The Shatter Belt and the European Core - A Geopolitical Discussion on the Untypical Case of Slovenia

Abstract

Europe in general is in a great state of change. States uniting with difficulty, states collapsing in pain, newly freed states struggling for new political, economic, and social identities - it is a region in a true transition. The paper is focussing primarily on the European Shatter Belt, formerly known as "Eastern Europe." Since the collapse of communism, the region has experienced some serious traumas that vary in intensity across the region. The adoption of capitalism and a democratic political system has been painful, disorienting, and is still in progress. The democratization process varies considerably across the region and in some states is in jeopardy. Reformed communist parties had staged a restoration in nearly all of the states - in some winning the control of the government, in others gaining strong and influential positions, or both. But, two major processes promise future democracy, rule of law, wealth and stability in general. This is the decision of the member states of the European Union and NATO to incorporate some/several states of the Shatter Belt into their own zone of protection and/or federation. Nation-states of the region tend to follow the EU Agenda 2000 rules with Slovenia one of the first.

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GeoJournal (52: 107-117, 2000. (C) 2001 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. 107

The Shatter Belt and the European Core - A Geopolitical Discussion on theUntypical Case of Slovenia

Anton Gosar Department of Geography, University of Ljubljana, SI-1001 Ljubljana, Slovenia (e-mail: [email protected])

Received 17 January 2001; and accepted 20 February 2001

Key words: transition, democracy, Slovenia, NATO/EU enlargement, Mitteleuropa, Central/Eastern Europe Abstract Europe in general is in a great state of change. States uniting with difficulty, states collapsing in pain, newly freed states struggling for new political, economic, and social identities - it is a region in a true transition. The paper is focussing primarily on the European Shatter Belt, formerly known as `Eastern Europe'. This is in fact a subset of new and old nation-states in the region of Central and Eastern Europe or, to use an older, but increasingly popular term, `Mitteleuropa' (Ruppert, 1997). `Mitteleuropa' is reemerging from the commotion resulting from the collapse of the old political order - communism. Our focus in this presentation is on personal experiences and observations. We will note the progress and positive dimensions of the change (transition) in the light of Europe's and NATO expansion. We will address the issues at two scales- at the international/national level and then, at the level of a Slovenian case study. This will enable us to discuss the `natural system' of the process of enlargement and incorporate supporting material of geographical, historical and social nature as envisioned by Hartshorne. Since the collapse of communism, the region has experienced some serious traumas that vary in intensity across the region. Probably the greatest pain has been experienced in the former Yugoslavia - an estimated 150,000 have perished and about 2.5 millions have been displaced within and outside the country. Chaos still exists despite the `protectorate arrangement' in Bosnia. The hot spot Kosovo has yet to be calmed down. In parts of the region economic pain has been considerable. Every state of `Mitteleuropa' experienced absolute economic decline from 1990-1995; high inflation rates, increased economic inequality, high levels of poverty, increase of crime and more. Economic and psychological stress effect demographic processes. Things have partly changed to the better in the most recent years. The adoption of capitalism and a democratic political system has been painful, disorienting, and is still in progress. The democratization process varies considerably across the region and in some states is in jeopardy. Reformed communist parties had staged a `restoration' in nearly all of the states - in some winning the control of the government, in others gaining strong and influential positions, or both. But, two major processes promise future democracy, rule of law, wealth and stability in general. This is the decision of the member states of the European Union and NATO to incorporate some/several states of the Shatter Belt into their own zone of protection and/or federation. Nation-states of the region tend to follow the EU Agenda 2000 rules with Slovenia one of the first!

Introduction In modern times the term Shatter Belt was first applied in 1961 by Gordon East, a Bloomington, Indiana scholar. In the 19th century geopoliticians referred to it as they discussed the forces behind the devolution of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and in the Near East. Recently the term has been put into connotation with the area of Southeast Asia as well. The term's connotation with `breaking the glass' is obvious. Several Anglo-American authors have used the term in describing therewith the fragile equilibrium of the area between the geographic Atlantic Europe and the Euro-Asian continental core (Dean Rugg, Thomas Poulsen, George Demko, . . . ). The term was applied to the area where the ethnic groups of Europe (Germanic, Slavonic, UgroFinish, Romance, Hellenic, Illiric, . . . ) have been most mixed through centuries. Their cultural landscapes carry the

impact of external, neighboring powers. These have had enormous, sometimes devastating effects. Authors have often used the term to avoid the term `Balkanization' to make a distinction between often violent centripetal and/or centrifugal forces, emerging most often in the area to the south. But the fragmentation of cultures and the political instability was always the characteristic of the area between the Russian Bear and the Germanic Eagle. World political maps prove that the breaking of the multination-state cores was extremely intensive in the last decade of the last century.

