NATIONAL RESILIENCE TO HYBRID THREATS AND THE SECURITY CULTURE. A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

Abstract

The present paper presents the main challenges and drivers of the emerging hybrid threats with security impact. Subsequently, considering these specific elements, we argue the need for a new resilience-based approach for the management of such threats and security risks. Nation-state and its various constituent elements (public institutions, civil society and critical infrastructure) is at the center of the approach we describe, revealing several options that might be useful in designing a security culture-based conceptual framework of national resilience to hybrid threats.

Headnote

The present paper presents the main challenges and drivers of the emerging hybrid threats with security impact. Subsequently, considering these specific elements, we argue the need for a new resilience-based approach for the management of such threats and security risks. Nation-state and its various constituent elements (public institutions, civil society and critical infrastructure) is at the center of the approach we describe, revealing several options that might be useful in designing a security culture-based conceptual framework of national resilience to hybrid threats.

Keywords: hybrid threats; hybrid warfare; nationalresilience; security culture; vulnerability; fake news.

Preliminary considerations

The recent security developments - like the annexation of Crimea and destabilization in eastern Ukraine and the proliferation of cyber and informational threats for the purpose of influencing social perceptions and political processes in some Western states (e.g. US and France) - are emerging security challenges that need to be addressed both nationally and through an enhanced and extensive external cooperation.

The most recent hybrid threats' patterns reveal, on the one hand, the complexity of these type of threats derived from the multiple combinations of the hybrid aggressor's methods and means implemented to achieve its strategic objective (which represents, in fact, the quintessence of hybrid warfare) and, on the other hand, the need for a whole of society (public institutions, private companies, academia etc.) effort to address these kind of threats. Our approach is related to this latter objective and aims to develop a conceptual framework for national resilience to hybrid threats based on enhancing security culture. Such a model might support a better understanding of the concepts we operate with - hybrid threats, national resilience and security culture - as well as the results from their cross-intersection.

We consider that such an action must first start by identifying the specific drivers that determine how hybrid threats appear, as well as known patterns, derived from the analysis of recent hybrid actions. These elements and aspects resulting from the analysis of the relationship that can be established between hybrid threats and national resilience can ultimately support the projection of an analytical framework for managing the response to hybrid threats, which might be applicable also for enhancing security culture at national level.

1.Hybrid threats - a new challenge to national security

The fight against hybrid threats was identified as one of the priority areas of NATO and EU cooperation for the first time during 2016 Warsaw NATO summit. The Joint Report of the European Commission and of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy issued in 2017 described the European security environment as significantly affected by hybrid actions: "hybrid activities are becoming a frequent feature of the European security environment. The intensity of these activities is increasing with growing concerns over elections being interfered with, disinformation campaigns, malicious cyber activities and perpetrators of hybrid acts trying to radicalize vulnerable members of society as their proxy actors. Vulnerabilities to hybrid threats are not limited to national boundaries."1. In this way, it was practically recognized not only that the effects of hybrid threats exceeded the Member States' borders (and that these effects were actually felt at European level) but also that "European security has become a negotiated, contested and combatted issue"2 as a result of new challenges derived from the actions of both state and non-state actors.

If during the Cold War security developments were defined by the confrontation of two dominant military superpowers, nowadays the global security environment is much more difficult to be described in the same terms or by referring to the prevalence of conventional means of deterrence. However, this change does not make the conventional threats less relevant nor it means that the classical military threats are felt less intense at the level of some international actors. These threats continue to manifest, but they overlap on the unconventional and asymmetric threats favoring the emergence of new hybrid threats. These current threats are multidimensional and the connections between the different hostile activities that define them are becoming blurred, unclear and sometimes very difficult, if not impossible to be confirmed and assessed. This kind of threats (of a hybrid nature) manifests at the limit of conflict escalation between two or more actors. If the interests and objectives of the aggressor using such tactics are not met and especially if his actions are not detected in time, the conflict may escalate into a hybrid war3. Hybrid threats are and might be used to define a new reality in which new military tactics might be tested4, the most eloquent example in this regard being the conflict in Ukraine in 2014. Therefore, for states prone to hybrid threats, a first effort should be undertaken to understand the instruments used in these hostile activities and the principles according to which these activities are carried out.

