. After all, the principal consideration of a government's decision on diplomatic recognition is political rather than legal.' Few states are willing to offend a Beijing that is politically, militarily, and economically powerful. These include even the world's major powers such as Japan and the countries of Western Europe.61 This is why Taipei could not make much progress, except by buying friendship from some small and weak Third World countries. While money talks, as some observers noted, the diplomatic recognition that Taipei "bought" through "dollar diplomacy" is highly unstable.62 Many Third World countries take advantage of the cross-Strait bidding game for legitimacy by selling their "friendship" to the highest bidder. Niger's switching sides twice in five years for economic gains testifies to the volatility of Taipei's diplomatic "successes."63 The short-lived formal ties between Taiwan and Papua New Guinea (PNG) in 1999, after Taipei's failure to meet PNG's hope of receiving $2.5 billion in aid, is another case in point.64 Macedonia's change of diplomatic allegiance to Beijing in June of 2001, after formal ties with Taiwan for only eighteen months, demonstrates that economic interests are not the only consideration in shaping a government's response to the "one-China" issue.65 These unstable results contributed to the controversy surrounding Lee's emphasis on economic incentives for diplomatic gains.66
Lee's aggressive diplomatic strategy also caused concerns in the international community, especially in the United States. Beijing's unyielding stand on the "one-China" issue, backed by military threats, suggests that any move by Taipei toward what Chinese leaders consider a separatist attempt would be disastrous. Countries in the Asia-Pacific region, North America, and Europe see that maintenance of the status quo can best serve their interests as well as the interests of the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Through the maintenance of the status quo, these countries can "acknowledge" or "note" Beijing's sovereign claim over Taiwan, while continuing to deal with the island country as a separate political entity. In the eyes of foreign leaders, Taipei's active pursuit of international legitimacy clearly runs the danger of inviting an aggressive response from Beijing. In an apparent attempt to send a strong signal to the Taipei government, former President Bill Clinton publicly announced the "three no's" policy" toward Taiwan in 1998, which was widely interpreted as a severe rebuff to Lee's aggressive policies. The concern over a possible military conflict may also explain why Lee's "two states theory" received so little favorable reaction from the international community. Instead, he was labeled as a "trouble maker," and some US congressmen even denounced him for undermining US-China relations when they were at a sensitive time following NATO's bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.68
Conclusions
Judging from the expansion of the island country's foreign relations network between 1988 and 2000, one can conclude that Taipei's "pragmatic diplomacy" implemented by the Lee administration enjoyed some measure of success. By creating a complex web of functional interdependence through foreign aid programs, trade and investment, arms purchases, and the exercise of informal diplomacy, Taiwan maintained a high profile in the international community and its de facto independence generally was recognized. As a democratically elected leader, Lee's persistent quest for Taiwan's international legitimacy therefore alerted the world community to the fact that the twenty-one million residents of the island were no longer willing to tolerate imposed isolation from Beijing.
It appears that Lee set the course for Taipei's foreign policy and that the quest for the island country's legitimacy will continue in the years to come. As noted, the implementation of "pragmatic diplomacy" was a response to Taiwanese citizens' demand for international legitimacy and received wide support on the island. Since the ROCOT has become a full-fledged democracy, any political leader on the island must now pursue policies that will win the majority's support in such an important area or run the risk of becoming politically irrelevant. Indeed, the incumbent DPP government which succeeded the Lee administration in May 2000 has continued the implementation of "pragmatic diplomacy" in its pursuit for Taiwan's international legitimacy, as demonstrated by, among other efforts, its campaign for UN membership. Even if James Soong, commonly considered the most pro-unification candidate in the 2000 presidential election, had been elected, he would have had to pursue this line of foreign policy. This is why Beijing leaders are so angry at Lee personally and have repeatedly attempted to prevent him from visiting foreign countries even after his departure from office.69
Since both Beijing and Taipei are seeking to change Taiwan's legal status which is currently unacceptable to each other, tensions across the Taiwan Strait cannot be avoided. The international community, especially the United States, "can act as a restraining factor in militating against precipitant action by especially the PRC," as one observer pointed out.70 Taipei, however, needs to avoid being perceived as unduly provocative lest it be blamed for possible cross-Strait military conflicts or forced into negotiations with Beijing in which its fate would be beyond its own control.
