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Everything has come to the point of explosion from the inside, because of bad policies, state terrorism, and torture,15 Mayor Yildinm told reporters.16 The government has also announced plans to forcibly relocate the inhabitants of several Kurdish areas.17 Armed clashes stepped up during April, with 21 guerillas being killed and 15 wounded at Oymakkaya, near the Syrian border.18 By mid- April 100 people had been killed in the course of the uprising. President Özal was permitted by opposition parties to simply bypass parliament when he issued his emergency measures to put down the Kurdish rebellion recendy.20 He then convened an extraordinary summit on 2 April to discuss the Kurdish crisis.\n39 An alternative strategy to guerilla warfare for those seeking Kurdish selfdetermination in Turkey would seem to be an alliance with other social layers claiming to be exploited behind the leadership of a social force with the ability to stop the country in its tracks and thus act as a lightning rod for the fight of all exploited social layers.
AN UPRISING IN THE TURKISH SECTION of Kurdistan, which began in midMarch this year,1 has had serious effects on many aspects of politics in Turkey as a whole. This paper will briefly examine some of the most important of those effects and discuss their ramifications for Kurdish nationalists.
The uprising began on 12 March, following a batde between PKK guerillas and Turkish troops in the district of Savur in Mardin province. Some 40 troops and 13 guerillas were killed in the clash. During the batde, helicopters bombed fields adjacent to the village.2
The battle occurred at the start of Newroz, the Kurdish New Year. For Kurds, Newroz has for millennia been the most important annual national celebration. It is a celebration of life, and the elusive goal of freedom, as well as of the new year. For the Kurds, Newroz symbolises their yearning for national self-determination. The coincidence of the particularly savage batde in Mardin province with Newroz sparked a regional uprising.
On 14 March five thousand people in the city of Nusaybin demonstrated at the funeral of Kamuran Dundar, a guerilla killed at the earlier battle of Savur. Turkish special units attacked the funeral, killing a 22-year-old man, Semsettin Çifri, and causing a stampede in which a little girl was trampled to death. More than 700 people were arrested and tens of demonstrators were wounded by troops.3
Protests were organised the following day in Nusaybin. Workers struck, shops remained shut, and students boycotted schools and colleges. Demonstrators fought security forces on the streets of Nusaybin. During the following week, both the Dundar and Çifti families said that troops beat up visitors arriving to offer condolences, insulted them and called them Jews and Armenians.4
Mass solidarity demonstrations were quickly organised across Turkish Kurdistan and even in Turkey itself. Almost 1,000 demonstrators were arrested, including in Ankara and Istanbul. General strike action spread throughout Mardin province.5 A solidarity demonstration was also organised by the inhabitants of Qamishli in Syrian Kurdistan.6
A 15,000-strong demonstration of residents in Cizre in Mardin province (a town with only 30,000 people) was attacked by army and police special units during March. Many people were wounded in apparently indiscriminate shooting by the state's forces and one demonstrator was crushed to death beneath a tank. Over 80 people were injured and hundreds arrested. State hospitals reportedly refused to treat the wounded.7
Nevertheless the rebellion continued in Cizre. Turkish flags and statues of Kemal Atatürk (to the Kurds a symbol of colonialism, like Cromwell to Irish nationalists) were destroyed. Offices of the ruling political party and a government MP were stoned, and the latter's car set on fire. Some government offices were burned down and shops staged a commercial strike.8
The protests in Cizre were among the most widespread in Mardin province that day, but they were not isolated; similar events took place throughout the province. At least five people were killed by authorities in the course of these demonstrations. Nationalist guerillas claim to have controlled the roads outside Cizre on this day, to prevent the entry of Turkish military reinforcements. Guerillas also say they attacked nearby military and strategic commercial targets.9
Other solidarity action during March included hunger strikes by 500 political prisoners in Diyarbakir (who were later joined in their strike by their relatives) and by 100 political prisoners in Van and in Antep. University students in Dicle, Istanbul, Ankara, Eskisehir and in Erzurum also staged demonstrations.10
Turkish authorities reacted vigorously. A state of war was declared, and food supplies into the rebellious area were stopped. Demonstrations continued to be met with strong state violence and 200 relatives, friends and supporters (including children) of Kurdish political prisoners were beaten by police on 28 April. A recent visitor to this region asserts that the army often patrols streets wearing masks on their faces.11 The Turkish government is currently negotiating to buy six mountain-warfare helicopters from the United States, according to the same source.12
