Proportionalism and the Natural Law Tradition

Abstract

Kalbian reviews "Proportionalism and the Natural Law Tradition" by Christopher Kaczor.

IN DUE MEASURE

Christopher Kaczor: Proportionalism and the Natural Law Tradition. (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2002. Pp. x, 228. $49.95.)

Pope John Paul II's clear assertion in Veritatis Splendor that "teleological" ethical theories like proportionalism "cannot claim to be grounded in Catholic moral theology" is the driving force behind Christopher Kaczor's well-written and thorough volume, Proportionalism and the Natural Law Tradition. Kaczor avoids the "inflated" and "abrasive rhetoric" characteristic of most other critiques of proportionalism as he takes on the thorny and much debated question of whether proportionalism is an expression of authentic Catholic doctrine. Proportionalism, an approach to moral reasoning that is based on the view that the ideal moral act must achieve proportionality between the means and the ends of that act, gained prominence among some Catholic theologians in the mid-1960s, and its influence continues to be felt today. Kaczor takes proportionalism seriously-not because he is a proponent of that position-but because he is convinced that its "attempt to undermine traditional understandings of moral absolutes" is significant (p. 9). As Kaczor states, "Proportionalism has both theoretical and practical import" (p. 9).

He agrees with proportionalists that their movement is a "revolution." That, however, is the extent of their agreement. Kaczor claims that proportionalists are revolting against the natural law tradition as exemplified by Thomas Aquinas, and that their understanding of morality reflects the influence of neo-Scholasticism. Proportionalists claim that they are revolting against the neo-Scholastic moral theology of the pre-Vatican II era and embracing a more genuine Thomistic view. Why is this disagreement important? Because Kaczor thinks that for many Catholics, the credibility of proportionalism rests on its claim of continuity with Catholic moral tradition. Hence, if Kaczor is successful in proving his case, proportionalism is stripped of much of its legitimacy.

Kaczor begins by offering what he claims is a description of proportionalism "as it is understood by its proponents" (p. 9). He states that the critical evaluation will take place later in the book. In my view, Kaczor does not always succeed in keeping these two tasks (description and evaluation) separate. For example, the title of the first chapter, "The Plausibility of Proportionalism," suggests that the aim is evaluation rather than straight description. Yet he claims that he will be offering a description. Moreover, he states that proportionalists claim continuity with Thomas Aquinas as a way to strengthen their connection to the Catholic tradition. But instead of presenting the "proponents" understanding of this claim, he immediately rules that "proportionalism seems to be asking and answering different questions than those that most interested Thomas Aquinas" (p. 9).

Kaczor rightly situates proportionalism in relation to the neo-Scholastic manuals. Indeed, most analyses of proportionalism note that it arose partly in response to (and rejection of) the moral system implied by the manualists. But Kaczor's conclusion is markedly different. While he acknowledges that proportionalists "partially reject" that background, he claims that their approach is more "an extension of the trends that differentiate neo-Scholastics from Thomas and not as a recovery of Thomas" (p. 35). To those less familiar with this debate, that might seem like a fairly innocuous statement. But, for Catholic moral theologians, especially those sympathetic with proportionalism, it is a stinging critique.

The chapter on double-effect reasoning provides one example of Kaczor's method of deconstructing proportionalism's claim of identity with Thomism. He identifies three major ways that proportionalism's interpretation of double-effect reasoning differs from Thomas's: (1) double-effect reasoning is not an actual moral principle for Thomas; it is for proportionalists, (2) they understand intention differently, and (3) proportion itself has different meanings in these two approaches. Many sympathetic with proportionalism will raise questions about this part of Kaczor's argument. He seems to make the quick move from Peter Knauer's view of proportionate reason (which does sound quite Thomistic) to a view of proportionate reason that is decidedly utilitarian in flavor, as "the maximizing of non-moral goods and/or the minimizing of nonmoral ends"(p. 34). Kaczor claims that while Knauer's position "is couched in similar language to Thomas's act/end proportion," it is a radically different version (p. 43). Yet a full explanation of this claim is lacking. His overall thesis in this chapter is that Pierre Gury's version of double-effect reasoning, the one that was adapted into the neo-Scholastic manuals of moral theology, is closer to proportionalism than is Thomas's. Regardless of whether one agrees with Kaczor's genealogical account, his detailed exposition of these various strands of double-effect reasoning is illuminating.

The discontinuity with Thomistic double-effect reasoning is only one of Kaczor's points about proportionalism. He also argues that, like the neo-Scholastic manuals, proportionalism lacks a sustained and sufficiently developed description of human action and the role of intention. For example, he claims that the proportionalist concern with "physicalism" is misplaced, because proportionalists fail to distinguish between acts of a human being and human acts-a distinction that was crucial for Thomas. Kaczor is a bit unclear in this section. He argues first that Thomas is not a "physicalist," a claim that is not especially controversial. He then argues that since it is the intention that ultimately determines the morality of an action, no exterior act is ever purely physical. In other words, it is always "conceived in the mind of the agent" first. It is not clear, however, that Kaczor is directly addressing the concern of proportionalists on this issue.

Many will find Kaczor's detailed treatment of particular moral problems like organ donation, removal of the fallopian tube in ectopic pregnancy cases, and the recent case of separating conjoined twins especially fascinating. In these discussions, Kaczor applies Thomas's account of human action as a contrast to what he sees as proportionalism's confused and sketchy account of the object. The Thomistic account presented by Kaczor certainly yields a more complex set of criteria for defining the object of the act.

Does Kaczor "attack" proportionalism? Yes and No. Yes, in the sense that he slowly dismantles it by arguing that it is ultimately an extension of neo-Scholastic moral theology-a move that strips proportionalism of its potency as a critique of neo-Scholasticism. No, because Kaczor's descriptions of proportionalist thinkers are measured and detailed. For instance, he is careful to indicate that not all who are called proportionalists share identical views.

Past critiques of proportionalism have taken various forms. The accusation that proportionalism is merely a veiled from of utilitarianism has been the most common. Others have claimed that it was simply an attempt to justify the use of contraception; or that it is a form of situation ethics. Kaczor's scholarly and carefully argued book represents a different genre altogether. Nevertheless, while he avoids the heated rhetoric associated with attacks on proportionalism, his seemingly gentle appraisal and evaluation of proportionalism is a bit misleading. It is, in fact, much more serious and damning than many offered previously. Kaczor deliberately and carefully tries to discredit proportionalism by hitting it where he can cause the most damage. Thus, instead of simply writing it off as an unimportant blip in the history of Catholicism, he acknowledges its importance. Instead of agreeing with those who might claim that proportionalism shares little with the tradition of Catholic moral theology, Kaczor argues that it does, but charts it on to the neo-Scholastic branch of the family tree. This book will undoubtedly stimulate many discussions in Catholic moral theology.