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A substantial number of US Army soldiers deployed to Haiti for Operation Uphold Democracy did not believe it was important that the US military be involved in the operation, did not believe that what the US military was doing was important and did not believe in the overall value of the operation. Halverson and Bliese investigated factors that were related to the wide variation in soldier reports of support for Operation Uphold Democracy.
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In the past five years the United States has participated in an increasing number of peacekeeping, nation building, and disaster relief assistance operations. Soldiers in the United States military have found themselves involved in fighting forest fires in the Northwest, rebuilding communities after Hurricane Andrew and Iniki, assisting the Kurdish refugees in Northern Iraq, and providing a safe and secure environment for the re-establishment of the government of Jean Bertrand Aristide in Haiti, to name only a few recent operations.
Even these military operations, which generally do not involve combat missions, are capable of producing significant stress for soldiers. Soldiers often live in taxing conditions; are exposed to threats including possible attacks, injuries and exposure to diseases; often live in confined areas within close proximity to their leaders; are separated from their families and friends for extended periods of time; and are required to perform sometimes grueling and sometimes tedious missions on a day-today basis. Taken together, these and other stressors can combine to substantially impact the well-being, readiness, performance, and, ultimately, retention of individuals involved in these operations.
The extent to which soldiers support these operations may be an important variable in determining how they cope with the stressors that they experience. Research in nonmilitary settings has shown that low levels of organizational commitment can lead to a variety of strains experienced by individuals, such as hostility and depression.l A key component of organizational commitment is belief in and acceptance of organizational goals and values. Recent military research has also shown that the degree to which soldiers support military operations is related to reports of their psychological well-being and physical health symptoms; and support for the overall operation has been shown to buffer soldiers to some extent from the stressors they face.2
Although the professionalism of members of the United States military has ensured obedience in carrying out recent military operations, the extent to which soldiers support these operations and the determinants of this support or lack of support have received little conceptual or empirical research attention. The purpose of this investigation, based on a field study of soldiers deployed to Haiti as part of Operation Uphold Democracy, was to examine the extent to which:
(1) soldiers indicated support for Operation Uphold Democracy, and (2) the extent to which various soldier, unit, task, and operational characteristics were related to soldier support for the overall operation.
Method
Background of Operation
Operation Uphold Democracy began on 17 September 1994, with the deployment of United States military forces to Haiti as part of a multinational peacekeeping force.3 The operation was initially planned to be a forced insertion combat mission, with the objective of forcibly overthrowing the existing Haitian government headed by General Raul Cedras and restoring the democratically elected President, Jean Bertrand Aristide. Due to last minute diplomatic discussions, the Cedras government agreed to peacefully transfer control of the Haitian government to President Aristide. As a result, the U.S. involvement changed from a potential combat operation to a peacekeeping operation, with the mission of maintaining a stable environment and overseeing the exchange of governmental power.4
In late October 1994, the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel requested that the Surgeon General of the Army form and deploy a human dimensions research (HDR) team to Haiti to assess the psychological and physical status and adaptation of the deployed U.S. Army forces. The U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command received the mission and tasked the Department of Military Psychiatry at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research to form an HDR team. A four-member team was formed that consisted of three U.S. Army research psychologists and one behavioral sciences noncommissioned officer.
The HDR team arrived in Haiti on 12 November 1994, and departed on 14 December 1994. In addition to recording personal observations and experiences from the month-long deployment to Haiti, two systematic strategies were employed by the HDR team to collect both qualitative and quantitative data pertaining to soldier status and adaptation. Portions of both the quantitative and qualitative data will be used in the current investigation.
