Systematic Review of the Causes of Latin American States' Compliance With International Human Rights Law

I. INTRODUCTION

Louis Henkin notoriously asserted "almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time."¹ A similar affirmation was made earlier by Hedley Bull, who stated that "[i]f it were possible or meaningful to conduct a quantitative study of obedience to the rules of international law, it might be expected to show that most states obey most agreed rules of international law most of the time."² On the same note, Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes stated "[c]ompliance is the normal organizational presumption."³ If this underlying assumption is embraced,⁴ then it is necessary to question why do states actually comply and more specifically, why do they comply in the particular field of International Human Rights Law.

Darren Hawkins inquired "[w]hy do states create enforceable international human rights norms that empower third parties to prevent and sanction domestic human rights abuses?"⁵ State sovereignty is at the center of the field of International Law, legalized on the principle of non-intervention. Thus, understanding the reason or reasons behind state commitment and observance with the field is an important puzzle to embark upon.

This issue has looked for answers in the different theories of the International Relations field. International Law, for realism, is mainly explained as a tool of state power,⁶ for rational institutionalism, as a system of facilitating cooperation among states⁷ and, for constructivism, as social norms based on shared understandings.⁸ They agree upon always finding some sort of interest for compliance. However, as decision-making is a complex process, usually its causality is not determined by one reason, but by a mixture of motives. Therefore, it is relevant to question if international law shapes state behavior in regard to compliance. The approach of this article will be to review what various scholars have concluded over time through the examination of possible reasons for compliance; reviewing what mainstream theories of International Relations state; and revising factors as sanction for non-compliance or deterrence, ethics, or commitment to law, sense of membership, reputation, naming and shaming, persuasion, capacity as a management issue and domestic politics, and explanations given by the notions of Darren Hawkins and Wade Jacoby's partial compliance, Thomas...