On 21 May prosecutors called for sentences of up to 10 years in jail for the 155 arrested for participating in the demonstration in Cizre.13 Turkey's already heavy-handed military censorship was also augmented considerably. Desperate to cover up its atrocities in occupied Kurdistan, the regime announced that any publications carrying reports deemed to be unhelpful to security forces would face massive fines. The popular columnist Mehmet Ali Birand has refused to publish his commentary on events in the newspaper Milliyet, in the face of this threat. Some opposition publications cannot now appear, as printers are too fearful of being penalised themselves. The editors of two leftist weeklies, ikibin'e Dogru and Emek, were arrested in late March for covering the Kurdish question. Foreign journalists and camera crews attempting to visit occupied Kurdistan have been banned from the region.14
The mayor of Nusaybin, who had described conditions in his town and admitted that people willingly participated in protest demonstrations, has been suspended from his post by President Özal. "There didn't even have to be a leader of the protests. Everything has come to the point of explosion from the inside, because of bad policies, state terrorism, and torture,"15 Mayor Yildinm told reporters.16 The government has also announced plans to forcibly relocate the inhabitants of several Kurdish areas.17
Armed clashes stepped up during April, with 21 guerillas being killed and 15 wounded at Oymakkaya, near the Syrian border.18 By mid- April 100 people had been killed in the course of the uprising. Semi-official figures for casualties in the war between guerillas and the Turkish military place deaths in the mountains at 74 for April and 90 for May.19
As usual, the Kurds have found no real allies in Turkey's parliament against this repression. President Özal was permitted by opposition parties to simply bypass parliament when he issued his emergency measures to put down the Kurdish rebellion recendy.20 He then convened an extraordinary summit on 2 April to discuss the Kurdish crisis. Present were the leader of the ruling Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi), Prime Minister Akbulut, Erdal inönü, Opposition leader and chairman of the Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçi Partisi) and Süleyman Demirel of the rightist True Path Party (Dogru YoI Partisi).21
This meeting revealed the limits of the Social Democrats' recent talk about infringements of the constitution; all present agreed upon the need to pacify the Kurds. All - including inönü - strongly support the government's hard line. "This is a matter of Turkish national interests," said inönü recendy. His party supports some measure of cultural rights being granted to the Kurds, but like all Turkish parliamentary parties, it opposes even the granting of autonomy status to the Kurdish region.22
A 36-page report issued by inönü's party in mid- July further confirmed this organisation's policy on the Kurdish problem. On the one hand the report eloquendy pleads for Kurds' right to "be allowed to accept their Kurdish identity ...and be able to freely express this identity." On the other hand, the report still refuses to accept the right of the Kurds to begin to solve their problems by exercising their right to self-determination.23
The small Demokratik Sol Partisi (Democratic Left Party), which claims to support the Kurdish people, is lead by veteran Turkish politician, Bülent Ecevit. However Ecevit's own track record does not inspire confidence among Kurdish nationalists. From 1973 to 1977 he was Prime Minister and leader of another party, the Republican People's Party. During that period, he first ruled in coalition with an extreme right wing Islamic fundamentalist party. Following his party's defeat in elections, Ecevit sought a coalition with Demirel's hard right party.
In a recent interview Ecevit indicated that he hopes for further opportunities to collaborate with these sworn opponents of Turkey's Kurds: "a coalition with the Social Democratic Populist Party would be quite possible and welcome, but also a coalition between any right wing and any left wing party would be welcome at this stage, in my view."24
A nominally more left wing alternative to this extreme pragmatism is the country's new legal pro-Soviet CP, the United Communist Party of Turkey (TBKP). The new party was officially founded on 4 June.25 Moves are afoot to ban the party, but at this stage the party is still allowed to function. Kurdish nationalists - including even many pro-Soviet Kurds - have little time for the new party or its predecessors, the TKP (Turkish Communist Party) and the TTP (Turkish Workers' Party), pointing out that it is because of the TBKP's refusal to confront the regime head on that it is permitted to function so easily, while all Kurdish organisations are firmly dealt with.26 Statements by party leaders that they intend to contribute to the stability of the regime add weight to this suspicion, in the eyes of many opposed to the Ankara government.27
In the face of this hostility by all the mainstream Turkish parliamentary and leftist parties, it is not surprising that Turkey's Kurds fall back on purely Kurdish political forces. A number of these exist, but they are all now apparentiy inconsequential in the face of the resurgent Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK). The PKK was formed in the mid-seventies and held its first conference in 1981.