Due to Central Europe's recent crumbling and breaking, the shape of Europe is changing. The European political map is/was since the 1990 characterized by:*

emerging new nation-states,* self-proclaimed entities (like Northern Cyprus),

108

Figure 1. East Central European Shatter Belt.

* entities constructed by the international community

(Bosnia and the inter-ethnic division within, Kosovo), and* several areas being placed under short or long term international (UN/EU) protectorate, or a form of it (Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia, Croatia, Yugoslavia (Kosovo)). The similarity with the major physical features shaping our planet is obvious. As does the collision of the African and European plates produce major earthquakes and stimulate volcanic eruptions, particularly in the European Southeast, so does the collision of cultures and the interest of major world powers result into trouble spots and inflammable

zones, generally in the same area. The epicenter of this type of the `earthquake zone' - where the Russian and WesternEuropean/American (NATO, EU); Christian and Islamic; African, Asian and European political interest meet - can be identified with numerous small nation-states entities. Here, world political maps show Europe's most condensed boundaries. For the intensity of the social/political earthquake no Richter scale was produced yet, but the fading away of wealth and of the rules of law can be good indicators of the approaching eruption, crumbling, braking apart, shattering, etc.

109 Figure 2. NATO-members 2001 (A) and EU members and the candidates (B).

Figure 3. East Central European EU candidates: the average regional GDP per person 1998 in relation to the EU - 15 (in %).

Personal experience often impacts general attitudes towards politics, economy and science - and subsequently motivates research. As a citizen of Slovenia, I am attending this meeting in Italy just with an identity card and a driver's license in my pocket. No passport is obligatory for Slovene citizens to cross the Eastern and Southern EU (`Schengen') borders of Austria and Italy (nor for any of the neighboring nation-states, like Hungary or Croatia). No visa is required for any of the EU/NATO member states. To the list of 26 countries whose citizens can enter USA without a visa, Slovenia was added in 1996. At the same time European Union's Portugal and Greece, as well as Australia and Japan were added too (`Visa Waivers', USA Today, March 26, 1998, p. 4A). I don't need an entry visa to make a tourist trip to Russia either. But, on the other hand, as a citizen of Slovenia, I must have a visa in my passport if I want to visit my long-time friends in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. To make things worse: one can not receive Yugoslav visas in Ljubljana, the capital of Slovenia, but must visit this nationstate's consulate in Trieste, Italy, Graz, Austria or Budapest, Hungary. In January 2001, ten years after the collapse of Tito's communism and the devolution of the multi-ethnic south-Slavic federation there are no diplomatic relationships established among all former entities (republics) of the same state. Nor are border issues solved! The switch to democracy in Yugoslavia (fall, 2000) promises to bring changes in this regard.

From this personal experience the following hypothesis can be drawn: nations of the European shatter belt get a diverse and very selective treatment by the adjacent (Spykman's) Atlantic Europe and the (McKinder's) Euro-Asian pivot. They tend to be suspicious to nations with whom they share the same geographical and/or geopolitical space. Unsolved matters of the past are flaming up on every occasion. Like in the case of the Yugoslavian succession, the border dispute between Croatia and Slovenia over the Pirano-Bay

110 delineation in the Northern Adriatic and in regard to the treatment of minorities and/or ethnic groups of the region. Just to name a few unfinished geopolitical contents related to the area.