Combining different methods and means is ubiquitous in classic military actions. This peculiarity, drawn from the general theory of war, makes unfeasible the hybrid war thesis (because, in essence, war has always been hybrid!). Also, this type of strategy (hybrid by its nature), whereby several power instruments are used simultaneously and complementary to achieve a common goal, existed long before the illegal annexation of Crimea and the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant. A hybrid actor can opt for "vertical escalation", by intensifying actions specific to one or more instruments of power, or for "horizontal escalation", by synchronizing multiple instruments to achieve a greater combined effect5 against its target.

Unlike hybrid war, what is essential to remember about hybrid threats relates to the interconnection between different and specific activities and, moreover, to the difficulty in establishing the connections between these activities outside the framework of an armed conflict.

In the Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats, drafted by the European Commission in 2016, a first definition of hybrid threats is proposed, which is, in our view, a starting point in the concept operationalization processes at the member states level. Hybrid threats are described as "the mixture of coercive and subversive activity, conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological), which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare. There is usually an emphasis on exploiting the vulnerabilities of the target and on generating ambiguity to hinder decision-making processes. Massive disinformation campaigns, using social media to control the political narrative or to radicalize, recruit and direct proxy actors can be vehicles for hybrid threats"6.

The range of methods and activities associated with hybrid threats is much wider, unlike other types of threats, conventional and/or asymmetric, we are familiar with. Thus, if connected on the same strategic objective, hybrid actions may include activities of influence through propaganda and disinformation, economic pressures by exploiting the vulnerabilities of a particular actor (e.g.: energy dependence), lawfare actions and even military activities (e.g.: demonstrations of force, border security incidents like violations of national airspace and waters etc.) conducted to influence the decision making processes and population of the target.

Therefore, hybrid threats refer to the instruments, methods and means used by a potential aggressor - who might be both a state or a non-state actor - to promote its own interests, strategies and objectives7 in relation to his opponent(s). As a tendency in the current heavily globalized international system, weaker revisionist state actors are acting according with their own agenda by implementing hybrid strategies in contested grey zone areas. Besides state actors, non-state entities (e.g. terrorist organizations) pursue hybrid actions to popularize their operational successes, their own ideological models on targeted audiences and/or to conduct specific rebranding activities. These are new and challenging topics for the Western countries, EU and NATO, which will inevitably have to identify appropriate cooperation options to address them.

In hybrid scenarios, unconventional actions are increasingly present, while the military, classical or conventional, operations are limited and, often, used to enhance the effects of the political, diplomatic, economic, informational and/or cyber activities. New types of threats (hybrid) are multidomain, exhibit a high degree of synchronization and generate non-linear and difficult to (rapidly) assess effects.

A recent study8, developed in the academic and research field in Sweden and Finland reveals the factors contributing to the emergence of hybrid threats9, namely:

* The post-Cold War change of international order. In the new international system "the power to change beliefs, attitudes, preferences, opinions, expectations, emotions and/ or predispositions to act - is today more important than material power"10. Nowadays, that the world is experiencing the "dark side" of globalization11, the role of the nation-state comes into question, likewise the alliances with their rules and principles that limit the responses to asymmetric and hybrid actions.

* Globalization, advanced communication technologies and online developments are instrumental in increasing the operational potential of both state and non-state actors (e.g. multinational corporations, groups of hackers, terrorist groups etc.) in less rule-based operational domains, such as cyberspace.

* The emergence of new areas of confrontation, such as cyberspace, where the "rules of the game " have not been created yet. With the exception of cyber means and technologies, most of the means used in hybrid conflicts - such as propaganda and political/ diplomatic or economic actions - are not new. Actions in cyberspace offer both new tools of action (like cyber espionage and fake news), but also new opportunities to maximize the effect of traditional instruments of influence (political/ diplomatic, economic, informational, etc.).

