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Shaw discusses the tactical-level relationship that existed between conventional and special operations forces during Operation Uphold Democracy and the problems that arose between these two groups in Haiti's central sector.
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OPERATION Uphold Democracy is now complete. This article discusses the tactical-level relationship that existed between conventional and special operations forces (SOF) in Haiti and focuses on the problems that arose between these two groups in the country's central sector, which included the Port-au-Prince (command post) operations area.1
Units participating in Uphold Democracy conducted after-action reviews (AARs) and produced reports assessing the overall mission's results. The AARs indicate that the operation-with minor exceptions-was a complete success.2 However, interviews I conducted on the interaction and integration of conventional and SOF in Haiti produced a decidedly more negative tone than that found in the official AARs. As a Special Forces (SF) officer, I have personal and professional interests in exploring the problems that occurred while conventional and SOF worked together in Haiti.
Uphold Democracy was a peace operation, yet ironically, before, during and after the operation, a combat mind-set existed in the principal US conventional unit in theater, the lOth Mountain Division (Light) [lOth MD (L)]. A 10th MD (L) AAR quotation stated: "Every movement outside of a compound is a COMBAT OPERATION."3 This type of "warrior" sentiment during and after Uphold Democracy was not generally shared by SOF troops.
One reason for these divergent views stemmed from the dynamic situation in Haiti at the time US troops were committed and from the concerns about force protection that followed. The operations plan began as an invasion, anticipating violence and resistance, thus instilling the combat mind-set on the part of planners and combat troops alike. Security measures in a combat operation include the "protection of soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities and equipment in all locations and situations."4 force protection is "accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services; supported by intelligence, counterintelligence and other security programs."5
Uphold Democracy was executed in a permissive or semipermissive environment, as opposed to the nonpermissive environment assumed in the original invasion plans. The actual mission statement for Multinational Force Haiti, of which the lOth MD (L) was the principal component, was "To establish and maintain a stable and secure environment."6 The last-minute change to the forceful entry operation entailed a dramatic shift from the combat operations that had been planned and, thus, required a different mind-set. A distinct difference in the two operations types is the technique used to ensure force protection.
Operations other than war (OOTW) also requires force protection measures. US Army and joint authoritative doctrine on OOTW define the relationship in terms of principles that relate to both types of operations. "OOTW principles are an extension of warfighting doctrine. Embodied in these principles is the dominance of political objectives at all levels of military operations other than war...."7 A political consideration commanders dealt with was the unacceptability of casualties. After the tragic events in Somalia, the US military fully understood that casualties in Uphold Democracy would not be tolerated.8
During Uphold Democracy, commanders had to establish a secure and stable environment, then enforce the peace, all while avoiding casualties. They were keenly sensitive to the political ramifications of potential casualties and to the consequences of failing to establish peace on the streets of Port-au-Prince and in the Haitian countryside. Therefore, their mission necessitated balancing the required amount of force protection with the techniques of enforcing peace, especially on Port-au-Prince's streets. Commanders wanted to make a show of force without having to use it lest they risk raising the level of tension, thereby putting US troops in greater danger.
OOTW Principles and Operational Necessities
During Uphold Democracy, the US military used different techniques to try to convince the Haitians that an area was secure and ready for them to return to their normal way of life. One technique soldiers employed was to tailor their appearance and actions in a way that simulates a secure environment. Wearing-or not wearing-certain items of equipment sends a nonverbal message to the civilian population concerning the mission's success. Commanders and planners must make assessments and strike a balance between wearing the items needed for protection and sending a message that peace is being enforced. In Uphold Democracy, commanders assessed a high enough threat level to US soldiers to warrant wearing Kevlar combat vests.9 These vests certainly provided the soldiers protection against threats, but did not send a message that the streets were safe and secure.
Although Kevlar combat vests are available to both conventional and SOF troops, a problem over force protection posture arose at several locations where the two forces worked together. One such place was Camp d'Application, an installation identified as a primary target in the US invasion plan. Camp d'Application housed the 55-man 22d Company of the Forces Armes d Haiti (FAd'H) and was considered by US planners to be a more serious threat than other military targets in country. As one planner stated, "If we anticipated any significant counterattack or fight, it would probably come from that unit."10
In the invasion plan, Camp d'Application was initially a SOF target for the US Army Rangers.11 Once the invasion was canceled, however, the target remained part of the peaceful entry operation. Because of its high threat potential, the camp was initially occupied by a strong US force from the 3d Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The SOF troops had orders to identify and inventory weapons and remove the V-150 armored vehicles and other, larger military weapons from the area and render them unserviceable. The task did not promise to be easy-the two forces trying to work together could just as easily have been trying to kill one another had the invasion occurred.