The PKK claims to be Marxist and Leninist, but its ideology, strategy and tactics are a mixture of guerilla Stalinism and virulent nationalism. The organisation consciously fosters a Stalin-like personality cult around its leader, Abdullah Öcalan. The PKK is firmly wedded to a two-stage theory of revolutionary strategy, in which the first stage is the achievement of a united democratic and independent Kurdistan (including the current Kurdish regions of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria). Only after this is achieved, says the PKK, can the struggle for socialism be started.
Some indication of just how far socialism will be in the future according to this perspective was recently given by Öcalan in an interview with Hürriyet newspaper. Öcalan explained: "There's no question of separating from Turkey. My people need Turkey: we can't split for at least 40 years...unity will bring strength."28 The PKK leader also renewed calls for cease-fire negotiations with the Turkish regime.
The reality is that the Kurds throughout the Middle East will not have 40 years to peacefully develop a stable and prosperous capitalist economy. As the Turkish regime has shown once again by its response to the events during and since March, it is quite prepared to mistreat the Kurds rather than give in to them. And, as we have seen, the rest of Turkish mainstream politics is hardly any different. Like its Iraqi counterparts, the Turkish government has recendy begun using chemical weapons against the Kurds. It may yet accede to the prompting of certain ultra-right wing factions in Turkish politics and attempt a bloody "final solution" to its Kurdish problem - probably with direct assistance from NATO. The PKK's strategy is an illusion.
After years of fighting, the PKK is at last making some headway militarily. But even to win on this front, it will need to secure the support of the majority of the productive classes in Turkey - who are overwhelmingly Turkish. (Kurds make up only 20% of the Turkish state's total population.) The key to smashing the military apparatus which Kurdish nationalists identify as their opponent is arguably held by the country's very large working class.
During March 1989 the workers showed they were regaining their self-confidence, with a brief wave of strikes. This was the most important indication that the repressive effects of the 1980 military coup were beginning to wear off.
Since that time, workers have continued to take action over economic issues and for union rights, such as at the Seka paper mills, at the Aselan works, in the steel strike, and in hundreds of other actions. Now large workers' demonstrations are beginning to occur. In February this year in the important town of Adana, one S. Yilmaz, the leader of Turk Is, the pro-government union federation, was booed by workers. In March, thousands of workers demonstrated in Istanbul and Izmir against low pay, snouting (among other things) "workers unite for a general strike!" This is not an idle threat; talk about a general strike is widespread and has even been discussed by the daily Günaydin newspaper on its front page recendy. Workers are beginning to draw some militant lessons from previous experiences as well. They are reportedly quite suspicious of union bureaucrats; in Istanbul city workers set up a workers' committee under their own control.29
Thousands of workers were on strike during March alone. The daily Milliyet newspaper reported in mid-March that "32, 825 workers in the concrete mills and agriculture are preparing a strike," that "in the Goodyear tire factories the strike is already set up," and that the "Pirelli and Lassa factories have made the decision to go out on strike."30
The Middle East Times reports that tire production was effectively halted throughout the country when 1,200 workers at the Brisa factory joined strikes for higher pay by some 2,500 other workers at Turkey's other tire plants. The Brisa workers demanded nothing less than a 400% wage increase over two years and increased benefits. Thousands of workers seeking pay increases in the petroleum industry also implemented overtime bans throughout the country for an extended period beginning on 19 April.31
Figures released by the Turkish Labour Ministry show that the country lost twice as many work days through strikes in the first four months of 1990 as in the same period the previous yean "The number of work days lost to the end of April in 1990 totalled 694,097 with the number of workers joining strikes rising to 31,281 from 16.670."32
A Turkish leftist, Filiz Cetin, predicted in May 1990 that the tens of thousands of workers on strike at that time would "rise to over a hundred thousand in September."33
The workers have been denied many basic democratic rights for over a decade now, and their meagre standard of living is steadily becoming much worse. Even the meek (and generally pro-government) Turk Is union federation recently admitted that a working class family of four on the minimum wage needed to work two and a half mondi s to earn what would be enough for one month of basic living.34 The Governor of Turkey's central bank, Rüjdü Saraçoglu, revealed on 24 April that the country's inflation rate rose to 62.8% in March 1990, from 59.5% in February and 60% in January.35 Turkey's foreign debt grew from around $15 million in 1980 to more than $40 billion ten years later.36