* Exploiting the potential of new media technologies, as well as new tools for social influences. The high speed of information flow, the way information is produced and how social communities can connect beyond national borders are the result of the global process of digitization and the advanced development of social media tools. Trust, one of the fundamental pillars in democratic societies, is eroding under the influence of modern manipulation techniques. The internet has become the new "tactical field" of confrontation, and propaganda, disinformation and fake news are the new weapons to be used in (hybrid) warfare.

* A clear delimitation between peace and war is increasingly difficult to achieve. The target does not realize the real situation or if it is at war until the military instrument is used even by short scale or dissimulated operations (like the "little green men" in Crimea in 2014).

2.Enhancing national resilience - a strategic option to manage hybrid threats

In the last years, academia and various national and European institutions12 have been increasingly discussing about "resilience" outside the concept's traditional area of applicability13. If previous approaches on resilience in security studies were, in particular, to reduce the exposure of critical infrastructure to external shocks, the question now arises whether or not these models are useful and can also be extended to complex adaptive systems such as social systems (private organizations, public institutions, social communities or even nation states), in a way that may help strengthening national security and its social dimension.

In most cases, the institutional emergency response policies have been instruments used to enhance the resilience of complex systems (both physical and social systems) following their exposure to extreme, random and very difficult (if not impossible) to anticipate events, like calamities and/or natural disasters. States have been and are still concerned, for example, about minimizing the negative, ecological and social effects generated by extreme weather phenomena (earthquakes, tropical storms, eruptions of volcanoes etc.). To achieve this objective, national authorities have developed contingency plans which, through the specific response measures they include, contribute to enhancing the social and critical infrastructure resilience to these types of threats.

The analysis of the literature reveals that resilience is both a feature and a process of social systems. Both attributes are observable during or after exposure to external actions with disruptive potential.

Although the social systems have a naturally ability to bounce back when exposed to shocks and to adapt, this is never enough to guarantee their survival. This is why it needs an effort to permanently prepare for the worst as a way to achieve resilience that, however, should not be seen as an absolute attribute of social systems. Therefore, resilience is a property of social systems because, in principle, any social system has self-regulating functions that keep them functional, despite the "damage" produced by external shocks, and allow them to adapt to the new conditions of the environment and to reorganize, sooner or later, in the sense of becoming "antifragile". Antifragile systems are those organizations that have the ability to learn from their own experiences and profit from uncertainty and volatility14.

Christophe Béné et al.15 define resilience as the capacity of the systems:

* to resist/cope with the challenges in the external environment; in this case, resilience is defined by resistance/persistence of systems functionality and an increased attention should be paid to critical infrastructure elements;

* to adapt to dynamical changes in the security environment;

* to transform/learn in the sense of becoming stronger in the face of new security challenges.

Learning capacity is an essential attribute of resilient social systems from private companies, public institutions, non-governmental organizations, up to large-scale social systems, such as state and international organizations. Lessons learned lead to the sedimentation and consolidation of the security culture of these systems.

The thesis saying that resilience is a (predefined) characteristic of complex social systems inevitably arises some questions whose response might facilitate a better understanding of the concept. If these systems have a certain degree of resilience, then why do they need to become more resilient? Why is it not sufficient to address resilience as a property of social systems? Why is it necessary to generate a process within these systems that leads to increasing their resilience to the threats they face or have to deal with?

The speed of changes in the integrative environments of the different social systems determine the need to train their resilience capacities on each of the three previously specified dimensions - robustness/continuity, adaptation/flexibility and transformation/ learning. Also, addressing resilience as a process arises as a necessity amid the diversification of non-conventional security threats (manifested in new and unregulated operational domains, like cyberspace), the resistance to change of the public bureaucratic institutions and the increase in social interconnection, as an effect of digitization in the economic sector and in the media industry.

