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In this article I argue that "criminal justice" logic rests on a thoroughly utopian interpretation of humans, justice institutions, and society, and that penal abolition logic rests on a grounded realism that is nonutopian. I demonstrate this by questioning the concepts and data entailed in three "criminal justice" assumptions: (1) that most people are good (law abiding) and some are bad ("criminals"); (2) that our "criminal justice" institutions (law, police, courts, and prisons), by the threat and/ or imposition of punishment, can be and are an effective social control mechanism to prevent "crime" ; and (3) that by controlling "criminal" persons through "criminal justice" institutions, we construct the good society (an ordered existence, justice and public safety, and a meaningful, shared community life). I show that these claims are not supported by the evidence. Because penal abolition is a call to abolish "criminal justice," it is actually a call to end utopian thinking about persons, utopist acting of institutions, and utopian visions of society.
"Criminal justice is about punishing law-breakers, protecting the innocent, the fair administration ofjustice, and fiscal responsibility in a manner that is responsive to the needs of communities." (Goodlatte & Conyers 2015)
THE ABOVE EPIGRAPH IS A SUCCINCT AND PRECISE PORTRAYAL OF WHAT I will argue in this article is the utopian perspective of "criminal justice" logic. As it notes, allegedly, "criminal justice"1 is about (1) distinguishing who among us are the lawbreakers, (2) punishing them via our institutions to provide justice and to ensure protection of the innocent, and (3) in this manner addressing the needs of our communities. The statement is telling because it is issued by the House Judiciary Committee, which has primary jurisdiction over the US criminal code and is celebrated as bipartisan (Altman & Rhodan 2015).
Leaving aside the rich body of arguments and evidence demonstrating that "criminal justice"-historically and in modern practice-is far more centered on the work of colonialism (Comack 2012, Dobchuk-Land 2017), white supremacy (Childs 2015, Saleh-Hanna 2017), and racial capitalism (Blackmon 2009, Oshinsky 1996, Robinson 1983) than any of the above objectives, in this article I focus on the penal project's other work: responding to transgression (what it calls "crime").2 The question I pose in this essay is where on the spectrum...