Biosociology of Dominance and Deference

Abstract

Mazur argues-with due mention of various caveats, such as the lack of evolutionary directionality in primates of some behaviors, such as mating patterns-that the major groups of primates, arranged by date of appearance from the most ancient (prosimians) to the most recent (African apes and humans), form a quasi-evolutionary sequence that permits inference on the probable evolution of human nature (as it relates to hierarchies) from observation of the behavior of living primates. The author discusses the implicit but complex rules guiding the use of language in conversation and argumentation, bringing to bear a diverse array of examples where dominance contests take place in verbal interaction, sometimes with far-ranging historical consequences: a movie barroom challenge involving Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid, real legal argument between Clarence Darrow and William Jennings Bryan in the Scopes trial, test of will between John F. Kennedy and Nikita Krushchev during the Cuban crisis, and an extraordinarily revealing exchange of telegrams between Tsar Nicholas of Russia and Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany on the eve of World War I. These are striking illustrations of human sophistication (and foolishness) in using symbolic manipulation to prevail in (it turns out) highly personalized dominance contests.

Biosociology of Dominance and Deference, by Allan Mazur. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005. 184 pp. $21.95 paper. ISBN: 0742536939.

Veteran biosociologist Allan Mazur has written a tightly reasoned book about biological mechanisms underlying face-to-face human dominance hierarchies, defined as "fairly persistent, unequal rankings of members in terms of power, influence, and access to valued prerogatives" (p. 7). Many sociologists will find the author's view on the relationship between biology and sociology appealing-or at least non-threatening. The author eschews imperialistic claims from either side: "We seek a middle road, avoiding the strong genetic and selectionist assumptions of classic ethology and sociobiology, while rejecting as well the biologically immaculate view of contemporary sociology" (p. 3). The continuity of physiological and psychological mechanisms of dominance between the animal world (especially closely phylogenetically related apes) and our species is most striking at the level of face-to-face, small group interactions. Technologically advanced agrarian and industrial societies also contain large-scale official hierarchies (formal organizations) and socioeconomic hierarchies (social class systems) that have no direct counterpart in the animal world. As Mazur points out, however, large-scale hierarchies typically resolve into locally autonomous primary groups whose members know each other personally, and dominance hierarchies originating within these primary groups "permeate all larger human social structures." Thus, understanding the biology of dominance in primary groups is essential for understanding hierarchies on a larger scale.

Evolution by natural selection affects not only the shape of bones and other "hard" parts, but also the structure of the brain and the physiological mechanisms associated with emotions and resulting behavior. The generation of dominance hierarchies in small groups is based on primitive emotional processes related to specific brain structures (such as amygdala acting as the center of anxiety) and hormonal responses. Mazur argues-with due mention of various caveats, such as the lack of evolutionary directionality in primates of some behaviors, such as mating patterns-that the major groups of primates, arranged by date of appearance from the most ancient (prosimians) to the most recent (African apes and humans), form a quasi-evolutionary sequence that permits inference on the probable evolution of human nature (as it relates to hierarchies) from observation of the behavior of living primates. Chimpanzees, in particular, should provide a good model of the behavior and associated physiology of the common ancestors of chimps and humans. In that view, one "should expect most components of human nature . . . to emerge smoothly across the primate series" (p. 57). And indeed a number of recurrent features of human hierarchies-association of rank with apparently extrinsinc attributes such as age or family of origin, greater density of interactions with individuals of similar rank, provision of functions by the leader for the group as a whole, etc.-are traceable throughout the primate series, or appear in rudimentary form as the sequence approaches humankind.

Across the primate sequences, certain individual attributes (possibly different in different species) serve as signs or signals of the status level of the individual, or what it should be. Examples are the silverback of dominant gorillas, or occupational status (and other diffuse status characteristics) in humans. Physiognomy, in the modern sense, is the study of facial appearance and expressions and how they affect social relationships. Facial dominance is one signal of status. The author describes research he carried out on the effect of facial dominance on career patterns of military men. In his study, judges rated West Point cadets for facial dominance on the basis of their yearbook picture. Facial dominance is strongly associated with promotion in rank when the cadet is at West Point. Facial dominance is unrelated to advancement during mid-career, when promotions are decided on the basis of personnel files, by boards who do not personally know the candidate. Facial dominance is again significantly associated with promotion for the highest positions in the military, as once again, decisions become personalized given the small number of candidates for these high-ranking positions.

In the course of primate evolution there is a "general broadening in the range and flexibility of available modes of communication" (p. 92). A distinctive step in that trend is, of course, human language. In humans, language is a primary means of establishing, maintaining and challenging dominance hierarchies. The author discusses the implicit but complex rules guiding the use of language in conversation and argumentation, bringing to bear a diverse array of examples where dominance contests take place in verbal interaction, sometimes with far-ranging historical consequences: a movie barroom challenge involving Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid, real legal argument between Clarence Darrow and William Jennings Bryan in the Scopes trial, test of will between John F. Kennedy and Nikita Krushchev during the Cuban crisis, and an extraordinarily revealing exchange of telegrams between Tsar Nicholas of Russia and Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany on the eve of World War I. These are striking illustrations of human sophistication (and foolishness) in using symbolic manipulation to prevail in (it turns out) highly personalized dominance contests.

The author concludes with an amplification of his assertion that a middle road exists between extreme views on the role of biology in human affairs:

Conventional social scientists treat humans as sui generis, a species apart from the rest of the animal kingdom. Ignoring evolution, sociologists explain our behavior and institutions as if we were created afresh by God, without roots in our simian ancestry. At the other extreme are evolutionary sociobiologists who ignore fundamental differences between humans and colony insects, invoking common genetic mechanisms to explain all social behavior. Two camps so far apart will never find common ground. (P. 151)

Except perhaps for some with such extreme ideas, most sociologists will find this book heartening, as it reminds us that Alan Mazur and a small group of colleagues (many of whom are cited in the bibliography) have been quietly working away within the sociology mainstream at developing a deeper understanding of the proximate biological mechanisms of social behavior, together with a sane perspective on the role of biology in the study of society.