Resilience development cannot be achieved otherwise than through processes established at different systems' levels (in a multilayered approach). In the case of nation states, for example, such a process is an integrative one that include public authorities and civil society actors' participation.

From a resilience perspective, risk management is based, also, on an integrated analysis of threats and vulnerabilities (identified in connection to the threats). Such an approach emphasizes the need to identify the weaknesses, exploited in the hybrid register by a potential hybrid opponent. Although this approach is much more anchored in the present, on the system ability to respond the security challenges that impact its future evolution, it also stresses the acute need for the "knowledge of the future". Therefore, from a resilience perspective, it is much easier to determine whether a system is fragile under certain specific environmental conditions (in our case, the manifestation of hybrid actions), rather than being obsessed to accurately anticipate the future uncertain developments. In this approach, we need to accept volatility, understand the stressful factors that affect/can affect the system and identify possibilities to make it stronger and more efficient.

In such a context, a systemic and processoriented approach becomes extremely relevant because many types of threats affecting societies are now covariant, in the sense that they simultaneously affect several segments or even large communities (and hybrid threats create such effects!). Such an effort must be an interagency and a collaborative one - focused on strengthening the public-private partnership and the state and society bound. This approach is necessary in order to be able to contribute to a satisfactory reduction of the nation states (and different physical and social systems within them) level of exposure to the different types of external actions that endanger their security.

3.Managing hybrid threat response - an analytical framework

In our view, any satisfactory results cannot be achieved if the following key questions are not pursued in the processes devoted to the management of hybrid threats: What are the national vulnerabilities that need to be addressed in the first place? How could an opponent take advantage of these vulnerabilities? What are the relevant scenarios of the threat? Are all sectors of society engaged in defense and are they prepared to act in situations of exposure to hybrid aggression?

Both theory and empirical examples (emerging from recent developments in the global and regional security environment), allow us to advance a possible useful analytical framework to properly deal with hybrid threats. This framework includes the following steps:

1)Identification of the instruments ofpower that the opponent could use in hybrid actions

At this stage, it is important to conduct an analysis on the different instruments of power that a potential opponent could use in a hybrid confrontation scenario. We believe that this analysis is necessary in order to be able to make it easier to assess how these instruments can be synchronized in practice and to assess the nonlinear effects of the hybrid hostile actions.

The analysis of recent hybrid patterns reveals a number of specific trends of the threats in the information and cyberspace domains that can be found in hybrid strategies and scenarios:

* The use of propaganda as a prevalent means of action

We are currently confronting with the "weaponization" of information as a specific warfare function16. This process of "weaponization" reveals something that is unrelated to the objectives of the propaganda - which remain the same and associated with the intent to influence the target political decision and population as well as its own population in order to legitimate its future actions (the aggressor delivers to his own audience an image of a victim which is forced to act in self-defenses). The novelty aspect lies in the means used in propaganda actions. New media technologies and social networks can be vectors of aggression in the informational domain. They are used to maximize the effects of a campaign in a hybrid confrontation. The costs of exploiting these means are low in relation to the proposed strategic objective of destabilizing the opponent17.

In order to successfully carry out information operations, two essential conditions must be met18, the channel through which information can reach targeted audiences (e.g. traditional media sources and social media platforms) and detailed information and knowledge of the target which provides the ability to develop those informational constructs that bring to the aggressor advantages in the hybrid scenario. Such constructions may include, where appropriate, opinions on sensitive topics for the target audience concerned, data leaks or fake news spreading.

* Control on local media which benefit of wide audiences, both inside and outside of the aggressor territory

Subservient media might become very efficient when the articles they publish are taken over by foreign popular media sources19.

* Social media offers new possibilities to a potential aggressor intending to gain access to the media and the general public of the targets concerned.

Disinformation can be particularly effective given the high prevalence among the general public accessing news through social networks.