Turkey's unfolding economic and political crisis has also propelled other social layers into action. Ten thousand peasants protested for over a week in February due to the low prices set for their tobacco crops by the government. Offices of the ruling Motherland Party were reportedly attacked in the demonstrations and the shops of tobacco merchants destroyed.37
Meanwhile, events elsewhere in the Middle East and in Eastern Europe are having an impact on Turkist politics as well. Turkey is NATO's largest military component; it is also the third largest ranking recipient of military aid (behind Israel and Egypt). The combined pressures of the wind-down of East- West confrontation in Europe and the sharp rise in tensions in the Gulf region have brought about changes in the strategic concerns of NATO commanders. Filiz Cetin reports:
The Turkish government has been informed that with the "Soviet threat" receding as a result of the recent international developments, Turkey must agree to play a more active role in the Middle East if it wants to keep its military aid at the present level.38
Turkey's enthusiastic economic and military participation in the current USinitiated economic blockade and military action against Iraq would seem to bear out this prediction, as did Turkey's earlier alacrity in seizing Iraq's alleged "nuclear cannon." But the Turkish government may have its own agenda for NATO as well. Cetin also claims that 'Turkey took the matter of the intifada in Kurdistan to NATO as a foreign threat against Turkish territory," and that "NATO and the US expressed deep concern over the developments."39
An alternative strategy to guerilla warfare for those seeking Kurdish selfdetermination in Turkey would seem to be an alliance with other social layers claiming to be exploited behind the leadership of a social force with the ability to stop the country in its tracks and thus act as a lightning rod for the fight of all exploited social layers. This could mean that such a solution requires the successful recomposition of the labour movement in the country as a whole. The instinctive response of Turkey's workers to the country's problems could point the way forward; a general strike of all workers in Turkey is certainly the next logical step in rebuilding their self-confidence and honing their combative skills.
Further evidence of the working class's combativity was provided on 1 May. On that day, thousands of workers and leftists attempted to hold a May Day rally in Taksim Square, Istanbul, fully aware that they would be forcibly prevented from doing this. The Helsinki Watch group reports:
Each year, some groups attempt to demonstrate; in 1989, one person was shot and killed by police. This year, Taksim Square was virtually sealed off. Labour and left wing groups tried to hold rallies near Taksim and in other areas; over 3,400 people were detained. Shots were fired in Istanbul, and four people were hospitalised. One, Gulay Beceren, a 20-year old university student, shot in the back and shoulder, was paralysed. As of May 10, 86 demonstrators had been formally arrested, and the rest released.40
Besieged on all sides, the government is plunging into a major political crisis. Support for the ruling party is now down to 7.9%, according to a recent opinion poll.41 To make matters worse for it, a three-way leadership struggle has erupted inside the government party.42
If the labour movement does lead the way to a revolutionary solution soon in Turkey and Turkey-Kurdistan, there is a force accruing forces in the wings which will. Politically ultra-conservative Islamic fundamentalists are organising again in Turkey and being quietly encouraged by the Iranian and Saudi governments, and even some in the Turkish ruling elite.43
The peak of political and military crisis sparked by the uprising centred in Mardin province now seems to have passed. Given the conditions in TurkeyKurdistan, of course, we can expect that such uprisings will recur repeatedly in the near future. The point is that one opportunity to unite the grievances of dissident Turks and Kurds was missed by Turkish and Kurdish radicals, when it could have been seized and built upon by these forces.
If another opportunity is not to be missed, a new political leadership will need to be constructed that understands the burning necessity for forging the unity of all the disaffected, and is not weighed-down by the deadly weights of nationalist narrow-mindedness and Stalinist conservatism.
1 See "Straggling With the Kurds" by Ken Mackenzie, Middle East International [hereafter MEI], No. 373, 13 April 1990, pp. 13-14; News from Helsinki Watch. News from Turkey, pp. 4-5; "An 'Intifada' in Turkey?" Human Rights in Turkey, No. 2, April 1990; "Popular Uprising in Kurdistan," Kurdistan Liberation No. 1, April 1990, pp. 5-6; "Kurds 'on the Point of Explosion,' " The Independent, 7 April 1990; "Regional Review" in the Middle East Times [hereafter MET] Vol. VIII, No. 14, 3-9 April 1990, p. 11 and "Separatist Rebels Step Up War of Liberation Against Turks" by Sami Kohen, in MET VIII, No. 13, 27 March 1990, p. 3.