Quantitative Data
Soldier status and adaptation were assessed using a deployment assessment questionnaire that included (among other variables): (1) three items that assessed support for the overall operation (e.g., I think that what the U.S. military is doing during this deployment is important); (2) two items that assessed morale (e.g., my personal morale is good right now); (3) three items that assessed task significance (e.g., I am making a real contribution to accomplishing this mission); (4) eleven items that assessed unit leadership climate (e.g., my officers are interested in my personal welfare; my NCOs would lead well in combat); (S) one item that assessed the extent to which soldiers were briefed about the mission and its accomplishments (I am briefed regularly by my leaders on the mission and what we have achieved); (6) one item that assessed the extent to which soldiers felt there was public support for the operation (the people of the United States appreciate what the soldiers in Haiti are doing); (7) two items that assessed whether soldiers felt adequately trained to perform the tasks they had been assigned (e.g., I feel adequately trained to do the jobs that I've been assigned to perform); (8) items that assessed the soldiers' race, gender, rank, and prior deployment experiences; and (9) one item that assessed the soldiers' unit type (e.g., infantry, military police, special operations).
Completed questionnaires were collected from 3,205 of the approximately 10,5OO US Army soldiers deployed to Haiti at the time the HDR team was deployed. The 2,294 soldiers with complete information for all variables comprised the sample for this investigation. Sixty-one percent of the soldiers were in the ranks from private to specialist/corporal (n=1,410), 33% were noncommissioned officers (n=762), and 6% were officers (n=147). Ninety-four percent of the soldiers were males (n=2,169) and six percent were females (n=127). Sixty-six percent of the soldiers were white (n=1,503), 18% were black (n=401), 8% were Hispanic (n=193), and 9% reported other racial backgrounds (n=199). Over one half of the soldiers were in infantry or mechanized infantry units (n=1,207); those in other unit-types were as follows: 12% were in logistics or division support (n=263), 10% were in military police (n=233), 7% were in engineer units (n=169), 6% were in special operations (n=147), 5% were in aviation (n=108), 4% were in air defense artillery or field artillery (n=184), 2% were in military intelligence (n=43), 1% were in medical (n=26), and 1% were in signal units (n=16).
Qualitative Data
Members of the HDR team also conducted semi-structured interviews and directed small focus group discussions with 267 soldiers. Generally, a U.S. Army Company was targeted and individual interviews were conducted with the company commander and the first sergeant; focus group discussions were conducted with NCOs (groups of 3-6) and junior enlisted soldiers (groups of 3-IS). A classic debriefing paradigm was used by the HDR team members to reconstruct the deployment along a historic timeline.5 Interviews and focus group discussions were conducted with soldiers in combat arms, combat support, combat service support, and special operations units. Soldiers were also asked to provide written comments on their positive and negative experiences as part of Operation Uphold Democracy. Two thousand six hundred and fifty verbatim comments (2,650) from 1,250 soldiers were obtained and were analyzed by content category, valence, and unit type. Results
Soldier Support for Operation Uphold Democracy
Responses to the three broad questions that assessed the extent to which soldiers supported Operation Uphold Democracy indicated that nearly one half (49%) of the soldiers surveyed did not believe it was important that the U.S. military be involved in the mission in Haiti, 43% did not believe in the overall value of the mission, and 38% did not think that what the U.S. military was doing during the deployment was important. The comments of one special forces sergeant first class typified the views of many soldiers Haiti was a poor underdeveloped country before we got here. Without immediate rebuilding of the Haitian judicial, prison, road, and public work systems in every city, town, and district, the problems will always be here. This will cost trillions of dollars and take many years to accomplish. It is not our job (U.S. Army) to do this. This mission should be turned over immediately to the organizations who have the funding and responsibility for it.
At the same time, a substantial number of soldiers had positive feelings about what they were doing in Haiti and the mission they were accomplishing. Numerous soldiers made comments such as one made by a sergeant in a military police unit who wrote "It was a very worthwhile mission. It was actually a mission where you could see what you were accomplishing." A junior enlisted solider in an infantry unit stated, "The Haitian people are now enjoying their lives. They have freedom and hope, and it makes me feel good about coming here." Positive perspectives about the mission were expressed by soldiers of all ranks in all types of units.
