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This dissertation examines the relations between the Soviet Union and the Spanish Republic during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). Since the Republic's defeat in spring 1939, Soviet participation in the civil war has remained the least understood aspect of that struggle. This study offers the first interpretation of wartime relations between the two states based on empirically authoritative data, including recently declassified archival materials from the Russian Federation and unpublished materials from Spanish archives in Salamanca and Madrid.
The study establishes that Soviet policy in Spain was driven by multiple motivations, encompassing not only geo-strategic considerations, but also economics, ideology and culture. The work revises our understanding of the effectiveness of the Kremlin's military aid to Spain at the operational level, and concludes that Soviet advisors never achieved the level of control in the Republic often assumed. Soviet resources were stretched thin by the commitment to the Republic, and severely handicapped by logistical barriers. Moscow's inability to monitor its officers in the field led to heightened levels of mistrust, which in turn weakened the advisors' ability to function usefully. The dissertation also demonstrates that the Soviet regime exploited events in Spain to advance its own domestic agenda and buttress popular support for the regime. Through solidarity campaigns and humanitarian fund drives, the Kremlin converted the Spanish war into an event that mobilized the citizenry towards a common purpose. Finally, the dissertation examines the cultural-propaganda dimension of Soviet policy in Spain, detailing Soviet attempts to saturate the Iberian peninsula through the export of film, poster art and print media.