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Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure. By Bruce D. Jones. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. 200p. $49.95.
Barbara F. Walter, University of California, San Diego
By almost all indicators, Rwanda's civil war should have ended in a successful negotiated settlement. Both the Tutsi rebels and the Rwandan government had agreed to participate in negotiations brokered by a team of Tanzanian mediators whom most people considered highly skilled. The two parties to the negotiations were able to reach and sign a detailed peace settlement that guaranteed both parties representation in the legislature and a set percentage of slots in the military. And the United Nations offered to "guarantee" the security of the two sides during the implementation period. Almost all factors purported to lead to a peaceful solution were present at the time the Arusha accords were signed in 1994. Rwanda's civil war, however, did not end peacefully. Instead, a peace process that seemingly had all the elements of success ended in one of the most rapid genocides in recorded history.
Bruce Jones attempts to explain this puzzle in his wellresearched book on the subject. Why did the Rwandan peace process fail despite the efforts of so many international and regional actors? And what can the international community learn from this failure? Existing explanations for the failed peace process and subsequent genocide tend to fall into two camps. Journalists have tended to...