Factors Related to Soldier Support for the Operation
Multiple regression analyses were conducted to determine the relative contribution of various soldier characteristics (e.g., race, gender, rank, prior operational experience, personal morale); unit characteristics (i.e., unit leadership, unit type); task characteristics (e.g., task significance, adequacy of training); and operational characteristics (e.g., public support for the operation, briefed on missions' accomplishments) to predicting the extent to which soldiers supported Operation Uphold Democracy. The results of the multiple regression analyses are presented in Table 1. Taken together, the variables entered into the equation accounted for nearly 50% of the variation in soldier reports of support for the operation (R2=.49; F=82.73, p<.001). Each of the variables in the equation is discussed below.
Race. Race was significantly related to the extent to which soldiers supported the overall operation. In fact, the race of soldiers was one of the strongest predictors of support for the operation (see Table 1). Black soldiers, Hispanic soldiers, and soldiers of other racial backgrounds reported significantly more support for Operation Uphold Democracy than white soldiers. For example, 43% of black soldiers and 37% of Hispanic soldiers indicated that they thought what the U.S. military was doing during the deployment was important, compared to 28% of white soldiers (see Figure 1).
Gender. Female soldiers reported significantly more support for the operation than male soldiers (see Table 1). As illustrated in Figure 1, male soldiers were nearly two times more likely than female soldiers to report that they did not believe in the importance of the operation in Haiti (39% vs. 20%).
Rank. Officers reported significantly stronger support for the operation than junior enlisted soldiers, although rank was not among the strongest predictors of support for the operation (see Table 1). The extent to which junior enlisted soldiers, NCOs, and officers thought that what the U.S. military was doing in Haiti was important is illustrated in Figure 1.
Previous Military Operations. Prior operational experience was explored as a potential determinant of soldier support for Operation Uphold Democracy.6 Results indicate that soldiers who had previously deployed to Somalia for Operation Restore Hope (n=606) reported significantly less support for the operation than soldiers who had not previously deployed to Somalia (see Table 1). Deployment to the Persian Gulf for Operation Desert Shield/Storm (n=358) or to Florida for Hurricane Andrew Relief Operations (n=319) was not significantly related to support for Operation Uphold Democracy.
Unit Type. The soldiers' unit type was strongly related to the extent to which they supported the overall operation. Soldiers in support units (i.e., combat support, combat service support) reported significantly more support for the operation than soldiers in combat arms units (t=-9.59, p<.001). Even within the broad unit-type classifications, there were significant differences in reports of support for the operation. As shown in Figure 2, soldier disagreement regarding the importance of the operation ranged from over 40% in infantry, mechanized infantry, aviation, and special operations units to less than 25% in signal, military police, and military intelligence units. The results presented in Table 1 indicate that soldiers in military police and military intelligence units reported significantly stronger support for the operation (compared to infantry soldiers) and soldiers in aviation units reported significantly less support.
Personal Morale. Personal morale was included as a possible determinant of reports of support for the overall operation because it is possible that soldiers with low morale viewed the overall operation negatively as well. Personal morale was found to be a strong predictor of reports of support (see Table 1). Soldiers who reported higher personal morale believed that the operation was more important than soldiers who reported lower morale (see Figure 3).
Unit Leadership. Because unit leaders generally provide a lens through which junior enlisted soldiers view the overall operation, we anticipated that soldiers' perceptions of their unit leadership would be related to the extent to which soldiers supported the overall operation. Although soldier ratings of the caring and competence of their company leaders were significantly correlated with reports of support for the overall operation (ro.40, p<.001), when all of the variables were entered into the multiple regression analysis equation, leadership climate perceptions did not contribute significantly to the prediction of support for the overall operation.
Task Significance. There were strong empirical relationships between soldiers' reports of support for the overall operation and reports that they were performing important tasks during the deployment (r=.77, p<.001); reports that they were making a real contribution to accomplishing the mission (r.44, p<.001); and reports that what they were doing during the deployment helped accomplish the overall mission (r=.47, p<.001). In fact, soldiers' reports of task significance were the strongest predictors of support for the overall operation (see Table 1). As an illustrative example, a comparison of soldiers reporting high task significance and low task significance (using median split) in terms of whether they thought what the U.S. military was doing in Haiti was important is presented in Figure 3. Over 64% of the soldiers reporting high task significance thought that the mission was important compared to 12% of the soldiers reporting low task significance.
