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SARTRE'S EARLY, formative view of freedom has bothered both passing readers of Sartre and eminent scholars-among them Gabriel Marcel, Merleau-Ponty, and the brilliant philosophical writer, Albert Camus. Sartre's attribution of "absolute," "total" or complete freedom to the human being struck against the grain of dominant thinking in the history of philosophy. And, for many 20th century thinkers, it suggested disturbing consequences. But, in my judgment, the repeated criticisms and/or dismissals of Sartre's seminal views on freedom are often rooted in a basic misunderstanding and misinterpretation of his position. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Camus's critique, especially in his controversial The Rebel (l'Homme révolté) and the acrimonious, divisive, 1952 "confrontation" with Sartre regarding it.1
Elsewhere,21 have offered only a preliminary outline of my case against the interpretation presented by Camus and variously made by Marcel, Merleau-Ponty, Frondizi, and others. In the present paper, however, I shall offer a detailed examination of this matter. Although my paper will attempt, primarily, to establish Camus's misunderstanding of Sartre's view of freedom, I believe (and intend) that my argument applies similarly to many other of Sartre's critics, including those mentioned above. On behalf of fairness, I shall not conclude without indicating how some of Sartre's own remarks have contributed to the repeated misinterpretation of his original position on freedom. If successful, my paper will have shown Sartre's concept of freedom to be considerably more complex than it is normally treated, and will also alert readers to the importance of distinguishing among dimensions of freedom, as they examine views of freedom in the history of philosophy, present as well as past.
In order to make my case, I shall begin with a résumé of the fundamental features of Sartre's original and core ontological analysis of freedom in Being and Nothingness. My account will attempt to confine itself to what is essential to my present argument.3
I
Sartre's Original Position. The root of Sartre's view of freedom, and equally of his ontology, is expressed early in Being and Nothingness:
Human freedom precedes essence in man and makes it possible; the essence of the human being is suspended in his freedom. What we call freedom is impossible to distinguish from the being of "human reality." Man does not exist first...