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Ronald Dworkin: Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000. Pp. 511. $35.00.)
Ronald Dworkin's latest collection of essays is divided into two sections. The first ("Theory") sets forth Dworkin's familiar arguments about the nature of liberty and of equality, distributive and political, as well as less familiar claims about liberal understandings of community and the good life. The second ("Practice") sets forth his views on a number of contested issues ranging from affirmative action to assisted suicide. The two sections proceed within the same argumentative frame and are meant to be mutually consistent. As Dworkin emphasizes, however, the "practical" essays do not represent simple applications of his theory but often serve as occasions for its further development and specification. He insists that theory should be the endpoint of a process that begins in experience, because only then can we have some assurance that our abstractions have genuine meaning (pp. 34). Throughout these essays, Dworkin's characteristic strengths-clarity of expression, capacity for sustained abstract argument, rapier responses to critics, and willingness to engage with the real world of public affairs-are on full display.
In contrast to John Rawls, Dworkin does not treat political philosophy as free-standing but sees it as grounded in general ethical values, such the structure of good lives and the principles of personal responsibility The direct appeal to ethical foundations means that Dworkin makes no use of social contract devices. In contrast to Isaiah Berlin, Dworkin is an ethical monist rather than a pluralist. While Berlin argues that basic goods and values are heterogeneous, incommensurable, and conflicting, Dworkin seeks to dissipate these conflicts and integrate key political values into a harmonized whole. In particular, unlike Berlin, Dworkin sees no conflict between liberty and equality, rightly understood. If there were such a conflict, liberty would have to give way to equality, which Dworkin understands as the master-value of liberalism, as "sovereign."
Each of these contrasts raises questions. In one important respect, Dworkin's claim to offer a "comprehensive" as opposed to Rawls-style "political" theory is puzzling. Early on, he suggests that his thesis concerning equality rests on "more general ethical values"-including the "structure of a good life described in chapter 6" (p. 5). But when we reach chapter 6,...