The Atlantic Security Area and the Central European Shatter Belt

There are no annoying questions and background checking for Slovene citizens travelling towards Western Europe. Schengen outer-EU border regulations are selectively realized at border crossings. Special entry lanes for EU-citizens and citizens of the Republic of Slovenia have been constructed. The reality of the fact that Slovenia is neither a member of the EU nor NATO is not experienced on the personal level. The 1997 defeat of the attempt to become a member of NATO in the first round of enlargement and the retarded start of talks to join EU in 1998, due to Italian restraints (in relation to the question of Italian - former Yugoslav - citizen's real estate ownership), were not perceived as dramatic as, for instance, in Romania. Due to the intensity of Slovenia's participation in the NATO program `Partnership for Peace' (in April 1998 a tri-nation brigade (`Juliana') has been formed out of military forces of the NATO member Italy, the non-NATO Slovenia and the new NATO member Hungary) we might assume that Slovenia has become, due to geopolitical reality (a gateway and a buffer-state character!), a `silent partner' of the Atlantic alliance. Judging on the basis of the above observation, the principal values of the Atlantic security seem to include the new nation-state of Slovenia already.

The coincidence of my tourist visit to Washington (April 27-May 2, 1998) with the debate on the first round of the NATO enlargement (Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland) in the US Senate, enabled us - visitors to the Senate gallery and the Senate in session - a very personal experience of the values for which this alliance stands. According to the discussion, soon after the collapse of communism the resetting of goals - from principally "defending a territory (of democracy and market economy)" towards "protecting values of stability (in a broader sense)" - took place. Namely, the global threats become minimized; the small-scale territorial disputes have grown in size and number. The quote of the first and long time general secretary in 1949 on the purpose of the NATO - "to keep Russia out, to keep America in, and to keep Germany down" - remains to be a historic statement, unfitting values of modern times. (New York Times, May 1, 1998, p. A10). After the overwhelmingly positive vote (YES 80, NO 19), a gray-haired Senate gallery spectator, with a Polish accent, expressed his feelings with "Thank you God, we've lived long enough to witness this historic moment for our nation".

What surprised many observers and experts of the NATO enlargement process is the fact that it did not follow the footsteps of the process of the EU-enlargement. Geopolitical expertise on the territory, combined with the general statement of The Agenda 2000 of the European Commission (Democracy and the Rule of Law, Human Rights, and

General Evaluation), has been considered though. Economic criteria, the ability to assume the obligations of the membership, administrative capacity to apply the accord, as stated in the 1993 Copenhagen EU criteria accords, was not discussed at the NATO level. At least not in public! Therefore, many observers see in this act an expression of a political orientation rather than of a well-considered strategic decision. The commentator of the `Neue Zu"richer Zeitung' points out the fact that only 40 Polish officers speak and write in English and that only about 250 of them communicate well in the above language (Neue Zu"richer Zeitung, 29.3.1998). Among the criteria of the NATO enlargement neither the geographical and historical principles, nor the well-established ties in economy and culture have been pointed out. The fact that Germany has, since 1994, intensified the relationship with the new NATO members-to-be, to the harm of Russia, has - understandably - not been mentioned either. German exports rise yearly with 25% - in the case of Poland, and 13% and 10% in the case of Czech Republic and Hungary, subsequently. The import of goods from Russia consists almost solely of raw materials (87%) among which oil and gas are 51%. Also, German imports of finished goods from the three new NATO member states have risen annually in average 24% (Boesler, 1997, p. 314). As a consequence of this one can argue that NATO has silently applied the EU economic criteria as well. Therewith the principal three East - West development axis of Europe*

The Baltic axis: Hamburg-St. Petersburg (POLAND);* The Danubian/Central European axis: Munich/Vienna- Moscow (CZECH REPUBLIC); and* The Mediterranean/`Sun Belt' axis: Barcelona-Kiev (HUNGARY)/ have become strengthened. Brussels promises to strengthen its Metropolitan Regions (Milan, Vienna, Munich, Berlin, Helsinki, etc.) and to enlarge their functional regions to the east, as well (Ruppert, 1996, p. 89).