1 In an interview taped for ABC's "Good Morning America," President George W. Bush said Washington would do "whatever it took" to defend Taiwan. This statement has been viewed as a significant departure from the longstanding policy of "strategic ambiguity" - in which the United States has expressed a strong interest in Taiwan's security, while avoiding an outright promise to defend it in war. See, "Sparing Ambiguity, Bush Vows to Defend Taiwan," New York Times, April 25, 2001,
2 Zhong-guo Shi-Bao (China Times), May 9, 1989, p. 2, cited from Qiu Han-cheng, "Lun Wu-shi Wai-jiao yu Liang-an Guan-xi," (Pragmatic diplomacy and cross-Strait relations) Zhong-guo Da-Lu (Chinese Mainland) 25, no. 2 (1992): 25.
3 At the end of 1960, forty-one countries had diplomatic relations with the PRC, while the ROC had fifty-six allies around the world.
4 T.Y. Wang, "State Policy and Industrial Promotion in Taiwan: An Interrupted Time Series Analysis, 1956-1994," International Journal of Public Administration 23, no.10 (2000): 1749-76.
5 Julian Baum, "Virtual Reality: Moves to Rejoin UN, Recognize Mongolia," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 3, 1993, 15.
6 T.Y. Wang, "`One China, One Taiwan': An Analysis of the Democratic Progressive Party's China Policy," Journal of Asian and African Studies 35 (2000): 159-82.
7 See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, "Why We Must Contain China," Time, July 31, 1995, 72, and Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "China I: The Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs 76, no.2 (March/April 1997): 1832. For an analysis of various arguments on the "China threat," see Denny Roy, "The `China Threat' Issue," Asian Survey 36, no.8 (August 1996): 758-71.
8 "President Lee Reiterates One China Policy, Outlines Realism," Central News Agency, May 8, 1989,
9 See "Statement of His Excellency Chow Shu-kai, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China on His Government's Withdrawal from the United Nations," in China Yearbook: 1971-72 (Taipei: China Publishing Co., n.d.): 801-4.
10 The Taipei government showed some flexibility in its foreign policy posture in the 1980s as Taiwan was increasingly isolated internationally. For instance, Taipei compromised on the subject of its formal name as the ROC and
sent a team to the 1984 Olympics game in Los Angeles as "Taipei, China." Taipei also managed to retain full membership in the Asian Development Bank under the new designation "Taipei, China." See The Republic of China Yearbook, 199091 (Taipei: Kwang Hwa Publishing Company, 1990), 225.
11 Dennis Hickey, Taiwan's Security in the Changing International System (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997), 114.
12 The Government Information Office, Looking Beneath the Surface of the "One China" Question (Taipei: The Executive Yuan, Taiwan, 1997).
13 "ROC Terminates Hostilities towards Peking," Free China Journal, May 2, 1991, p.1.
14 "Responses to Questions Submitted by Deutsche Welle," July 9, 1999, transcript supplied by Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Chicago. Also see, the Mainland Affairs Council, "Parity, Peace, and Win-Win: The Republic of China's Position on the `Special State-to-State Relationship'," August 1, 1999,
15 "Despite Beijing's Displeasure, Latvia Plans to Establish Ties with Taiwan," U.P.L, September 17, 1992,
16 Hungdah Chiu, "The International Legal Status of the Republic of China," in Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs 8 (1988/89): 1-19.
17 The Republic of China Yearbook 2000 (CD-ROM) (Taipei: Government Information Office, 2000), and The Republic of China Yearbook 1990-91, 226.
18 Examples include the Trade Mission of the Republic of China in Bahrain and in Mauritius, the Trade Mission of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in Nigeria, and the Commercial Office of the Republic of China in Jordan.
19 Examples included the Association of East Asian Relations in Japan (before 1992), the Coordination Council for North American Affairs in the US (before 1994), the Far East Trading Co. in Australia (before 1991), and the Institute of Chinese Culture in Austria (before 1992). By 1999, thirteen of Taipei's missions abroad were identified as representing the Republic of China, while eighty-five used names containing the word "Taipei." See, The Republic of China Yearbook 2000.
20 "Business and Pleasure," Far Eastern Economic Review, January 20, 1994, 9.
21 The Republic of China Yearbook 2000, and The Republic of China Yearbook 1999 (Taipei: Kwang Hwa Publishing Company, 1999), 153.
