FIRST AS TRAGEDY, THEN AS FARCE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF RIGHT-WING POPULISM IN HUNGARY AND POLAND

Abstract

National populism is a widespread phenomenon, present in almost every European country. Even though literature on populism is quite ample, it lacks terminological intersections and uses different approaches to delineate the term. The aim of this article is to adjust the term national populism to the specificities of the V4 countries, focusing on Hungary and Poland. We make threefold contribution to the current debate on populism. Firstly, a new dimension concerning populism is present, a requirement of the newly formed populist elite to decide, who is the "people". Secondly, we introduce coherent description and comparison of national populists' tendencies in Hungary and Poland, in summary called "Orbán's illiberal doctrine", which was adopted around BudapestWarsaw axis. Thirdly, we view the V4 region to be a proxy-war in what Milanović calls "Clash of Capitalisms". The notion of Orbán's illiberal doctrine challenges erratic Czech and Slovak opportunism, so far prone to liberal capitalistic order.

Headnote

National populism is a widespread phenomenon, present in almost every European country. Even though literature on populism is quite ample, it lacks terminological intersections and uses different approaches to delineate the term. The aim of this article is to adjust the term national populism to the specificities of the V4 countries, focusing on Hungary and Poland. We make threefold contribution to the current debate on populism. Firstly, a new dimension concerning populism is present, a requirement of the newly formed populist elite to decide, who is the "people". Secondly, we introduce coherent description and comparison of national populists' tendencies in Hungary and Poland, in summary called "Orbán's illiberal doctrine", which was adopted around BudapestWarsaw axis. Thirdly, we view the V4 region to be a proxy-war in what Milanović calls "Clash of Capitalisms". The notion of Orbán's illiberal doctrine challenges erratic Czech and Slovak opportunism, so far prone to liberal capitalistic order.

Keywords: national populism; Orbán; Kaczyński; FIDESZ; PiS.

1INTRODUCTION

Widespread interest in the right-wing populism re-emerged as a result of refugee crisis in Europe following the year 2015. Although populism has been under heavy assault since then, it seems to become stronger the more intellectuals criticize it (Taguieff 1995, 43). It is generally accepted that scholars tend to lack a consensus on what establishes the right-wing populism, even though it is the only political force which managed to successfully penetrate the established order of the European political families, alongside the Greens (Mudde 2007, 1). Despite the lack of terminological intersection, the implicit acceptance of D. Trump, J. Bolsonaro, B. Netanyahu or M. Le Pen as being the representatives of the right-wing populism is present (Heywood 2019; Inglehart and Norris 2019; Eatwell and Goodwin 2018). What is missing though, is a complex assessment of the V4 countries in terms of their infiltration by the right-wing populism, with a specific focus on Hungary and Poland. The aim of this article is to extend the current knowledge of populism to the V4 countries, while adjusting it to the specificities of the region. Firstly, we sort out various approaches to the term "populism", while sticking to the most suitable for our purposes. Secondly, by focusing primarily on the right-wing side of political spectrum, national populism to be more precise, we are allowed to compare political situation within Hungary and Poland. After national populism first took over Hungary, it swiftly moved to Warsaw. Unsurprisingly, Marx turned out to be right when claiming that history recur twice, "Once as tragedy, and again as farce" (Marx 2009, 1). Finally, after defeating the charm of the "undefinable" (Mudde 2004), we lay out the most crucial struggle, unnoticedly taking place in the V4 grouping. There is a friction of two potential futures on the periphery of the European Union (EU), one leaning toward Russia-like national populism-based surveillance capitalism while the other trying to preserve the residuals of liberal democratic order.

2REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON POPULISM

Term "populism" originated in the United States labelling the political uprising of the American farmers, workers and miners against the Northeastern financial establishment. The coalition led to a creation of the People's Party in the 1890's (Rodrik 2018). Few decades before (in 1860's), Russian political rural movement - the Narodniks, rising against the repressing Tsarist regime got to be called populist as well (Traverso 2019, 20). There we have two possible origins of the term populism. Nevertheless, none of these movements managed to succeed in taking power. We have seen a major transformation in terms of populism, from the time of People's Party and the Narodniks, through Latin American populists like Perón and Vargas, to current populist wave assaulting the foundation of Western liberal democracies.

