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Polit Behav (2010) 32:303330
DOI 10.1007/s11109-010-9112-2
ORIGINAL PAPER
Brendan Nyhan Jason Reier
Published online: 30 March 2010 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010
Abstract An extensive literature addresses citizen ignorance, but very little research focuses on misperceptions. Can these false or unsubstantiated beliefs about politics be corrected? Previous studies have not tested the efcacy of corrections in a realistic format. We conducted four experiments in which subjects read mock news articles that included either a misleading claim from a politician, or a misleading claim and a correction. Results indicate that corrections frequently fail to reduce misperceptions among the targeted ideological group. We also document several instances of a backre effect in which corrections actually increase misperceptions among the group in question.
Keywords Misperceptions Misinformation Ignorance Knowledge
Correction Backre
It aint what you dont know that gets you into trouble. Its what you know for sure that just aint so.-Mark Twain
A previous version of this paper was presented at the 2006 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. We thank anonymous reviewers, the editors, and audiences at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Northwestern University, and the Duke Political Science Graduate Student Colloquium for valuable feedback.
B. Nyhan (&)
School of Public Health, University of Michigan, 1420 Washington Heights, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USAe-mail: [email protected]
J. Reier
Department of Political Science, Georgia State University, 38 Peachtree Center Ave., Suite 1005, Atlanta, GA 30303, USAe-mail: [email protected]
When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions
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304 Polit Behav (2010) 32:303330
A substantial amount of scholarship in political science has sought to determine whether citizens can participate meaningfully in politics. Recent work has shown that most citizens appear to lack factual knowledge about political matters (see, e.g., Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) and that this decit affects the issue opinions that they express (Althaus 1998; Kuklinski et al. 2000; Gilens 2001). Some scholars respond that citizens can successfully use heuristics, or information shortcuts, as a substitute for detailed factual information in some circumstances (Popkin 1991; Sniderman et al. 1991; Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998).1
However, as Kuklinski et al. point out (Kuklinski et al. 2000, p. 792), there is an important distinction between being uninformed and being misinformed. Advocates of heuristics typically assume that...