Adequacy of Training. Soldiers who reported that they were not specifically trained to accomplish their assigned missions generally viewed the overall mission as less important than soldiers who felt they were adequately trained for their missions. However, because perceptions of training adequacy were strongly related to unit types, the extent to which soldiers reported that they had adequate training to perform their assigned missions was not significantly related to soldier reports of support for the operation when all of the variables were entered into the regression equation (see Table 1).
Public Support. Nearly 50% of the soldiers surveyed in Haiti were not sure whether the U.S. public appreciated what the soldiers in Haiti were doing as part of Operation Uphold Democracy. The remaining soldiers were split, with approximately 25% reporting that they thought the public appreciated what they were doing in Haiti and 25% indicating that they thought the public did not. The extent to which soldiers believed they had public support for the operation was significantly related to their overall support for the operation (see Table 1). Soldiers who felt that the U.S. public supported their efforts in Haiti reported substantially more support for the operation than soldiers who did not feel that they had public support (see Figure 3).
Mission Information. Over 36% of junior enlisted soldiers and 33% of senior enlisted soldiers reported that they were not regularly briefed on the accomplishments of the mission, significantly (p<.001) more than company grade officers (19%) or field grade officers (10%). When all of the variables were entered simultaneously into the regression equation, the extent to which soldiers were briefed about the mission and its accomplishments was not significantly related to overall reports of support for the operation (see Table 1). Nonetheless, lack of mission information arose frequently as a concern for soldiers.
Discussion
A substantial number of soldiers deployed for Operation Uphold Democracy did not believe it was important that the U.S. military be involved in the operation (49%); did not believe that what the U.S. military was doing was important (38%); or did not believe in the overall value of the operation (43%). At the same time, a substantial number of soldiers had positive feelings about what they were doing in Haiti and the mission they were accomplishing. The primary focus of this investigation was to examine factors that were related to the wide variation in soldier reports of support for Operation Uphold Democracy.
The results indicated that a combination of soldier characteristics, unit characteristics, task characteristics, and operational characteristics accounted for nearly 50% of the variance in soldier reports of support for the overall operation. Reports of task significance, in particular, were the strongest predictors of support. Soldiers who indicated that they were performing important tasks during the deployment and felt that they were contributing to the success of the operation reported significantly more support for the overall operation. The extent to which soldiers felt they were performing significant tasks during the operation was systematically related to the soldiers' unit type. Over two-thirds of the soldiers in medical, engineer, and military police units, for example, reported that what they were doing during the deployment helped to accomplish the mission, compared to less than one-half of the soldiers in infantry/mechanized infantry, special operations, and air defense artillery/field artillery units. Numerous soldiers made comments similar to what a sergeant in a military police unit wrote: "It was a very worthwhile mission. It was actually a mission where you could see what you were accomplishing." Also, a specialist wrote:
I feel that I have helped the Haitian people while I was working with the police in Haiti for two weeks. I'm showing the police how to have respect for themselves and to give respect to their own people. (I) am setting an example for the police and the people of Haiti on how to handle situations civilized and correctly.
Other soldiers reported that they were not performing missions that they felt were significantly contributing to the success of the operation. For example, one infantry platoon leader remarked: "A big problem with this deployment for many soldiers is that their individual missions do not perceptibly add to the overall mission."
These findings suggest that operational support may be enhanced if soldiers (1) can be assigned missions that are clearly related to the goals of the operation and/or (2) the links between soldier missions and the overall concept of the operation can be clarified. These issues may be particularly important for soldiers in combat arms units. When it is possible, the linkages between the missions that these soldiers are performing on a daily basis and the accomplishments of the overall operation should be strengthened.