While conducting their mission in the sweltering heat, the SOF troops welcomed the FAd'H's help in counting and uncovering cached weapons. This assistance came through careful and purposeful negotiations designed to convince the FAd'H to cooperate. Uncertain of its own purpose and position as an army, the FAd'H had initially made the situation "very tense." Both forces were trying to get used to one another, yet not lose an ounce of credibility. Over time, each began to earn the other's trust to the point where SOF soldiers could lessen their defenses and shed their Kevlar vests and helmets, allowing them to work more comfortably in the heat. Cooperation replaced confrontation. The turning point came when FAd'H soldiers stopped carrying their weapons and began helping SOF soldiers.12
At one point during the Camp d'Application disarming process, a 10th MD (L) element drove up to the front gate to replace the SOF soldiers. These conventional troops arrived in armored vehicles and were wearing their Kevlar vests and helmets. With guns aimed at the FAd'H soldiers, they demanded entry into the camp. One SF officer at the camp explained that this was totally unexpected.13
As soon as the armored vehicles arrived at the gate, the FAd'H soldiers resumed the highest level of security.14 The SOF soldiers who had persuaded the FAd'H to cooperate, even to the point of putting down their weapons, instantly lost the trust the SOF had worked so hard to obtain. The difference in methodology and degree of necessary force protection between SOF and conventional forces clearly affected this operation.
The conventional force did not understand the SOF methodology employed. The whole episode strained the relationship the US forces had established with the FAd'H in terms of who was in charge and who they could trust. It also strained relationships between the US units involved. At one point, a conventional force commander criticized the SOF for "being out of uniform," for not conducting what he believed were appropriate security measures in the camp and for not applying the "appropriate level of force protection."15 In this case, the SOF troops did not wear the Kevlar vests because they had lowered the level of threat from the FAd'H at the camp. Clearly, there was a different mind-set over the force protection issue.
OOTW principles applied during this event may provide insight into what happened between the SOF and conventional forces. The SOF objective seemed clear-inventory the weapons and render the camp secure and safe for later use. The conventional force's objectives were also clear. They were to relieve the SOF, occupy the camp and take over the inventory and security tasks, thus freeing up the SOF for other operations. Although the objectives for each force were clear and definable, they were never communicated in advance.
Unity of effort This was clearly a problem at the camp. The two US forces did not work together in preparing and planning for integration on the target site. Not only was this a failure in unity of effort, but also a failure of each US force to understand the other's methodology, as well as who was in charge of what at the camp. Doctrine directs forces to "seek unity of effort in every operation," not just in the initial planning.16
Security. This principle was not a problem. The SOF managed security at Camp d'Application at a realistic level over time. That level rose immediately to a higher state when the lUth MD (L) troops arrived on the scene. This heightened security at the camp resulted in an increased sense of distrust by the FAd'H, leading to "everyone carrying guns." In true warrior fashion, the conventional troops tried to force the FAd'H to give up their weapons. What the changed situation clearly required was an appropriate level of restraint.
Restraint. Another OOTW principle, restraint should "apply the appropriate military capability prudently."17 In this case, the SOF had lowered the requirement for security and use of force through their ability to gain the FAd'H's trust. The conventional forces were not used to working under these conditions, and with the operations in Somalia fresh in their minds, they failed in this case to use the appropriate level of restraint required.
Perseverance. In peace operations, a vital ingredient is the preparation for the "measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims."18 In the Camp d'Application example, the type of decisive resolution the occupying conventional force used was not the best answer. The techniques used by SOF personnel to gain FAd'H trust was gradually creating an atmosphere of stability. Unfortunately, the conventional force upset the balance when they showed up ready to fight. Their intent may not have been to "take down" the camp in true military combat style, but that possibility certainly seemed real enough to the FAd'H. Not knowing or understanding the time it had taken to build FAd'H trust worked against the conventional force because of a failure to understand the perseverance necessary to complete the mission more successfully. The conventional troops did not provide the FAd'H with sufficient justification for the level of force protection being used.
Legitimacy. US forces must work toward a "condition based on the perception by a specific audience of the legality, morality or rightness of a set of actions."19 The SOF convinced the FAd'H that the United States was the new legitimate military force on the ground and that there was no point in trying to resist. SOF techniques allowed the FAd'H to remain a professional military force and, along with US troops, to conduct the military procedures required to ensure the camp's security. The conventional force used "strong-arm" tactics against the FAd'H. These were two distinctly different techniques by the two distinctly different forces. In this case, the strong-arm method did not work, thereby making other tasks in the camp much more difficult to accomplish under the "new" conditions set by the lOth MD (L). Of course, there are situations in which both techniques will work.