As we mentioned earlier, there is no easy way of defining populism, however, almost every delimitation of populism has at least one overlapping feature, or what Mudde (2004) calls a Manichean worldview. It is basically a way of expressing the opposing antagonism of the pure people against the corrupt elites. This will be our baseline for the delimitation of populism. There are numerous ways how to perceive populism. The most common one is to consider populism as an ideology. According Mudde, populism is a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated between two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the "pure people" versus the "corrupt elite", and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people (Mudde 2004, 3). He views the term "populism" to be the opposite of the elitism on the one hand and the pluralism on the other. By adopting this minimalistic approach Mudde puts an emphasis on the lack of purity of the term explaining the occurrence of various forms of populist movements. Other authors have further developed this minimalistic approach toward populism (Abts and Rummens 2007; Stanley 2008; Kaltwasser 2013). Moffit (2016) criticizes the "thin ideology" approach because by sticking to its thinness, it might become difficult to conceptualize populism as a distinct ideology (Hugo Chaves's ideology was a socialism, not populism). Even though some authors like Mudde consider populism to be a distinct ideology, it does not possess the same level of intellectual refinement and consistency like liberalism does (Mudde 2004, 544), therefore despite Moffit's critique Chaves can bear socialist and populist ideology at the same time. That is the purpose of thin-centred delimitation of populism, not putting nationalism or communism on the same level with populism, but to show its adjustment within political ideology. Perhaps as a result of this confusion, Hawkins and Kalwasser (2017) decided to replace thin-centred ideology with the moral set of ideas, so they could avoid this misunderstanding.

Conceptualization of populism as a set of ideas expressing itself as a Manichean discourse that identifies Good with an unified will of the people and Evil with a conspiring elite (Hawkins 2009, 1042) is basically a way of accepting Mudde's ideational approach to define populism as a thin-centred ideology, while avoiding the need to explain its subtle context. Heywood (2019) also shares the ideational approach toward populism as an ideology separating society between the two antagonistic groups: the "pure people" and the "corrupt elite". The homogeneous group of the pure people is considered to bear the sole legitimate guide to a political action. Fukuyama (2018) tries to cover the term "populism" as an ideology with three coherent characteristics: (1) the pursuit of policies that are popular in short term, but lack any sustainability in the long run, (2) basis of legitimacy build upon the "true people", excluding everyone outside a certain racial or ethnic group and ultimately (3) an authoritarian leadership, selfdeclared Trump-like outsider, claiming to have a direct connection with the "people". Various modifications of these traits establish different types of populism.

Next, there is nothing rare about perceiving "populism" not as an ideology, but rather a "political style" (Canovan 1999; Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Moffit 2016). Moffit (2016) criticizes the perception of populism as an ideology due to losing its initial apparent clarity by operating with discourse rather than ideology itself. Moffit acknowledges the political style as the repertoires of embodied, symbolically mediated performance made to audiences that are used to create and navigate the fields of power that comprise the political, stretching from the domain of government through to everyday life (Moffit 2016, 46). The populist political style in his view features an appeal to the "people" versus the "elite" dichotomy, bad political manners and the permanent induction of societal crisis, breakdown or threat. The most crucial aspect of this rhetoric consists of exalting the people's natural virtues opposing the elite (the political establishment), in order to mobilize the masses against the system they managed to create (Traverso 2017, 20).

Opposing these views, Inglehart and Norris (2019) do not acknowledge the populism to be an ideology per se, neither a political style, but rather a style of rhetoric claiming who has a legitimate power to govern. The only legitimate authority comes directly from the people, and established powerholders (let's call them the "elite") are deeply corrupt, aim purely at satisfying their selfinterest and keep betraying public trust. Norris and Inglehart disclaim populism as an ideology, mainly as a result of its indifference towards what should be done, what policies should be followed or what decision should be made in order to improve the well-being of the society. Eatwell and Goodwin (2018) also reject the idea of populism being a serious ideology by considering it to be a way of competing for power, a way of doing politics. In their specification of populism, we can again encounter some shared characteristics with previous concepts of populism. Populist tend to invoke "popular will" so that it is heard and acted upon, defend the "ordinary people" against distant self-serving elites and ultimately replace them.

Populism as a way of doing politics, or rather a political strategy is commonly used approach (Weyland 2001; Ellner 2003; Roberts 2006). Barr (2017, 44) defines populism as a means of building and maintaining political power based on the mass mobilization of supporters through the usage of anti-establishment appeals and plebiscitarian linkages, a challenge to those who wield power on behalf of ordinary people. It is basically a political strategy used to generate popular support. Anti-establishment appeal tends to go as far as to completely refuse to wear clothes associated with the deeply rooted establishment. An example can be a former Bolivian leader Evo Morales, who never wears a business suit of Bolivia's white elite.