The fact is that enlargements, resulting out of defensive or political reasons, tend to focus on the geopolitical, democratic and economic dimensions. A selection of indicators (Drbohlav and Demko, 1997) show progress in the region of the Shatter Belt in this regard. Indexes revealing `democratization' (Freedom House, New York) and several economic variables (private sector share of GDP, progress in banking reforms, privatization, economic liberalization and growth, and inflation), presented in the map is revealing. The result is clear - the first and best performing states belong to the area of the Eastern `Mitteleuropa'. We see a clear reemergence of Central Europe's core: Poland, The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia. The remnant Shatter Belt states - as visible in Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, etc. - are lagging behind the rest of `Mitteleuropa'. The Balkans still reel from violence, ethnic hatred, forced migration and economic collapse. In particular Macedonia, Kosovo and Montenegro tend to explode and took neighbors into the turmoil. The Baltic states are leaning strongly westward in the direction of economic and political restructuring. Other former Soviet Republics, like Belarus, Moldavia, and

111 Table 1. Central / Eastern Europe's EU candidates: the average regional GDP per Person, 1998 in relation to the EU 15 (in %).

Rank Nation-State/ GDP / Person / GDP / Person Buying Total4

Region Nation-State.1 /Region2 Power3

5. Estonia 34 39 36 10. Latvia 25 30 28

8. Lithuania 29 34 32 7. Poland 27* 40 34

Zahodnopomorskie 33 Pomorskie 34 Warminsko-Mazurskie 26 Podlaskie 25 Mazowieckie 49 Kuwasko-Pomorskie 30 Lubuskie 30 Dolnoslaskie 32 Opolskie 30 Slaskie 40 Malopolskie 30 Swietokrzyskie 24 Lodzkie 33 Lubelskie 25 2. The Czech Rep. 58* 75 67

Severozapad 58 Jihozapad 58 Sredny Cechy 49 Praha 119 Severovyhod 55 Jihovyhod 57 Sredni Morava 54 Ostravsko 61 3. Slovakia 53* 52 53

Bratislavsky 96 Sredne Slovensko 37 Zapadne Slovensko 43 Vyhodne Slovensko 34 4. Hungary 43* 55 49

Nyugat Dunantul 49 Ko"zep Dunantul 43 Ko"zep Magyaroszag 69 Eszak Magyaroszag 33 Eszak Alfo"ld 33 Del Alfo"ld 38 Del Dunatil 37 1. Slovenia 66 78 72

Osrednja Slovenija (Ljubljana) 85 Ostala Slovenija (other, 2nd region) 50 6. Romania 33* 37 35

Nord-Vest 30 Vest 34 Nord-Est 26 Sud-Vest 29 Centru 35 Sud 30 Bucuresti 44 Sud-Est 32

112

9. Bulgaria 26* 33 30

Sofia Stolista Grad 27 Sev. Blgarija 25 J. Blgarija 25

Source: Eurostat, 2000; FAZ - Frakfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Wed., 06. 09. 2000, S. 121

Average GDP per Person in relation to the average of the GDP of the 15 EU countries (= 100);4 Statistical median of the data 2 and 32 Average regional GDP per Person, according to FAZ (EU 15 -100)3 Average GDP measured on purchsing gemessen am Durchschnitt EU-15 (100)

Figure 4 Progress in economy and democracy 1989-1995 in countries of Central Eastern Europe (source: Demko and Drbohlav, 1997). Ukraine are engaged in a more complex struggle for change and the decoupling from Moscow is more difficult.

The enlargement process of Europe plays at three levels: multilateral framework, accession process, accession negotiations. A European Conference bringing together all the countries that wish to join the Union is to be held yearly.

At the turn of the century 12 countries are invited to join: ten applicant states from Central Europe (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia), Cyprus and Turkey. The first conference took place in London in early March 1998. The European Council confirmed that all are destined to join

113 the EU on the basis of the same criteria, and should participate in the process on an equal footing. Important elements of this process are:*

the `structured dialogue',* the pre-accession strategy (to align with the acquis communitaire),* the `Accession Partnership' assistance (financial aid), e.g., The Phare, Tacis, Interreg II, . . .* the participation in selected Community programs (education, research, . . . ). The European Commission recommended that negotiations for membership should be opened with five of the Central European countries. They were found to be best placed to take on the obligations of EU membership in the medium term (2004-2010). The so called `-ins' are: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia! The s. c. `pre-ins' are the ones who require further preparation before entering negotiations with the Union: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and the Slovak Republic. The accession negotiations with the above named five countries and Cyprus, recommended by the Commission, have begun in Brussels in 1998. Included in Agenda 2000 is a package of financial measures to help all 10-candidate countries prepare for membership. Under the Phare program, money is to be spent on investment and institution building. Once the countries become members, they will progressively be covered by the Community budget in the same way as other member states, while those who are not yet members will effectively benefit from the fact that the increased aid will be divided up among the smaller number remaining outside.

