Content area
Full Text
Keywords Budgets, Budgetary control, Performance monitoring, united States of America
Abstract Performance-based budgeting (PBB) is a prominent reform around the world, and has been in prominence in the USA for over a decade now. Evidence presented in this article suggests, however, that the reform is commonly implemented in a limited fashion. This raises the questions, "Why do few states adopt PBB meaningfully?" and "What needs to be done to ensure meaningful adoption?". In addressing these questions with reference to case studies of state performance-based budgeting, this article suggests that a three-factor model is useful in thinking about PBB implementation. In this model authority, acceptance and ability intersect to determine the "reform space" a government has for PBB. In most governments this reform space seems rather constrained.
Introduction
Performance-based budgeting (PBB) has been a prominent reform in US state governments for over a decade. A few years ago many budgeters would have been satisfied to claim that the reform had been implemented in their state "if it meant that performance measures are reported in the budget" (Willoughby and Melkers, 2000, p. 208). As more states have developed performance measures, however, such sentiment has changed, with many now arguing that performance measurement is meaningful only if it is tied directly to the budget process (Walters, 1999). Unfortunately, surveys show that few states actually do tie performance information to the budget process, however, leading to the important questions: "Why do few states adopt PBB meaningfully?" and "What needs to be done to ensure meaningful adoption?"
These questions are relevant to all governments attempting to introduce this reform, whether these are national or sub-national entities in developing or in developed countries. One way to answer the questions is to address whether PBB is a practical and appropriate reform for public organizations. While this is a valid line of investigation (and has indeed been the focus of many studies in the last decade (see Joyce, 1999 for example)), the current article takes a more applied line of analysis, attempting to glean information about the factors affecting reform adoption from governments that have actually attempted to implement the reforms. Interestingly enough, the conclusion relates the findings from such analysis to the more specific question of whether PBB itself is practical...