2 "March is the Symbole [sic] of Freedom," in the Voice of Kurdistan No. 1, May 1990, p. 19. In "Criticism of Kurdish Policy Mounts, Rebel Attacks Intensify," in MET, Vol. VIII, No. 25, 19-25 June 1990, 13 March is given as the date of the uprising's beginning; I am using the date stated by PKK supporters, in the Voice of Kurdistan journal.
3 Kurdistan Liberation, op. cit., p. 5; Voice of Kurdistan, pp. 19-20 and "Uprising and Newroz. The Chronology of Actions" p. 20; MET, op. cit., 27 March 1990.
4 Hugh Pope, The Independent, op. cit.; Voice of Kurdistan, "Chronology ...," p. 20; Human Rights in Turkey, op. cit., p. 1 and Kurdistan Liberation, p. 5.
5 News From Helsinki Watch, p. 4; Pope, The Independent, 7 April, 1990; Human Rights in Turkey No. 2, 1990, pp. 1-2 and Kurdistan Liberation, April 1990, p. 5.
6 Kurdistan Liberation, April 1990, p. 5.
7 Kurdistan Liberation, April 1990, p. 5.
8 Kurdistan Liberation, April 1990, p. 5.
9 MET, op. cit., 27 March 1990, Voice of Kurdistan, May 1990, "Chronology...," p. 20 and Kurdistan Liberation, April 1990, p. 5.
10 Ken Mackenzie, "Struggling With the Kurds", in MEI, No. 373, 13 April, 1990; Voice of Kurdistan, May 1990, "Chronology ...," pp. 20-21 and Kurdistan Liberation, April 1990, p. 5. See also the "Regional Review," in MET Vol. VIH, No. 23, 5-11 June 1990, p. 11, which reports on repression of a hunger strike by Kurds in Diyarbakir.
11 See "Kurdish Uprising," an interview with one Sheri Laizer, co-ordinator of the Kurdistan Workers Association in London, who spent two weeks in Turkish Kurdistan during March 1990. Workers Press, 26 May 1990.
12 Workers Press, op. cit., 26 May 1990.
13 "Regional Notes," in MET, VoL. VIII, No. 22, 29 May-4 June 1990, p. 11.
14 News From Helsinki Watch, pp. 2-4; Ken Mackenzie, "Furor Over Ozal's Decree," in MEI, No. 374, 27 April 1990, p. 14; Human Rights in Turkey, "An 'Intifada' in Turkey?" and "4 Years Imprisonment for Newspaper Editor Sert," both in No. 2, p. 2.
15 Ken Mackenzie, "Straggling with the Kurds" in MEI, No. 373, 13 April 1990, p. 13 and "Furor Over Ozal's Decree" in MEI No. 374, 27 April, 1990, p. 14; Hugh Pope The Independent, op. cit.
16 Sami Kohen (MET, 27 March 1990) comments: "The escalation of demonstrations in south-east Turkey, with thousands of ordinary people taking part, suggests that the local population is gradually becoming sympathetic to Kurdish nationalist aspirations."
17 Ken Mackenzie, "Furor Over Ozal's Decree" in MEI No. 374, 27 April 1990, p. 14 and Sami Kohen, "Criticism of Kurdish Policy Mounts, Rebel Attacks Intensify," in MET, Vol. VIII No. 25, p. 3.
18 "Regional Notes" in MET, Vol. VIII, No. 16, 17-23 April 1990.
19 Ken Mackenzie, "Struggling with the Kurds," in MEI, No. 373, 13 April 1990, p. 13 and The Independent, op. cit.; "No End to the Violence" in MEI No. 378, 22 June 1990.
20 Ken Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 14.
21 Sami Kohen, "Violence and Separatism Leave No Options. Turkish Leaders Unite Against Kurdish Threat," in MET Vol. VIII, No. 15, 10-16 April 1990. See also Notes from Helsinki Watch, p. 5.
