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Studies on the Doctrine of Trairupya. By CLAUS OETKE. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, vol. 33. Vienna: ARBEITSKREIS FUER TIBETISCHE UND BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIEN, UNIVERSITAET WIEN, 1993. Pp. 144.
The topic of the work under consideration, whic consists of a series of related studies, is the trairupya doctrine of Indian logic. That doctrine states that a valid reason dr middle term--hetu--of an inference (anumnna) must possess three characteristics: it must (1) be a property of the subject or paksa, (2) occur in the sapaska, i.e., the domain of things which possess the property to be proved or sadhya, and (3) not occur in the vipaksa, the domain of things which lack the sadhya. As stated in the Nyayapravesa: hetus trirupah. kim punas trairupyam? paksadharmatvam sapakse sattvam vipakse casattvam. Now, presumably, this manner of stating the relation of probans and probandum in an inference, which is found not only in the Nyayapravesa but also in the works of Dignaga and various other Buddhist and non-Buddhist logicians, is meant to clarify the relationship originally described by Vasubandhu in the Vadavidhi as avinabhava, invariable concomitance. Thus, Vasubandhu asserts, tadrgavinabhavidharmopardarsanam hetuh, "the
logical
reason is the pronouncement of a property which does not occur without such a thing
i.e., which is inseparably connected with the probandum
." Yet it is no entirely clear how the state of affairs defined by trairupya relates logically to invariable concomitance. The two criteria do not appear to be equivalent; trairya seems to be in certain respects stronger than avindbhdva. Moreover, we find in the Prasastapadabhasya a slightly different formulation of trairupya. It is stated there not merely that the hetu must belong to the paksa and occur in the sapaksa but not in the vipaksa, but that it must be known (prasiddha) to belong to the paksa, etc.: yad anumeyenarthena desavisese kalavisese va sahacaritam, anumeyadharmanvite canyatra sarvasminn ekadese va prasiddham, anumeyaviparite ca sarvasmin pramanato sad eva tad aprasiddharthasyanumapakam lingam bhavatiti. Thus, we are confronted with a two-fold problem: how do the "epistemic" version of found in the Nyayapravesa, etc., relate to each other, and how do they both relate in turn to Vasubandhu's criterion of invariable concomitance? The solution of these problems, especially the latter, is the key to understanding the classical Indian...