Social media platforms' business models, as well as media publications - also users of social networks - are based on generating content based on users' preferences captive in their "echo chambers"20 - limiting their knowledge universe to the content consumed and to the "people" with whom they share the same ideas and values. This is a practice for which social media platforms are much blamed and criticized.

Social media platforms are thus becoming news "aggregators" that can be easily used to promote disinformation and fake news - through state-sponsored accounts, botnet networks, trolls - which, in this way, go directly to the target audience. This appears to have been one of the particularities of the information campaign in the last US presidential elections, when numerous news from Russian media sources were then taken over and rolled into Twitter and Facebook through botnets and trolls, generating algorithms based on misleading or false consumption trends and the risk of takeover and popularity by local media sources21.

* Fake news widespread use in order to influence the perception of target audiences

Fake news are more than just false stories. They include information that deliberately distorts the truth and seeks a specific objective, usually associated with the satisfaction of hostile interests. In contrast to fake news, false stories can be generated by causes that indicate superficiality in media documentation or lack of professionalism, but also of interests derived from editorial policy that can be reflected in the content and the manner in which the information is presented.

Fake news dissemination is frequently performed via social media channels due to the absence of "filters" or instruments for verifying the veracity of the online information. Most of the time, this type of filter is found exclusively at the end-user level. Even if social media platforms develop new instruments to verify published postings, their complete content removal is difficult, if not impossible, because of the algorithmic model after which these platforms function, which allows "rolling" information from one user to another. It is also unlikely that mainstream media distribution through social networks of promoted articles that are suspicious of fake news would stop. As long as they have a high level of popularity among users, this scenario seems unattainable. Beyond the advantages and opportunities offered by the new era of digitization, one of the major challenges we have to face is related to the social ability to process the information, especially if fake news will end up generating trends in social media or be taken over and reported by other media in search of "sensational" news.

* The existence of platforms that facilitate publication of data leaks (e.g. WikiLeaks, DCleaks.com), obtained through cyber espionage actions (such actions would have been carried out in recent US and France elections)22.

It is very difficult and it is incumbent on the specialized security structures to identify the connections between these platforms and the hybrid actor interested in the publication of sensitive and sensational information, with the ultimate consumer only having the precautionary measure and its own critical sense as a defense instrument in the face of manipulation.

2) Assessment of the vulnerabilities, based on the assumption that, in hybrid actions, the aggressor acts by exploiting social sensibilities

Gregory F. Treverton provides enough useful landmarks23 on this topic. This analysis includes two steps: identifying critical functions of society and assessing the vulnerability dimensions.

Identification of social critical functions

One direction could target how much the state is dependent on digital services and how vulnerable they are to cyber aggression. The assessment should probably include a relevant set of threat scenarios that can be used to support the processes related to strengthening national resilience on its social and cyber dimension.

Assessing vulnerability dimensions

Geography or proximity to the potential source of threat will amplify certain social fears represented by the impending of a possible hostile action, which could be for instance of conventional/military nature. This is clearly an effect that worries national security decision makers and experts.

The social and political security dimensions are equally relevant at this stage. The existing social fault lines, generated by conflictual opinions and beliefs between different ethnic communities, generations, social classes, livelihood (rural versus urban), and the way information is consumed by different social classes (online media, radio/television, social media) as long as their preferences and interests are exploitable factors in information campaigns. At the same time, the orientation of the state's foreign policy and the changes of social perception, as well as the relationship between authorities and society (the degree of confidence of the population in public institutions) are themes that can be found in hybrid actions.

3) Identification of the objectives that the opponent might pursue in relation to existing vulnerabilities

This could be done in conjunction with the hybrid actor's instruments of power. Hybrid defense planning must be based on the understanding of the motivations and objectives indicating the opponent's actions and identifying possible targets for the opponent's hybrid operations. In other words, the planning process should answer to the questions: what should be defended? and for what reason? For example, information operations carried out through media and social media as well as cyber-attacks are not instruments used in a hybrid action strategy if they cannot be connected to a strategic objective along with other means of action (political, economic, etc.). In other words, the presence of an informational campaign does not guarantee that the opponent has employed or will necessarily use other means of action (political, economic, etc.), but could be an indicator of a potential hybrid strategy24.