The case of Slovenia Slovenia, like the other former communist states of Central Europe, has been rapidly converting its former totalitarian and centrally controlled system (installed in 1945) to a capitalist one, which widely is viewed as a successful, prosperous, democratic, and pluralistic society. The `political transformation' has been accomplished quite rapidly through a more or less non-violent uncoupling from Yugoslavia in 1991. The main objectives of the economic transformation, along with the tasks of liberalizing, privatizing, and restructuring industrial and other enterprises are already achieved. The low inflation rate (6.8% in 1998), a healthy state of finance with a low level of debt and a strong economic growth (3.2% in 1998), with a stable and convertible currency promise social stability of the entire society. The low level of (re-) privatization and of the development of the private sector and a still high rate of unemployment (8.3% in 1998) threaten, in part, the progress of the society. Foreign investments are in 1998 remarkably rare - if compared with the neighboring Hungary, or the Czech Republic. In 1998 692 firms in Slovenia (less than 18%) have foreign capital: 170 larger foreign investors (more than 200,000 DEM) have invested 936.3 million German marks in the Slovenian economy. Most investments are related to services (banks) and trade warehouse firms and enterprises, to be

Figure 5 Phare-funds allocated by sector in 1995. followed by electronic component and car producers. 190 enterprises in Slovenia are owned completely by foreigners, 109 have joint venture agreements.

Although many `transformations' have been successfully implemented, a number of problems still await a solution. Some enterprises still anticipate restructuring, capital markets are still directly or indirectly constructed by large banks and state intervention in some cases. Some prices still require liberalization, especially in the energy and agricultural sectors. There exists a significant set of problems related to `cultural change'. The former `collective' mentality provides little tradition of tolerance to foreigners and other racial groups (nationalism), and in general, condoned the acceptance of patronage, bribes, etc. These psychological behavioral patterns will take some time to change in a new society that also promotes some negative values (Gosar, 1993). There has been a mushrooming of social pathological problems, like increase in crime, prostitution and drug use, especially in urban areas. Crime, for example, is three times higher than in the late 1980s. Crime is especially related to arms smuggling, illegal migrant runners, drug and fuel smuggling. Internationally organized crime groups, most often from the Balkan neighborhoods, have entered the country and supervise money laundering, car theft, arms and drug running (Gosar, 2000).

The traumas mentioned above, although serious, are not the key issues. Slovenia has had no severe problems - compared to many other countries within the region of the Balkans and/or `Eastern Mitteleuropa'. The percentage of population in poverty is only about 1.5%. In Romania and

114 Yugoslavia this level is about 60%. In terms of purchasing power parity, Slovenia is at the same level as Greece, Portugal and Ireland. There are also demographic stresses in Slovenia that are common to some developed countries, like neighboring Italy and Austria - a large and growing proportion of aged population, delayed marriages and the delaying of first births resulting in very low fertility: total fertility rate reached only 1.89 in 1998, resulting in a population decrease (Gosar, 2000). The ecological traumas suffered in certain regions of Slovenia are not comparable to other parts of Central Europe. The core of the Southeasterly Alps, the karstic Dinaric mountain ridge, the Pannonian (Danubian) lowlands and the Mediterranean coast areas seem to be in a fairly good condition. But condition of major rivers and of the coal field areas is alarming. Public health has been affected (Plut, 1997). The psychological and monetary costs of the ecological damage is, and will be, high.

