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Positive effects of campaign spending on electoral outcomes have been found in several comparative, multiparty contexts, but very few of these systems use proportional representation. The few studies examining spending effects in multiparty elections have found that incumbent spending is no less effective than challenger spending, contrary to the vast bulk of empirical literature drawn from single-member district contexts. This study reexamines incumbent-challenger differences in spending effects under the single transferable vote. Examining the Irish general elections of 2002, the authors find a positive and statistically significant relationship between spending and votes. Candidates that spend more win more votes, and outspending one's rivals means winning more of the vote share. Spending more also directly increases a candidate's chance of winning a seat. Finally, incumbent spending is considerably less effective than spending by challengers from other parties but no less effective than spending by challengers from a candidate's own party.
Keywords: campaign spending; campaign finance; Ireland; single transferable vote
The relationship between campaign spending and electoral success has been the subject of much attention in political science, focusing mainly on studies of the U.S. Congress (e.g., Erickson and Palfrey 1998; Green and Krasno 1988; Jacobson 1980, 1985, 1990) but extending increasingly to other national contexts. While scholars continue to debate certain issues, such as whether differences exist in spending effects between incumbents and challengers (see Stratmann 2005), the question is no longer whether money matters, but only how much it matters (Cox and Thies 2000, 40). More specifically, previous research into campaign spending effects has yielded two main findings. First, spending is positively linked to the electoral success of candidates, although previous studies have investigated this effect predominantly in single-member district systems, such as the United States, Britain (Johnston and Pattie 1995), Canada (Carty and Eagles 1999; Eagles 1993), Australia (Forrest 1997; Forrest, Johnston, and Pattie 1999), and France (Palda and Palda 1998). Second, most studies have found that incumbent spending is less effective than challenger spending (Abramowitz 1988, 1991; Ansolabehere and Gerber 1994; Green and Krasno 1988; Jacobson 1990; Denver and Hands 1997), with some (e.g., Jacobson 1985, Ansolabehere and Gerber 1994) even documenting a zero return on incumbent spending. The argument, first elaborated by Jacobson (1978, 479), is that incumbents are already "saturated"...