Marco Revelli (2017) considers populism to be just a senile disorder of liberal democracy, natural revolt of those, who have been excluded and pushed to the margins. There is nothing ideological within the concept, it is just a natural response of society to tackle globalization, inequality and marginalization. This view is shared by other authors describing populism as a "normal pathology" of western liberal democracies (Betz 1994). This worldview has been attacked in Mudde's earlier paper (Mudde 2004, 548-551). Mudde claims that if the populism had been just a normal pathology of the liberal democracy, it would have become a solid part of the European political scene much sooner, however, its wave-like advent destines it to subside, like any other political ideology does. Although Mudde's counterargument is reasonable and valid, we do not completely share his viewpoint. Regarding various phases of business cycle and price level, income and wealth inequality or refugee inflows, various populist movements (in terms of populism as a Mudde's thin-centred ideology complementing other ideologies - socialism, communism or various fascist movements) used to reach its peaks and downsides alongside the metamorphosis of Western liberal democracies. Had it been just a random occurrence, we would not be discussing its manifestations today. It is no coincidence that the centre of gravity when it comes to populism has begun to shift from Latin America to Europe in recent years (Hawkins and Kaltwasser 2017). a e a e ea a a a a e

In a joint paper published by Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2013) authors utilized a quasi-obsolete definition of populism articulated by Dornbush and Edwards in 1991, viewing populism as the implementation of policies receiving support from a significant fraction of the population, but ultimately hurting the economic interests of this majority. It is one of few definitions of populism not taking into an account elite versus people antagonism, at least not explicitly. One of the reasons might by their focus on the Latin American countries dealing with a more redistributive agenda tilting the populist spectrum more toward the left.

Slovak research focusing on the issue of populism is not very ample, however we managed to find few pertinent papers mentioning the term populism. Although Mesežnikov and Gyárfášová (2008, 7) concentrated primarily on the national populism, they based their approach on viewing populism as a method of appealing to ordinary people by promising to defend peoples' interest against the elite (here we have the people vs. the elite antagonism). The bearer of populist method aims for the protest votes by criticizing the political establishment, mainstream media and opponent parties for their corrupt behaviour. According Mesežnikov and Gyarfášová, populist movements do not have any relevant election program, their strategy is based solely on their appeal to the people, so they are able to address the masses. Unfortunate by-product of this approach is the exclusion of some identity groups - rich, capitalists, establishment politicians, liberals or intellectuals. This definition is quite similar to that of Eatwell and Goodwin (2018), who consider the populism to be a way of doing politics. However, by utilizing this catch-all approach, we can easily lapse into the fallacious perception that all politics is populist and ipso facto lose the raison d'etre of the term itself. Anti-elitist, against the current political establishment rhetoric present in the pre-election struggle is an inherent part of politics. We do not see a purposefulness of this approach, needless to say, almost every catch-all party (Tory party in the UK, current Democratic party in the US or Austrian People's party led by Sebastian Kurz) would be considered populist by this definition, what seems to be utterly unproductive. There are some authors who conceptualized populism as a political logic though. In his book On Populist Reason Laclau (2005) put forward his case for populism as a particular logic of political life. He claims that any political cleavage is built upon the division between the two competing antagonistic groups (the people versus the elite; us versus them; the establishment versus the underdogs). Although it is true that the nature of politics is populist, we cannot accept this approach. The purpose of populist label is to differentiate movements, parties and leaders who make a false pretence of being the true and only voice of people.

Despite Drabik's (2019, 77) focus on the ideology of Fascism and Nazism, this young Slovak historian did not leave aside the difference between fascist ideology and populism. Even though he does consider the populism to be an ideology, Finchelstein's (2017) likening of the populism to the Fascism would be in Drabik's estimate unsuitable. He regards populism to be a subset of Fascism, a necessary condition if you will, not a sufficient condition on its own. Not every populist movement is fascist, however it seems that every fascist unit bear populist feature. Drabik probably did not come up with the definition of his own, merely assumed quasi-Mudde's and Manichean definition of populism as a political ideology labouring under the misapprehension that society is inherently divided between common, good-hearted and morally incorrupt people and immoral, depraved, corrupt and decadent elite exploiting the pure common folk. Furthermore, fascist populism tends to have an anti-Semitic tinge.

