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Abstract
In the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics, I find that Aristotle endorses two distinct forms of political activity. The first form, which I term statesman activity, is intrinsically valuable. Aristotle thinks that we should value this kind of political activity because it is constitutive of human well-being. The second form, which I term officeholder activity, is instrumentally valuable. Aristotle thinks that we should value this kind of political activity on account of its contributions to experiential knowledge (ϵµπϵí&rgr;íα). I argue that officeholder activity is a necessary condition for the achievement of practical virtue. The reason for this, so I argue, is that it is only through this form of political activity that persons may acquire experience of laws and constitutions. Aristotle’s ethical agent must be politically activity at an early point in his life if he is to become good. In order to defend these theses, I provide a new account of the development of experience from perception. I claim that if someone is to (i) become a good judge of craft x and (ii) acquire experience of craft x, then they must participate in activities essential to craft x. I find support for this new account in Aristotle’s discussion of music at Politics VIII.6 and in his description of perfect friendship. Finally, I offer a new reading of collective judgement at Politics III.11. This text is often thought to conflict with Aristotle’s other remarks on judgement and experience. Against this view, I argue that this text is best understood as an argument against expertise. I find that Aristotle is committed to the idea that each agent party to a collective judgement must themselves be experienced