Soldier characteristics, particularly race, were also significantly related to reports of support for Operation Uphold Democracy. Minority soldiers reported significantly more support for the operation than white soldiers. These results are similar to the results reported by Miller and Moskos,7 which revealed that significantly more black soldiers (42%) than white soldiers (32%) believed that the United States should become more involved in humanitarian missions. In the current study, even when potential differences in rank, gender, unit type, and prior operational experience were accounted for in a separate hierarchical multiple regression analysis, racial background accounted for a significant amount of variance in reports of support for the operation (R2change =.05, p<.0001). Future inquiry will be required to determine the reasons that minority soldiers report more support for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions than white soldiers. Potential differences in world views, in resistance to stereotyping, or in cultural awareness could be explored as possible determinants of minority support for these operations.8 In contrast, gender differences in support for the operation were minimal once unit types were accounted for in a subsequent hierarchical multiple regression analysis (R2change =.001, p<.OS).
Prior operational experience was explored as a potential determinant of soldier support for Operation Uphold Democracy. Results indicated that soldiers who had previously deployed to Somalia for Operation Restore Hope reported significantly less support for the operation than soldiers who had not previously deployed to Somalia. It is difficult to determine whether the weaker support for the operation among Operation Restore Hope veterans was due to the nature of the Somalia operation or due to the rapid succession of the operations. For example, one specialist wrote "I wouldn't feel as bad about Haiti if it weren't for coming back from Somalia only five months and then being deployed to Haiti. All those frustrations I had in Somalia weren't given enough time to go away." Another specialist indicated that his perception of the operation was affected because of " . . . just getting back from Somalia in March, 1994, spending six months over there, and now deployed to Haiti 6 months later."
Soldiers' reports of personal morale were significantly related to reports of support for the overall operation. As with several of the previously discussed variables, it is beyond the capacity of this investigation to determine whether low personal morale resulted in low support for the operation or whether low support for the overall operation resulted in decrements in morale. No causal inferences can be drawn from these relationships. Nonetheless, it should be noted that there is a substantial empirical link between reports of personal morale and reports of support for the overall operation.
In addition to the specific variables addressed in this investigation, soldiers' broader geopolitical views appeared to influence the degree to which they supported the overall operation. Many soldiers indicated that they did not support the operation because they believed that the mission could not be successful in the long run and that the problems in Haiti would return as soon as the United States left Haiti. Because the longterm success of the Operation was not known by the soldiers deployed to Haiti in the early stages of the operation, perhaps a certain degree of skepticism was warranted. Nonetheless, the potential negative consequences associated with low support for the operation should not be underestimated. A captain in a special forces unit indicated, for example, that he felt that the dim prospect for the operation's long-term success was having negative consequences on deployed soldiers when he wrote:
Since our deployment I have witnessed numerous changes for the better for the general populace of Haiti. However, these remedies are only "quick fixes" because the real solution to these problems lies only within the Haitian people. The people must take the initiative to improve their country. Because of this, there is no recognized end to this operation and no real military objective to achieve. I believe that this aspect (is) demoralizing and will have long-term negative effects for my soldiers.
A second common broad view of soldiers was that the United States "should concentrate on our own problems rather than someone else's problems," as stated by a private first class in an infantry unit. A staff sergeant concurred when he wrote "I have been in the Army 15 years and I strongly believe in the military. I was deployed to Somalia and now Haiti. My personal belief is the U.S. needs to worry about the problems at home before worrying about third world countries." Another sergeant noted, "The tax dollar that has been wasted here could have provided for people in need, education, and other problems at the home front." These views appeared to be related to the degree of support soldiers felt they had from the U.S. public. As one staff sergeant in an engineer unit wrote: "I feel that the lack of support for this mission by Congress and the majority of the people of the United States is undermining our efforts in Haiti."