The ruling party - Liberal Democrats of Slovenia (LDS), headed by Janez Drnovs^ek, that controls the government more or less since 1991, is considered by many `too centralized'. A major decision is being debated about devolving some power to the peripheral regions by creating small entities - communes (obcine). The increase in the number of communes, from 66 in 1991 to 197 in 1998, was regarded as a success. On the other hand there is no serious discussion regarding self-governing regional-territorial units on the mezzo-level, in the size of provinces in Italy, or La"nder in Austria. Despite increasing Brussels' demands and requests regarding this, the `pokrajine' are far from being established. Such new political units would permit a more effective coordination system to solve economic, social and ecological problems, and prevent public and private abuse of power (Klemen^ci^c and Gosar, 1994). This has becomes a problem also in regard of the unsuccessful candidacy of provinces of Carinthia (in Austria), Friuli - Venetia Giulia (in Italy) and Slovenia (!) for the joint `Winter Olympic Games in 2006' (`Klagenfurt 2006' Senza Confini). The provinces in Austria and Italy had hoped for a comparable, compatible regional partner (Province of Gorenjsko) in Slovenia.

The European integration viewed from the Slovenian viewpoint

J.H. von Thuenen's (1783-1850) theory on forces and processes that were shaping Europe in his time never underwent a serious testing in Central and Eastern Europe. The world's first geographical model produced by the Rostock farmer and economist of Prussia was too much in favor of European centralism and Western dominance to be accepted by the countries and people of the `Eastern periphery'. The effects of distance and transportation costs on the location of productive activity were most often disregarded. Central/East Europe's role in Europe's economy was seen as supportive, but not governing. Within von Thuenen's rings of economy, Central Europe was regarded, even by his 20th century followers Samuel van Valkenburg and Colbert Held, at best, as a zone of `increasingly extensive field crops' (Poland, Czech Republik, Slovakia). Ranching and animal

production `was expected' from Hungary, Romania, Croatia and Slovenia, as `wilderness' has, on maps, dominated most of the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Albania. Since von Thuenen's time of study, Europe experienced spatial changes particularly in transportation technology, which permitted the micro-scale isolated state to expand and become a macro-scale model. Thus, the model is no longer centered on a single city, but on the vast urbanized areas lining the coasts of the Atlantic. From there, the half moon shaped zone stretches from Europe's NW to SW, into the northern lowlands of Italy. This area of Northern Italy is of a particular importance for the development of the young nation-state of Slovenia.

The major force of the European restructuring of the 1990s is the European Union. Slovenia is from a cultural perspective the most westerly positioned Slavic `island', bordering Romance (Italian), German (Austrian), Ugric (Magyar) and South Slavonic (Croatian) nations. Since the country's natural composition is of equal diversity, as it encompasses the ecosystems of the Alps, of the Mediterranean, of the Danubian (also Pannonian) plains and of the central Karst areas of Europe, one justifiably characterizes Slovenia as a major transitional area of the continent. Slovenia's geopolitical position within Europe is therefore of particular importance (Brunn and Cottle, 1997). Slovenia is supportive of all three major development scenarios discussed recently in Brussels:*

the European Central Axis Model (London-Brussels- Frankfurt-Milan),* the Isolated Metropolitan Regions Model (like: the Milan Metropolitan Area, the Vienna MA, the Munich MA, the Budapest MA),* the Intra-Regional and Intra-Metropolitan Cooperation Model (the s.c. Core/Axis Model) which is in parts a combination of the named above. Understandably, priority is given to the model calling for an interregional cooperation. Within this model Slovenia could realize its own intentions most easily. The youngest nation state in Europe would be otherwise forced to accommodate other states' and regions' development policies. In this case Slovenia's territory of 20,256 km2 and 2.1 million of inhabitants would be asked to adapt its economy to the interests of Milan, Lombardy and Italy or to be the outer ring of the Budapest, Vienna, or Munich Metropolis (Klemen^ci^c and Gosar, 1994).

In reference to scenarios, Slovenia's is often on the center stage of Brussels' theater because of transportation routes. Agreements to construct a substantial highway system were signed with the EU in 1992. Two major traffic corridors would impact the cultural landscape and improve the economy and society and appearance of the nationstate. The opening of borders towards Central/Eastern Europe, and the loss of power of the `Russian Bear', has introduced new markets and other, new (outer?) rings of development. In this respect, priority was given to plans which would anticipate improvement of traffic conditions and construction of highways along the corridor from Barcelona to Kiev (Marseille-Milano-Trieste/Koper-

115 Table 2. Selected demographic and economic indicators of the Slovenian border municipalities towards EU member states, 1999.

