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Lazarus reviews "Invasion, Intervention, Intervasion: A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy" by Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann and John T. Fishel.
Invasion, Intervention, Intervasion: A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy, Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, and John T. Fishel (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1998), 271 pp.
Essentially, this book is an account of the actions of the United States military in Haiti, mainly events of the 1990s, and to a lesser extent events of the late 1800s and early 1900s. In this respect, this book covers the first US intervention in 1915, and its second one in 1994. In addition, the book provides a good historical chronology of Haiti generally, and a synoptic account of events surrounding negotiations and agreements involving Lieutenant General R. Cedras, the United Nations, the US, and Haiti's President Aristide. Major challenges of this book are to understand the US military organizational structure, and to follow the various US plans initiated under its joint task force system. Although the purpose of the book is to give an account of the US Army's actions, a discerning reader is able to identify several themes and concepts in post-conflict operations that could explain various symptoms that confronted policy makers, planners, and those who execute the US missions in Haiti. A few references are also made to Multi-National Forces, especially, the Caribbean Command (CARICOM).
The first salient point concerns when the international community should intervene and, in making that decision, with whom the international community should deal. As a corollary, in whose interest will the international community's act - its own or the Haitian people? Lieutenant-General Cedras was the defacto ruler of Haiti at the time of planning the 1994 intervention; but, for all intents and purposes, he was an illegitimate ruler. Nevertheless, the international community chose to conduct diplomatic and military businesses with Cedras, much to the disappointment of Haitians. Furthermore, some flows and challenges of initial deployment of military intervention force were very evident. The force, once in-country, was meant to be non-interventionist in practice - by being a show of force and observers only - while the national de-facto government is being negotiated out of a country and into exile.
Political tokenism was an undertone based on the involvement of the seven participating Caribbean states under the CARICOM. The authors quite correctly made the observation that there was no such entity as the CARICOM that legally stands for the trade organization of 14 Caribbean Community states. The US desire for a Multi-National Force had nothing to do with actual troop requirements but simply for political propaganda. This is highlighted by Major General Byron's (USACOM J5 - CIMIC) guidance to "`get as many flags as possible' from the Caribbean nations, even if they could only provide a platoon" (pp. 65) - despite the fact that the USACOM coordinator, Lieutenant-Colonel Chris Olson "discovered that many of the CARICOM soldiers needed everything from canteens, to underwear, to boots" (pp.72). Unfortunately, this characterization is common among developed forces, where requests from less well-off forces for assistance are usually treated as indicative of the lack of professionalism of these forces.
Other themes of this book that can be discerned are the following:
the importance of cultural awareness;
taking care to "do no harm;"
the dilemma of adopting a strict force protection posture versus engaging and participating in the local context (engendering); and,
seeking not to undermine local capacities for rebuilding, through over dependence on the `intervenors,' or disproportionate use of funds for external versus internal impacts.
Most of the book is about the US Army and National Command Authority planning process, and provides detailed accounts. For those interested in the components of a military plan, as well as the evolving interagency planning methodology, this account of Operation Uphold Democracy is instructive. Interestingly, although covered in much less detail, the readers should note the political imperatives of mounting a multinational mission. In accordance with the title, the book is about the US Army, so the readers should not be surprised that certain events are covered only for US input or impact.
Reflecting on the uncertainties and confusion that existed in the US Army planning process, and perhaps due to the structure of the book wherein the writers divided the writing of the various chapters, the writers contradicted themselves over the mission of the CARICOM. On the one hand, Kretchik clearly outlined the agreed upon mission of the CARICOM contingent as conducting "peace operations, including guarding airport, escorting vehicles, and conducting limited security operations" (pp.73). On the other hand, later in the book Fishel claimed that "in no case, however, did the plans address in detail how the CARICOM contingent was to be employed" (pp. 163). This is a strange revelation, as the leaders of the CARICOM contingent, Jamaica, were very adamant about the requirement for specific tasks with clearly separated areas of responsibilities for the CARICOM contingent.
Still, the authors are to be congratulated because they provide a critical account of the US actions and do not flinch from often controversial topics such as racism, strained relations or professional competition between the l Oth Mountain Division and the Special Operations Force, and national interest imperatives and military blunder.
In reading this book, do not forget that `war is an extension of politics by other means' (pp. 142,. Carl von Clausewitz). One should never embark on a war - or, in this case, a military operation other than war - without possessing a clear understanding of objectives and means.
Major R.B. Lazarus
Jamaica Defence Force
Copyright Pearson Peacekeeping Centre Jul/Aug 1999