After proposing various delimitations of populism, the only purposeful approach toward populism, with regards to specificities of Hungary and Poland as explained below is to accept Mudde's delimitation and consider populism to be a thin-centred ideology. So far, we have been able to discount fascist ideology from the populist one, explain what is generally perceived by populism and pick up the most suitable approach. Nevertheless, contrasting names labelling the right-side political spectrum can be little confusing. Are there any meaningful distinctions between right-wing populism, national populism, extreme right or populist radical right? Firstly, it is needed to focus solely on the right side of populist spectrum. For instance, Heywood (2019) came up with the coherent distinction between the right and the left types of populism. Right-wing populism, in his view, tends to prioritize sociocultural concerns such as immigration, crime and corruption while the left side of populism focuses on the socioeconomic identity linked to the income inequality, poverty and deprivation. This will be our baseline, national identity, so we can grasp the concept of the right-side of political spectrum when it comes to populism.

Mudde (2017) explains, why is it that there is so much terminological confusion concerning the right-wing populism. Political parties will never personify themselves as "populist radical right", "extreme right", "radical right" or "rightwing populist", in comparison to Greens or Socialists. No political movement wants to be labelled populist, apart from few exceptions. Many of them reject even the left-right political divide as obsolete. We have to thereby rely on the terminological overlaps. For instance, Mudde (2007, 26) prefers the "populist radical right" as a result of thoughtful selection based on the combination of ideological features of the maximum definition approach. The term covers all the needed nuances, while emphasizing nativism over populism, because it is the ultimate core feature of the thin-centred ideology in his view. Our approach will be slightly different, we do not aspire to come up with the maximum definition of the political family, thereby there is no need for us to focus on the nativism over the populism, but to treat them equally.

Term "radical right" first emerged in pioneering study of Bell (1963) linking together some features from the early American populist movements of the 1890's to the McCarthy era of the 1960's. Although the republican politicians at that time used to be generally perceived more as a right-wing conservative, McCarthy's launch of the populist "witch-hunt" against the communist threats to the American way of life based on the free-market system and Northern puritan values bounded together all aspects of right-wing populism. The pure American folk (the people), jeopardized by the foreign devilish communist ideology linked to the elite (external enemy and the elite), have an urgency to be protected. Other authors have worked with the "radical right" concept since then (Ramet 1999; Kitschelt and McGann 1998). Granted that the term radical right contents all aspects of right-wing populism, it is missing an important part in its name, populism itself. The same apply for the "far right" as well (Marcus 2000; Jungerstam-Mulders 2003).

Schain, Zolberg and Hossay (2002, 23), along with other authors (Rémond 1982; Hainsworth 2003) prefer the label "extreme right" over radical right or populist movements, due to the notion of extremeness in a political and ideological space. The term refers to the anti-democratic, anti-liberal, and therefore anticonstitutional standing. Although some of it might be true, right-wing populist parties tend to move within the constitutional boundaries, at least most of the time. By looking at the usage of the fascist minimum in the paper, Roger Griffin's new consensus definition of fascism as "palingenetic form of populist ultranationalism" (Griffin 1993, 34), we can dismiss the term "extreme right" promptly as not suitable for our purposes. Populist supposedly aim to readdress the balance of discussion towards the "voiceless", they do not attempt to establish fascist-like dictatorship, therefore any comparison with Fascism/Nazism, like the one proposed by Finchelstein (2017, 89), is erroneous in this sense, getting back to Drabik's argument.

Describing populism with authoritarian values - authoritarian populism is a domain of Norris and Inglehrat (2019, 7). They combine the rhetoric approach towards populism with the authoritarianism, defined as a cluster of values prioritizing collective security for the group at the expense of liberal autonomy for the individual. In the authors view, the biggest threat facing the liberal democracies nowadays is cultural backlash favouring authoritarian values. We do accept the subtle notion of authoritarian populism; however, we are missing the national aspect, which is not necessary present within the authoritarian label. We consider the authoritarianism to be just a by-product of national tendencies, not taking into account all the shades of right-wing populism. In his Political Ideologies, Heywood (2017) uses the name "national conservativism" taking into consideration far right and anti-immigration parties like The National Rally (former National Front) of Marine Le Pen or Matteo Salvini's League (former Northern League). Although, it is by no means a prerequisite for the right-wing populism on its own, Heywood (2017, 105) further develops his idea. The "rightwing" populist parties express their concerns about immigration and multiculturalism. National identity (right-wing aspect) of the French and Italians is supposed to be jeopardized by the refugee inflows (external enemy) and domestic liberal elite (internal enemy). We can see the Manichean dichotomy and the "people" vs the "elite" antagonism.