4)Calibrating means of response to hybrid threats that are applicable to enhance the national security culture

Based on the premise that hybrid threats are manifested, with predilection, in the cognitive field, at the level of civil society, with multiple implications in the national security25, an enhanced security culture approach - as an exponent of national resilience to hybrid threats - is more than necessary.

Security culture is generically defined as "the ideas, customs and social behaviours of a particular people or group that help them be free from threat and danger"26. Security culture involves two interconnected dimensions:

* knowledge - refers to the degree the population is aware of security issues and its perception of several strategic strands of action deriving from the answers to fundamental questions such as who is the opponent?, how does he threaten us? and how can we effectively manage the threats?21.

* behavior - expresses the use of knowledge in people's way of reporting on a particular security issue with an impact on the community they belong to; refers to the active participation of the society in the management of security issues. We consider that critical thinking abilities are also a measure of a social healthful behavior from the security point of view.

The process initiated towards the development of the security culture can be designed on three levels: individual - refers to the cultivation of each person's ideas and principles (aimed at the mental and spiritual dimension), social - refers to the organizational values development and to an action-related consciousness for the benefit of the social security and material - relates to the existential resources at the level of society.

Conclusions

The interconnection between physical, digital and social domains - as an effect of the developments generated by the fourth industrial revolution that we are experiencing - makes the hybrid aggressions become much more accessible to state and non-state actors, which uses them to support their own strategic interests. The hybrid nature of the new types of threats is a reflection of the developments in Ukraine and Syria but also in western democracies that claim a high degree of exposure to hostile information operations and cyber-attacks, in order to influence the perception of the population and the internal political processes.

The new era of hybrid threats puts into question the nation-state role and, equally, the efficiency of regional cooperation formats and the alliances to which they belong, as well as existing international law rules, which either limit or fail to provide an appropriate framework for responding to this kind of action.

In the new security context, defined by hybrid manifestations in the conduct of international actors, resilience and security are not incompatible concepts. However, resilience should not be considered an alternative to national security but, on the contrary, an innovative way of enhancing it. This possible new security perspective should be much more flexible, so it would allow deterrence and countermeasures and the use of a wide range of instruments, as a result of the cooperative efforts between civil (public and private) sectors and the military sector.

The complexity of hybrid threats tests the responsiveness of public institutions and the existing connection between society and central authorities. Therefore, in the pre-manifestation phase of the threat, awareness of the danger and strengthening the partnership between public institutions and civil society are paramount to increasing social resilience. We believe that stepping up the effort to identify smart solutions by enhancing security culture can support the development of social/community resilience on medium and long term.

The social dimension of security must represent - alongside the initiatives to strengthen the institutional capacity to respond to the strategic decision, defense, public order and national security and the level of critical infrastructure (transport, communications, energy, etc.) - as a complementary function of good governance that can sustain, on long term, a whole of government strategic approach - in formulating response measures to hybrid threats. One of the useful options that we support in this respect is the need to promote policies that contribute to the development of security culture, as one of these measures.

The relationship between the government and the population in the hybrid context is essential. National resilience to hybrid threats does not only imply specific response measures designed at institutional level (how do authorities prepare to respond in the event of aggression?), but it is a process that includes all the elements of a nation, including the participation of the society. The development of the security culture should not only cover the confidence building in the national security institutions, but also concrete measures aimed at increasing the level of social knowledge/awareness about emerging/ revolutionary forms of manifestation of security threats, as well as concrete policies to tackle new actions in cyberspace and information operations - such as actions to minimize the large scale effects generated by fake news.

Footnote

1 ··· Joint Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the Implementation of the Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats - a European Union Response, 2017, p. 3, URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN/TXT /HTML/?uri=CELEX :52017JC0030&from= GA, accessed on 12.05.2018.

