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This paper is the first in a sequence of INSS Strategic Forums dedicated to multinational exploration of the strategic and defense challenges faced by Baltic states in close proximity to a resurgent Russia that the U.S. National Security Strategy describes as "using subversive measures to weaken the credibility of America's commitment to Europe, undermine transatlantic unity, and weaken European institutions and governments."1 The American and European authors of this paper, along with many others, came together in late 2017 to begin exploration of the most significant Baltic states security challenges through focused strategic research and a series of multinational, interactive theater wargames sponsored by the U.S. National Defense University and Swedish Defence University. This first paper highlights early research and wargaming insights indicating the importance of denial-based deterrence for protection of the Baltic states from potential Russian aggression. It also provides recommendations for how the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States, and the Baltic states can best improve their ground, maritime, and air forces to generate credible denial-based deterrence.
The worst-case military scenario for the Baltic states is the one described in a 2016 RAND wargame.2 In this scenario, Russian conventional forces overwhelm Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania within days while maintaining a robust antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) bubble in Kaliningrad. Inspired by success, Russia then invades Swedish Gotland and/or the Finnish Aland Islands in
order to dominate the Baltic Sea. Several military analysts have argued that Russia might seek to achieve the strategic surprise necessary for such stunning success, under the guise of a military exercise, and present NATO with a fait accompli.3 Seizing the initiative through preemption and surprise is one way a militarily inferior country could achieve victory over a militarily superior adversary. This principle especially holds when strategic aims are limited. In this scenario, a militarily inferior country could hope to achieve a situation where the costs to its adversary of reversing its initial success would exceed any perceived benefits; therefore, the adversary would instead choose to live with the results of the initial offensive.
As outlined, the RAND scenario leaves NATO with a series of bad options. To deter Russia from such a gambit, the Alliance could deploy ground forces forward in sufficient numbers to defend the Baltics. To this end,...