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Tomasello contends that our sense of obligation is instantiated through “agreement-like” social interactions. For example, if I promise a co-worker that I will attend her birthday party, I commit myself to do so; and I would need to apologize or justify myself if I failed to attend the birthday festivities. Tomasello further argues that, from a developmental perspective, this understanding of obligation is first evident in children “inside, but not outside, of collaborative activities structured by joint agency with a partner.”
I agree that obligations are often established through mutual cooperative agreements. But, I disagree that (1) obligations arise exclusively out of such arrangements and that (2) children first feel the demand of an obligation only in the context of activities structured by joint agency. Instead, it seems that some obligations are inherent in certain types of social relationships – namely, our kinship relationships – and, importantly, that children recognize this from a young age.
Consider a father with a sick baby girl. The way he feels toward his daughter fits into Tomasello's conception of obligation in some ways but not in others. He likely feels a demanding and coercive force to care for his sick daughter, and he would be judged harshly if he decided to leave his daughter and go on a vacation (Bloom 2011; 2013; Gopnik...