22 Gerald Chan, "Taiwan as an Emerging Foreign Aid Donor: Developments, Problems, and Prospects," Pacific Affairs 70 (Spring 1997): 37-56, and Wei-chin Lee, "Taiwan's Foreign Aid Policy," Asian Affairs: An American Review 20, no.1 (1993): 43-62.
23 Julian Baum, "Fast Friends: Lee's Tour Staves Off International Isolation," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 9, 1994, 18.
24 "Macedonia Switches Diplomatic Ties from Taipei to Beijing," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June 18, 2001,
25 Julian Baum and Matt Forney, "Dollar Diplomacy: Beijing, Taipei Woo African States with Cash," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 6, 1996, 22.
26 Marsali Mackinnon and Julian Baum, "Island Hopping: Taipei's Campaign for Diplomatic Recognition Stumbles," Far Eastern Economic Review, August 19, 1999, 26.
27 The Republic of China Yearbook 1990-91, 259.
28 Julian Baum, "Let's Tango: Taipei Asks Investors to Back Its Diplomatic Goals," Far Eastern Economic Review, October 9, 1997, 29.
29 Virginia Sheng, "Lien's Trip Improves Sooutheast Asian Ties," Free China Journal, January 7, 1994, 1, and Virginia Sheng, "Lee Talks Trade on 'Holiday' to Southeast Asian Nations," Free China Journal, February 18, 1994, 1.
30 The Republic of China Yearbook 1989 (Taipei: Kwang Hwa Publishing Company, 1989), 239, and The Republic of China Yearbook 1993 (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1993), 179-80.
31 The Republic of China Yearbook 1999, 152.
32 These high-level officials included French Minister of Foreign Trade Jean-Noel Jeanneney and US Trade Representative Carla A. Hills.
33 See, Laura Li, "Contractual Relations: Economic and Foreign Relations in the Six-Year Plan," Sinorama 18, no.2 (February 1993), 21.
34 Mainland Affairs Council, Liang-An Ching-chi Tung-chi Yueh-Pao (Monthly Report on Cross-Straits Economy) no.101 (January 2001), 18, 24.
35 The Republic of China Yearbook 2000.
36 Mainland Affairs Council, Monthly Report on Cross-Straits Economy, no.101, 22, 24.
37 Julian Baum, "Prepare to Surface," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 4, 1993, 10-11, and Barbara Opall, "Taipei Considers Compact Subs," Defense News, September 8-14, 1997, 1, 40.
38 Harlan W. Jencks, "Taiwan in the International Arms Market," in Taiwan in World Affairs, ed. Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 73-111, and Wei-chin Lee, "Desperately Seeking Fighters: Taiwan's Military Aircraft Deals," Pacific Focus 8, no.2 (Fall 1993): 14162.
39 "Taiwan to Buy French Missiles and Other Weapons," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 20, 1995,
40 Julian Baum, "Prepare to Surface."
41 T.Y. Wang, "US Arms Sales Policy towards Taiwan: A Review of Two Decades of Implementation," in United States, China, and Taiwan: Bridges for the New Millennium, ed. Paul H. Tai (Carbondale, IL: Public Policy Institute, Southern Illinois University, 1999), 115-41.
42 T.Y. Wang, "Taiwan and Theater Missile Defense," Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 25, no.3 (Fall 2000): 259-83.
43 See, "Admiral Dennis C. Blair Briefs on U.S. Pacific Command," Department of Defense News Briefing, March 7, 2000,
44 Bill Gertz, "Chinese Bases near Taiwan Sport Defense Missiles," Washington Times, March 28, 2000,
45 Jencks, "Taiwan in the International Arms Market," 95.
46 These IGOs included the Asian Development Bank, the International Cotton Advisory Committee, Asian Productivity Organization, Afro-Asian Rural Reconstruction Organization, and Inter-American Development Bank. See The Republic of China Yearbook, 1991-92 (Taipei: Kwang Hwa Publishing Company, 1990), 116, and Michael Yahuda, "The International Standing of the Republic of China on Taiwan," in Contemporary Taiwan, ed. David Shambaugh (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), Table 2, 284.
47 Gerald Chan, China and International Organizations: Participation in
Non-Governmental Organization Since 1971 (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1989), 159-62.