22 Sami Kohen, "Criticism of Kurdish Policy Mounts, Rebel Attacks Intensify," in MET, Vol. Vin No. 25, p. 3.
23 Hugh Pope, "Support for the Kurds"in MEI, No. 380, 20 July 1990, pp. 13-14.
24 See the interview with Ecevit by Thomas Cromwell, MET publisher, "State Ownership is no Longer a Prerequisite of Social Democracy," in MET 5-11, June 1990, pp. 1 and 14.
25 "Regional Review," MET, Vol. VIII, No. 24, 12-18 June 1990, p. 11.
26 "Regional Review," MET, Vol. VIII, No. 26, 26-2 July 1990, p. 11. Some of the TBKP's leftist critics point to Turkey's growing trade with the USSR and the Soviet Bloc in general, as at least part of the reason for Ankara's more tolerant attitude towards the TBKP. According to the MET, the head of Turkey's Eximbank said on 27 March that "his bank might extend SUS300 million in new credits to Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and Romania in the first half of 1990 and consumer credits to the Soviet Union this year. Turkey's exports to Eastern Europe rose to $1.1 billion in 1989 from $8308.8 million a year ago, while imports went up to $1.6 billion last year from $1.2 billion in 1988." (See the MEI, Vol. VHI, No. 15, 10-16 April, "Economic Review," p. 12 See also "Ankara Seeks New Trade with East Europe" in MET, Vol. VIII, No. 14, 3-9 April 1990.)
27 Filiz Cetin, "Turkey Ten Years After. Renewed Repression and Revolutionary Upsurge", in Democratic Palestine journal, number 39, May 1990, p. 22.
28 Hürriyet, (1 April 1990).
29 "A Rise in die Workers' Combativity" in The Spark, No. 401, May 7-21, 1990. Reprinted and translated from Lutte Ouvrière, Paris.
30 Cited in The Spark, op. cit. The MET ("Economic Review," Vol. VHI, No. 14, 3-9 April 1990, p. 12) cites statements by a union official that 16,000 workers in some 38 plants had gone on strike, but that a further 1,600 in Turkey's Kurdish region were prevented from joining the strike by regional union officials.
31 "Economic Review" MET, Vol. VITI, No. 19, 8-14 May 1990, p. 12. Petroleum workers taking industrial action covered some 30 per cent of the industry.
32 Summary of the report's findings, in "Economic Review" MET, Vol. VIII, No. 19, 814 May 1990, p. 12.
33 Filiz Cetin, 'Turkey Ten Years After. Renewed Repression and Revolutionary Upsurge," in Democratic Palestine, number 39, May 1990, p. 21.
34 The Spark, op. cit.
35 The Spark, op. cit.
36 Filiz Cetin, op. cit, p. 24.
37 Filz Cetin, op. cit.
38 Filiz Cetin, op. cit., p. 24.
39 Filiz Cetin, op. cit., p. 25.
40 News From Helsinki Watch, p. 20. The MET ("Regional Review," p. 11, in vol. VIII, No. 20, 15-21 May, 1990) claims that "over 1,000 people were arrested in Istanbul."
41 Ken Mackenzie, "Struggling with the Kurds," in MEI No. 373, 13 April 1990, p. 14.
42 See "Regional Review," in the MET Vol VII, No. 15, 10-16 April 1990 and Ken Mackenzie, "Struggling with the Kurds," in MEI No. 373, 13 April, 1990, p. 14.
43 See "Mosque Minarets are Tip of Turkey's Islamic Resurgence," in the MET, Vol. VIII, No. 28, 10-16 July 1990, p. 4.
Bibliography
Human Rights in Turkey No. 2, April, 1990: "An 'Intifada' in Turkey?"; "4 Years Imprisonment for Newspaper Editor Sert." Published by the Turkish Community Resource Centre, Coburg, Melbourne.
Hürriyet newspaper, 1 April 1990, Ankara.
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News From Helsinki Watch. News From Turkey, June 1990. Published by the U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, New York.
The Independent, 7 April 1990, Hugh Pope: "Kurds 'On the Point of Explosion'". London.
The Spark, No. 401, 7-21 May 1990, "A Rise in the Workers' Combativity." New York.
Voice of Kurdistan, No. 1, May 1990, "March is the Symbole [sic] of Freedom" & "Uprising and Newroz. The Chronology of Actions." Published by the Kurdistan Committees in Europe, Cologne.
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Paul White, University of Melbourne
Paul White received his doctorate in political science from the University of Melbourne (Australia).
Copyright Kurdish Library Summer 1991