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, many soldiers believed that the United States should not be involved in any peacekeeping operations. One specialist in an infantry unit wrote, for example, "I signed up to defend the U.S., not for peacekeeping or nation building." A private first class wrote "We are the infantry. We have trained for combat conditions not for peacekeeping. We are not the policemen for the world. That is what the UN is for." These views have important implications for policymakers and training personnel. If the United States continues to participate in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, soldiers, particularly soldiers in combat arms units, may need to acquire a broader awareness and additional training about their potential roles in these operations. While preparing physically, mentally, and psychologically for warfighting missions must remain central, soldiers participating in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions must also be fully prepared to accomplish these missions. This important issue deserves additional research attention.
Operation Uphold Democracy may or may not be representative of future peacekeeping operations. Consequently, the current investigation may not fully address issues involving soldier support for such operations. Nonetheless, this study addresses an issue that has received relatively little empirical attention and one that may play an important role in the well-being, performance, and retention of soldiers involved in future peacekeeping operations.
Notes
AUTHORS' NOTE: The views of the authors do not necessarily reflect the position of the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense. We gratefully acknowledge Maj. John Leu and SSG Robert Moore for their assistance in collecting the data used in this investigation.
J. E. Mathieu and D. M. Zjac, "A Review and Meta-analysis of the Antecedents, Correlates, and Consequences of Organizational Commitment," Psychological Bulletin 108 (1990): 171-194; R. T. Mowday, R. M. Steers, and L. W. Porter, "The Measurement of Organizational Commitment," Journal of Vocational Behavior 14 (1979): 224-247.
See R. R. Halverson, P. D. Bliese, R. E. Moore, and C. A. Castro, Psychological Welbeing and Physical Health Symptoms of Soldiers Deployed for Operation Uphold Democracy: A Summary of Human Dimensions Research in Haiti (Defense Technical Information Center, #ADA29812-5, 1995); R. R. Halverson, L. Wong, and P. D. Bliese, "Belief in Mission, Leadership Climate, and Well-being: A Field Study of Soldiers deployed to Haiti" (Paper presented at the biannual meeting of the InterUniversity Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, October 1995).
The multinational force consisted of nearly 21,000 military personnel at its peak, of which 19,000 were United States forces.; J. Merrill, "Scope Paper-A Haiti Primer" (Office of the Secretary of Defense Haiti Task Force, July, 1995). 4. 1. Merrill, "Scope Paper-A Haiti Primer."
This interviewing technique, carrying small groups through a time-line of events, was originally developed by Walter Reed Army Institute of Research scientists in collaboration with Brig. Gen. S. L. A. Marshall as a modality for assessing stress and adaptation at the unit level during the Korean conflict. It has been used during the Vietnam conflict, during a number of Sinai deployments, following Urgent Fury in Grenada and Operation Just Cause in Panama, and during and after Operation Desert Shield/Storm in the Persian Gulf and Operation Restore Hope in Somalia; see also S. L. A. Marshall, Men Against Fire (New York: William Morrow, 1966). Multiple consecutive deployments have been shown to be negatively related to intentions to re-enlist: see L. Wong, P. D. Bliese, and R. R. Halverson, "Multiple Deployments: Do They Make a Difference?" (Paper presented at the biannual meeting of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, October 1995). 7. L. Miller and C. Moskos, "Humanitarians or Warriors?: Race, Gender, and Combat Status in Operation Restore Hope," Armed Forces & Society 21 (1995): 615637. 8. For a discussion of possible reasons for differential support for humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, see Miller and Moskos, "Humanitarians or Warriors?"
RONALD R. HALVERSON holds a Ph.D. in organizational psychology from DePaul University and is a uniformed research psychologist at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. His current research centers on assessing factors that influence the psychological and physical health of soldiers. Address for Correspondence: Department of Military Psychiatry, Division of Neuropsychiatry, Walter Reed Institute of Research, Washington, D.C. 20307-5100.
PAUL D. BLIESE earned his Ph.D. in applied social psychology from Texas Tech University and is a uniformed research psychologist at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. His research interests include examining group-level factors affecting soldier stress and adaptation.
Copyright Transaction Inc. Fall 1996