2 Matti Saarelainen, Hybrid threats - what are we talking about?, European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, Helsinki, 2017, URL: https://www.hybridcoe.fi/news/hybrid-threats-what-are-we-talking-about/, accessed on 10.05.2018.

3 Ibidem.

4 Ibidem.

5 Patrick J. Cullen, Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud, MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare, 2017, p. 8, URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/647776/dar_mcdc_ hybrid_warfare.pdf, accessed on 01.05.2018.

6 ··· Joint Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the Implementation of the Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats - a European Union Response, 2017, p. 3, URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52017JC0030&from=GA, accessed on 12.05.2018.

7 Matti Saarelainen, op.cit.

8 Gregory F. Treverton, Andrew Thvedt, Alicia R. Chen, Kathy Lee, Madeline McCue, Addressing Hybrid Threats, Swedish Defence University, 2018, URL: https://www. hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Treverton-AddressingHybridThreats.pdf, accessed on 01.05.2018.

9 Ibidem, pp. 1-2.

10 Ibidem, p. 1.

11 Ibidem.

12 A.N.: such explicit references are found in the content of documents adopted at EU and NATO level, but also in the various strategies developed at national level.

13 A.N.: in engineering sciences, ecology, social sciences (organization theory, psychology) or economics.

14 Nicholas Nassim Taleb, Antifragile, Random House New York, 2012, p. 17.

15 Christophe Béné, Rachel Godfrey Wood, Andrew Newsham, Mark Davies, Resilience: New Utopia or New Tyranny? Reflection about the Potentials and Limits of the Concept of Resilience in Relation to Vulnerability Reduction Programmes, Institute of Development Studies, 2012, p. 21, URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/ epdf/10.1111/j.2040-0209.2012.00405.x, accessed on 12.05.2018.

16 Iulian Chifu, "Pulsul planetei. Militarizarea şi transformarea informaţiei în armă de război", Evenimentul Zilei, URL: https://evz.ro/pulsul-planetei-militarizarea-si-transformarea-informatiei-in-arma-de-razboi.html, accesed on 01.05.2018.

17 N.A.: If we only think, by comparison, of the (operational) limitations that states had during Cold War attempt to implant a piece of news or an article in a publication in another state.

18 Gregory F. Treverton, Andrew Thvedt, Alicia R. Chen, Kathy Lee, Madeline McCue, op.cit., p. 46.

19 Ibidem, p. 47.

20 ··· Facebook în era post-adevărului, URL: http:// intelligence.sri.ro/facebook-era-post-adevarului/, accessed on 02.05.2018.

21 Gregory F. Treverton, Andrew Thvedt, Alicia R. Chen, Kathy Lee, Madeline McCue, op.cit., p. 47.

22Ibidem.

23Ibidem.

24 Ibidem, p. 19.

25 A N.: for example, affecting social cohesion in crisis situations that the target state can undergo, undermining public confidence in state institutions, changing perceptions in the population in relation to certain sensitive topics of public debate, etc.

26 Kai Roer, Build a Security Culture, IT Governance Publishing, 2015, p. 6, URL: https://news.asis.io/sites/ default/files/Build%20a%20Secuirty%20Culture%20 %28Fundamentals%20Series%29%20by%20Kai%20 Roer.pdf, accessed on 28.05.2018.

27 Lucian Dumitrescu, Lansarea barometrului culturii de securitate. Ce este cultura de securitate?, Bucureşti: Fundaţia Universitară aMăriiNegre,2018, in "Adevărul", URL: https:// adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/lansarea-barometrului-culturiisecuritate-cultura-securitate-1_5acf1cf9df52022f75bd1153/ index.html, accessed on 28.05.2018.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT:

This article is an integral part of the scientific research project entitled Culture of security and national resilience to hybrid threats, conducted during 2018, within the Romanian Academy of Scientists.