The integration of SOF and conventional forces at Camp d'Application was strained and problematic. Both techniques were valid, but neither force understood the reasons behind the techniques the other chose. Obviously, both forces thought they were conducting the mission appropriately, using an acceptable force protection level.
Force integration was difficult to plan for and even more difficult to execute. The difficulty of implementing OOTW principles was evident at Camp d'Application. This analysis also suggests how important the principles are in planning and conducting integrated efforts. Planners must consider each principle in order to achieve success in an operation like Uphold Democracy.
There were several other situations that arose during the US occupation of Haiti concerning SOF and conventional force integration. One case involved relocating the forward operating base (FOB) at the Light Industrial Complex (LIC) in Port-au-Prince. The LIC was the warehouse complex for the Port-auPrince port facility and airport. Within the compound, SOF and conventional forces planned and worked together. The LIC was also a secure base of operations for each unit and had separate warehouse-style areas to use for planning and living. The conventional force conducted patrols and operations directly from this complex. The SOF used this complex for planning and, because much of their work was out of the city, for relaxation and preparation for the next mission.
Because the LIC compound was a secure area housing US troops, it required an appropriate military appearance. Certain rules applied inside the compound, such as speed limits, off-limits areas and proper uniforms and protocol-all of this strictly in the sense of conducting a military operation within standards. However, there were certain unwritten rules that placed the SOF at a distinct operational disadvantage while living within a compound dominated by a conventional force's rules.
Unwritten rules inside the LIC ranged from SOF soldiers not being allowed to use a weight room facility controlled by a conventional force element, to minor on-the-spot corrections made on SOF soldiers returning from lengthy field operations. The environment was described by some soldiers as almost discriminatory.20 The rules extended outside the compound as well, adding to the friction. Because of the "warrior" mind-set conventional force commanders took into the operation, SF units found themselves required to wear the Kevlar vest for protection at all times once outside the secure LIC compound.21
I listened to over 70 hours of interviews, many of which contained typical soldier gripes from good soldiers trying to do their jobs. The LIC compound was supposed to act as the operation's hub-the place where the planning occurred and soldiers could get a little rest before going back out to field locations where they worked most of the time. It was a home away from home for the SOF and conventional forces alike, a place where they could get a hot shower, good meal and a break away from the operation. But given the compound's "hostile environment," SOF in general "feared returning to the LIC" and "would rather stay out in the villages in some cases versus going back to the LIC."22 The circumstances at the LIC did not promote the proper cooperative relationship between the two forces but distracted each from the operation's overall purpose.23 That such negative feelings should exist between SOF and conventional forces, especially during an ongoing operation, is very alarming.
The LIC case serves as a reminder for careful planning in setting up a secure administrative environment that will operate efficiently. Again, two OOTW principles are as applicable here as in the Camp d'Application case. There is, for example, no evidence of either force lacking a clear objective while at the LIC. Although each conducted operations separate from the other, both had specific objectives to provide command and control and to conduct necessary coordinations within the compound. Doctrine mentions the problem of "varying views of the objective," and some of the operations themselves were not as clear as the commanders may have wanted, but the daily planning for operations and responsibilities was clear and was doctrinally correct as the forces worked together.24
Unity of effort was not always evident at the LIC. This principle was difficult to implement because of the sometimes strange and complicated command arrangements between the SOF and conventional forces, and the UN and other governmental and nongovernmental participants. Still, doctrine states that OOTW calls for heavy reliance on consensus building to achieve unity of effort.25 The environment described in the interviews does not support this. At higher echelons though, AARs show that the "integration of special operations forces and conventional forces worked well throughout the operation."26
The situation at Camp d'Application and LIC both point to the difference in perceptions at different levels within the military. The view from the tactical level by SOF and conventional forces can be very different from the view presented by those who write the final AARs. Lower-ranking individuals in the military sometimes find release in grumbling about their situation, although their complaints may be overstated. Conversely, higher-ranking officers sometimes seem to paint a more general and optimistic view of the same situation. In assessing both perspectives, the actual truth of a situation can be difficult to uncover.