Socio-economic indicators Slovenia - Slovenia - All Slovenian Slovenia

Austria Italy border areas (average)

Size of demographically threatened areas (in %) 41 44 54 28 Index of youth (+ 60 years vs. - 15 Years, in %) 82 110 99 79 Social dependency (in %) 47 39 48 37 Workmigration vs. total workforce (in %) 69 71 71 59 Unemployment rate (in %) 7 6 9 7 Index of Education (high school + vs. all, in %) 19 31 21 44 Income in fishery/agriculture (in %) 20 13 25 13 Income in mining/manufacturing (in %) 42 41 39 41 Income in trade, transportation, tourism, services, education, 38 45 36 46 administration, banking, etc. (in %) Seasonal short-term migration (education/work), (in %) 15 16 10 37

Source: Statistical Office of the RS, 2000.

Ljubljana-Maribor-Budapest). A high-speed train corridor would go along. The reinforcement of this route could improve economies of Southern and Central Europe (Ravbar and Klemen^ci^c, 1993). In Slovenia, 318 km of four-lane highways will be constructed in the time span of ten years (1994-2004). With no exception, all are bound from EU and NATO Italy towards EU Austria and NATO Hungary. The investment, 1,496 million US dollars, is to a large percentage going to be financed by Slovenian and EU funds. The plans to improve the traffic conditions on the route from Austria towards Croatia (the Tauern Route/the Phyrn Route), and further towards Balkans, have been left in drawers. The well constructed and in 1992 opened 7,864 m long KarawankenTunnel/Salzburg (Austria)-Ljubljana-Zagreb(Croatia)/ does not have a straight, four-lane highway continuation towards Europe's Southeast. But, for the first time in history, a direct, modern traffic artery would link the Danubian and Mediterranean basins. As ports Koper, Trieste and Venice would become major gateways. The Slovenian port of Koper with 8.6 million tons of transshipment in 1998 is particularly interested in this development. Hungarian, Slovak and Austrian firms are Koper's main partners. Along the way, the Slovenian population and production axis Ljubljana - Maribor could be further developed. In January 2001 the construction of a 19 km long stretch of the railway line Murska Sobota (Slovenia)-Zalalo"vo" (Hungary), linking Slovenian and the Hungarian railway systems, has been completed. Interestingly enough, the new traffic line is going to be built partly on the same path which was closed and removed due to 1947-1989 `Iron Curtain' closed border circumstances. The World Bank was supportive of this construction and other improvements of the Slovenian Rail. Without any improvement in communications, Slovenia might end up being an obstacle of the European integration and a burden to neighbors ( ^Cerne, 1992).

Often, developments made in a single country's interest can be, within relatively small Europe, hazardous to all, but in particular to the next door neighbor. Due to the result of the inherited communistic central planning and the past administrative Yugoslav state policies, Slovenia is in

several relatively small conflicts with its neighbors. The following are major obstacles for the improvement of better neighborhood relations:*

the nuclear power plant at Krs^ko (dispute with Austria - because of the general nonnuclear policy of the state; dispute with Croatia - due to unsolved inherited question of the ownership),* the nationalized property of the neighboring state's nationals (dispute previously with Italy, now Austria due to own nationals, former citizens of Yugoslavia, who have `left' or were forced to leave Yugoslavia/Slovenia after WW2),* the duty free shops on land border-crossings (dispute with Italy and Austria; Europe's general policy in this regard has forced Slovenia to close DFS in September 2001);* the Croato-Slovene border-line demarcation at 12 different locations (in disagreement with Croatia; in particular in the Northern Adriatic: the case of the four hamlets and the sea-border in the Pirano Bay),* the bank accounts in (former) Slovenian banks (e.g., Ljubljanska banka), outside the present Republic of Slovenia (disagreement with citizens of the former state of Yugoslavia, in particular of the Republic of Croatia) (Gosar, 1996). Slovene citizens' nationalism (the ultra-right SNP - the Slovene National Party, being the only one not supporting the EU-alliance - received, at several elections, between 5 and 10% of votes) is in part understandable - because of the past decade's immigration of peoples from the once Yugoslav South: 238,968 foreigners received Slovenian citizenship in 1992; in addition 40,987 `guest workers' work here. The recent refugee problem (14,432 Muslims and Albanians are hosted; along with several thousand illegal immigrants from Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa: 36,540 were arrested in 2000 because of illegal trespassing of the border) is adding oil to the fire of Slovenian chauvinism.

