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The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 turned out to be-contrary to the expectations of the Kremlin leadership-the largest, longest, and costliest military operation in Soviet history. The United States, in support of the Afghan resistance, waged an exceedingly elaborate, expensive, and ultimately successful covert war. Unlike other proxy wars in Africa and South America, for the first time ever, the United States supported a guerrilla army firing on Soviet troops. With Pakistan's General Zia-ul-Haq as America's foremost ally and Saudi Arabia as the principal source of funds, the CIA openly recruited Islamic holy warriors from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Algeria. Radical Islam went into overdrive as its superpower ally and mentor funneled support to the mujahideen. In 1988 Soviet troops withdrew unconditionally and U.S.-Pakistan-Saudi-Egypt alliance emerged victorious. A chapter of history seemed complete.
Appearances were illusory, however, and events over the next two decades were to reveal the true costs of the victory. Even in the mid-1990s -long before the 9/11 attack on the United States-was clear that the victorious alliance had unwittingly created a dynamic now beyond its control. The network of Islamic militant organizations created primarily out of the need to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan did not disappear after the immediate goal was achieved but, instead, like any good military-industrial complex, grew from strength to strength. It now exists with extensive transnational cooperation, coordination, and close ties. Indeed these non-state actors have repeatedly targeted their former sponsors, as well as other states and governments globally-Pakistan, India, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Philippines, Indonesia, Russia, and the United States have been attacked in recent times.
Prologue to the Soviet Invasion
Building upon the crumbled edifice of European colonialism, the United States had emerged as a superpower at the end of the Second World War with vast global strategic and economic interests. Desolate and tribal, Afghanistan was of only marginal interest. Although there were some attempts to increase U.S. influence through economic aid in the early 1950s this dry, mountainous and barren land was understood to have no significant strategic or economic value. Indeed, there had been implicit acceptance of Afghanistan as belonging to the Soviet sphere of influence. For example, in the Eisenhower era, secretary of State John Foster Dulles had...