It is important for both SOF and conventional forces to understand the difference in methodology between the tactics, techniques and procedures unique to each. The diverse techniques used by these two force types may aim at the same eventual end state, but differ in the way the end state is achieved. Now that doctrine establishes various types of organizations, such as the Special Operations Command and Control Element and the Special Operations Coordination Element, the degree of cooperation between SOF and conventional forces should improve. Commanders and their planners must facilitate continued coordination and discussions in order to alleviate future problems such as those encountered during Operation Uphold Democracy.
NOTES
1. Commanders in other sectors of Haiti, notably the country/s northern sector, did not report problems similar to those discussed in this article. A logical explanation for this is the physical distance from the daily command influence of the headquarters in Port-auPrince. Another factor may be the more cooperative leadership styles of both the conventional and special operations forces (SOF) in those areas.
2. I attended several after-action reviews (MRs) once the initial missions were completed, between October 1994 and January 1995. Most MRs were with the Special Forces (SF) or SOF units involved with the initial invasion plan. Additional information concerning MRs can be found in subsequent endnotes. This research was consolidated from a series of interviews I conducted in February 1996 and several others from the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as part of a Haiti study effort focused on the ot history oi Operation Uphold Democracy.
3. 10th Mountain Division (Light) [l ith MD (L)], Operation Uphold Democracy, OPERATIONS IN HAfT Planning/Preparation/Execution, August 1994 Thru January 1995, 22-30. 4. Ibid 5. Ibid.
6. From Multinational Force Haiti Mission Statement in ibid, 1-6 7. US Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Pub 3-7, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Final Draft (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office (GPO), January 1995), 11-8.
8. This reference is to the 3 October 1993, military operation in Mogadishu, Somalia. Sixteen SOF soldiers died in a battle when two helicopters were shot down and US Army Rangers were surrounded by hundreds of Somali militia.
9. Photographs show soldiers wearing Kevlar vests as they conduct "peaceful" patrols on Pat-au-Prince streets. The Kevlar vests are made to stop small-caliber projectiles and smother the effects of larger projectiles. US Congress United States Army Posture Statement, Fiscal Year 96, Statements of Togo D. West and General Gordon R. Sullivan, Selected Committees and Subcommittees of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, February 1995, 104th Congress, 1st session (Washington, DC: GPO, 1995).19.
10. Sean Naylor, The Invasion That Never Was," Army Times, 26 February 1996. 13. Camp d'Application was the heavy weapons company stronghold for the Haitian army.
It housed several Cadillac Gage V-150 Commando armored cars equipped with heavy machineguns. This target was key because of its unknown storage areas and the condition of weapons located in these caches The quote was attributed in the article to Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Bonham, XVIII An)ome Corps plans director. 11. Ibid. 12. I conducted this interview in Port-au-Prince. Haiti on 13 January 1996. 13. At this time in the operation, it was still considered 'normal' for 10th MD (L) soldiers to wear all pf their force protection equipment based on command guidance and their personal situation assessment. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. There was a complete failure of the conventional force to try to understand what the SOF were trying to do and how they were doing it inside the camp. The two types of forces were forced to work this problem out on the ground inside the camp, in front of FAd'H soldiers who were already confused about what was going on. 16. US JCS Joint Pub 3-07, 11-2 17. Ibid. 11-3 18. Ibid. 11-4 19. Ibid. 20. Oral interview with a SOF "A" Team leader and an operations noncommissioned officer assigned to 3d Special Forces Group. 16 January 1996, Port-au-Prince Haiti. 21. From a protocol officer briefing for me upon my arrival at the low-intensity conflict, Port-au-Prince Haiti, January 1995. The briefing concerned the rules, regulations and safety measures to observe while visiting units living at the LIC. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. Throughout the operation there were different levels of planning and sectors developed to meet the requirements of the operations with forward operating bases (FOB) to support and control SOF elements. Under circumstances notunlike those at the LIC, one SF FOB initially set up at Camp d'Application moved to Fort Lamentine, about an hour away due to the conventional force environment. The reason the FOB moved out is important. It shows that SOF planners would rather move away than have to put up with the distractions caused by conventional forces. 24. US JCS Joint Pub 3-07. 11-2 25. Ibid. 26. 10th MD (L), Iperation Uphold Democracy, OPERATIONS IN HAITI 22-2
At the nme he wrote this article, Major Robert C. Shaw was working on a second M.M.A.S. degree as a student in the School of advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.A. from the Citadel and an M.M.A.S. from the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in special operations units, including the 3d Ranger Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, and the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne). He also served as a planner and special operations task force commander in support of Joint Task Force (JTF) 120, JTF 160, JTF 180 and JTF 188 during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti.
Copyright Department of the Army Headquarters Jul/Aug 1997