On the other hand, Slovenia has a couple of requests to its neighbors, hoping for an immediate resolution. The case of Slovene ownership in former Yugoslav republics is, in the

116

Table 3. Slovenia: the ecology problems in comparison (1995).

Subject Austria Italy European EU-candidate Slovenia

Union countries (10)

Emissions CO2/inhabitants (in Tons) 7.0 6.9 8.6 6.5 7.1 Emissions SO2/inhabitants (in Kg) 11 42 80 132 98 Emissions NOx/inhabitants (in Kg) 28 35 34 21 24 Communal waste/inhabitants (in Kg) 316 301 359 - 430 Communal waste in landfills (in %) 67 89 61 - 91 Com.-waste treated in waste-treatment facilities 12 6 22 - 0 (in %) Forests (in %) 47 23 26 39 53 Natural reserves (in %) 24 8 12 14 8 Water use (in %) 2 31 23 11 3

Source: Eurostat, 2000; Plut, 1998. - not known.

successor states, at different stages of resolution. To European business partners, the case of Slovenia is a continuing mystery, as long as the succession of Yugoslavian debts and property will not be solved. The nearness of the Balkan's hot spots works against the image of the state as well. It lowers investment readiness. On the list of safe investments Slovenia ranks behind Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Unsolved problems can have a hindering effect on the future European integration of Slovenia.

Conclusion There is no doubt that Europe is in a remarkable state of change. Clearly, the former `Eastern Europe', now Central/Eastern Europe, is changing rapidly and radically. There are many shocks associated with these processes and more are yet to come. In addition to traumas, the region in general has experienced many positive advances since 1991. There are no truly authoritarian systems in the region, despite the fact that in some countries re-named former communists have gained/remained in power. All states have made some progress economically and politically. Eastern Europe is more heterogeneous than ever before and there is a very clear west-east trend in terms of the rate and success of transformation and transition. Two concerns must be raised:*

first, the attitude and actions of the Western European states are critical to the success of some of the Central/Eastern European states and place obstacles in the path of their sincere will to be integrated into the EU. Central/Eastern Europe and Slovenia look westward for more supportive and collegial policies, especially to Germany, France and the United Kingdom;* second, Russia's opinions about decisions made by NATO, European Union and Central / East Europeans should be taken as just what they are - an opinion. It should be noted that these are remarkably dynamic times, but very dangerous times as well. The area of the Balkans has, once again, proven to be the epicenter of the Shatter Belt tectonics, stretching through Central/Eastern Europe, from Russia to the European Union.

In the last decade of the 20th century the instability and fragmentation of the area has again become a matter of international concern. The weakening of the idea of communism in the world and the implementation of democracy, based on nation-state principles, and combined with the altered center-periphery relationships might be regarded as major factors for the temporary instability. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, two multi-ethnic states of the post-WW1 era, have disintegrated into entities of ethnic dominance. In the later, this has caused violence and wars and resulted into forced migrations, affecting Europe as a whole. The declaration of independence of the Republic of Slovenia on June 25, 1991 was met by fierce fighting. The international community was able to prevent a major outbreak of hostilities. This was not the case in some other parts of the former South Slavic federation, especially in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia-Kosovo and, just recently, in Macedonia. The resolution of the problem, elaborated by different international mediators, has yet to be proven. Slovenia meanwhile developed its political system and economy to the standards of the European Union, surpassing even some of the members in regard to economic power. Within the Shatter Belt a star of prosperity and stability has risen. Slovenia's major advantage is in its geopolitical location, based on the multitude of natural and cultural landscapes. Trade and traffic always was in these peoples prime interest. Preconditions are given for Slovenia to become a major gateway-state of Europe. In particular since the Slovenian window to the seas - the harbor of Koper - experiences unexpected growth and prosperity. Therefore, the fragility and instability of Europe's Shatter Belt can not be discussed pointing to Slovenia as an example. Instead, the new nation-state's gateway location and the multiple characteristics of nature and cultures `On the sunny side of the Alps' soon could become Central/East Europe's guiding light, reflecting democracy and prosperity and showing the way towards European integration.

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