48 Yahuda, "The International Standing of the Republic of China on Taiwan," 285.
49 The World Trade Organization succeeded the GATT in 1995.
50 Free China Journal, August 13, 1993, p. 1, and July 22, 1994, p.2.
51 See, ROC Government Information Office, "The Now Silent Partner in the Founding of the UN - The Republic of China on Taiwan: After 50 Years, the UN Still Has Unfinished Business," June 1995,
52 See, Frank Ching, "China Adds to Taipei's Isolation," Far Eastern Economic Review, January 29, 1998, 30.
53 For instance, in an attempt to counter the mid-1990s "crisis" of African states recognizing Taiwan, Beijing provided hefty loans and aid to countries in the region, including a $13 million soft loan to Kenya, a $51 million loan to Egypt, and a $10 million soft loan and a $1.2 million grant to Zimbabwe. See, Baum and Forney, "Dollar Diplomacy."
54 Yahuda, "The International Standing of the Republic of China on Taiwan," 294.
55 Jennifer Huang and Victor Lai, "ROC to Kickoff Outdoor Ad Campaign in New York City for U.N. Entry," Central News Agency, September 1, 2001,
56 Jencks, "Taiwan in the International Arms Market," 74.
57 Hsin-hsin Yang, "Taiwan President Urges Shared Identity with `New Taiwanese,"' Agence France Presse, December 2, 1998,
58 Survey results from the Mainland Affair Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, in
59 The Taiwan Affairs Office and the Information Office of the State Council, The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue, in People's Daily, February 21, 2000,
60 Chiu, "The International Legal Status of the Republic of China."
61 Indeed, the Japanese government's refusal to issue a visa to Lee to attend a conference in Japan even after his departure from office clearly speaks of Tokyo's caution to not offend Beijing. "Confab on Japan-Taiwan Relations Opens in Lee's Absence," Japan Economic Newswire, October 29, 2000,
62 Linjun Wu, "Does Money Talk? The ROC's Economic Diplomacy," Issues and Studies 31, no.12 (December 1995): 22-35; Lee, "Taiwan's Foreign Aid Policy."
63 Niger resumed formal ties with the ROC in 1992 and then switched its diplomatic recognition to Beijing in 1996. See, "Taiwan `Deeply Regrets' Niger's `Submission to Communist China's Threats,"' BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 22, 1996,
64 The ROC and the PNG established diplomatic relations on July 5, 1999. Only fifteen days later, Port Moresby withdrew its diplomatic recognition of Taipei. "Taiwan, Papua New Guinea Set up Full Diplomatic Ties," AAP NEWSFEED, July 6, 1999, and "Relations as Usual," Asiaweek, July 30, 1999. Both are in
65 Using its veto power on the extension of a UN peacekeeping force in the former Yugoslav Republic, Beijing finally compelled Skopje to switch its formal recognition from Taiwan in June of 2001. "Taiwan Cuts Diplomatic Ties with Macedonia," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June 18, 2001,
66 Chan, "Taiwan as an Emerging Foreign Aid Donor," 37-56; and Lee, "Taiwan's Foreign Aid Policy," 43-62.
67 The exact wording by President Clinton was "that we don't support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan-one China. And we don't believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement." See, White House, "Remarks by the President and the First Lady in Discussion on Shaping China for the 21" Century," Shanghai Library, Shanghai, China, June 30, 1998, http:; see also, Washington Post, June 30, 1998, p.A12.
68 Julian Baum, "Troublesome Friend," Far Eastern Economic Review, October 28, 1999, 22.
69 For instance, Beijing leaders launched campaigns against Lee's visits to Japan, Great Britain, and the US. See, "China Reaffirms Opposition to Former Taiwan President's Foreign Visits," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 21, 2000, and "China Slams Japan, US over Lee Visits," Agence France Presse, April 24, 2001. Both are in
70 Yahuda, "The International Standing of the Republic of China on Taiwan," 295.
T.Y. Wang
Illinois State University
* This research is supported by a grant from the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference on "Taiwan under Lee Teng-hui (1988-2000): An Era of Democratization in Retrospect and Prospect," Wake Forest University, September 14-15, 2001. The author would like to thank Quansheng Zhao and an anonymous referee of this journal for their helpful comments. All errors are my own.
Copyright Institute of Asian Studies Spring 2002