Right-wing populism, or in Fukuyama's words (2018) "populist nationalism" is a domain primarily of Northern Europe and Northern America, where the populism takes a middle class-oriented, more ethnic and anti-immigrant stance. Eatwell and Goodwin follow up the Fukuyama's delimitation of right-wing populism as a "national populism". Populist nationalism, or national populism for that matter, accomplishes our requirements of linking together the term populism with the right-wing aspect of identity politics based on the "lowest common denominator" approach, or so-called minimum definition approach. Ultimately, we base our national populistic approach on the understanding populism as a thin-centred ideology having four key features: (1) dialectical antagonism considering the society to be inherently divided between the people and the elite, (2) only the moral, uncorrupted and hard-working people have a say in where should the society be heading, (3) the politics is just a means to achieve the will of people and ultimately (4) it is up to the populist antiestablishment newly-formed elite to decide who is the people. Using the example of Hungary and Poland, the fourth feature of our perception of populism will be explained.

3THE ORBAN PHENOMENON

Erratic Hungarian 20th century full of political upheavals, dissolution of big empire, advent of authoritarianism under the regency of Miklós Horthy, participation in ethnic deportations, 1956 revolution crushed under the Soviet tanks followed by communist oppression and ultimately hopefulness of the 1989 bloodless takeover of the power to the new democratic elite marked the Hungarian people significantly. New hope accompanying free elections gave rise to a fresh, liberal, west-educated and democracy-prone politician called Viktor Orbán. In 1988, Orbán and thirty-six other university students gathered and laid out foundations for the most influential political party in current Hungary, Alliance of Young Democrats - FIDESZ (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége). FIDESZ congress decided to transform itself into a proper political party in October 1989, in order to participate in the first free elections after the fall of communist regime. Although Orbán had been working for the George Soros' Open Society Foundation since April 1988, and later moved to Pembroke College (September 1989) with a grant from foundation to study the idea of civil society in European political philosophy for nine months, he managed to return to Hungarian political life in 1990 (Lendvai 2018).

It only took him eight years to become the second youngest prime minister Hungary ever had, serving between the years 1998-2002. FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Party constituted government together with Independent Smallholders' party (FKGP) and Hungarian Democratic forum (MDF). Orbán's right-wing administration had functioned quite foreseeable and even pushed Hungary closer to the EU nevertheless, seeds of populism were present (Fowler 2003). One-man leadership of Orbán's government avoided bigger scandals, apart from few exceptions. Orbán quite successfully stablished himself as a firm proWestern, reformist leader and later as an integral part of the European People's Party (Roháč 2016, 75). How is it possible then, that liberal youth organization - FIDESZ, with the 1990s motto of "Do not trust anybody over 35", transformed into a conservative right-wing populist party within a decade?

It was not long after 2006 elections when on the 50th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution FIDESZ called for the "revolution" and encouraged riots targeting political establishment, who they claimed to be "rebranded communists" (Ding and Hlavac 2017, 9). Their identification with the "oppressed", the people suffering under the rule of establishment was self- evident and laid out the foundation for the following decay of residual liberal values of the party. Their inability to accept electoral loss by a narrow margin (2002, 2006) fuelled the nationalist rhetoric glorifying the Treaty of Trianon, which turned the pre-1914 Kingdom of Hungary into a curtailed state. Trianon had cost Hungary more than two-thirds of its land area and about a third of its people, which is a detriment that never got to be forgiven (Rupnik 2012). During the two terms in opposition, FIDESZ started its metamorphosis from quasiliberal movement, through centre-right conservativism to the embodiment of national populist prototype. Main trigger of this opportunistic metamorphosis were precisely the protests after 2006 election combining an outrage against the Socialist Party (MSzP) and proto-nationalist awakening (Trianon).

In the beginning of their second term in a row (September 2006), prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány got taped saying "I've almost killed myself the last one-and-ahalf years having to pretend that we were governing. Instead we've been lying morning, noon and night. And I don't want to do that anymore". Angry (predominantly far right and neo-Nazi) riots burst out, which were successfully repressed by the Hungarian police. After Gyurcsány outlived the vote of nonconfidence, Viktor Orbán had begun to capitalize on the anti-MSzP emotion and escalated (opportunistically) the populist antagonism, claiming that "the government has begun a war against its own people" (Lendvai 2018, 36-39). FIDESZ, "defender of the people" was getting closer to finally take over, while dexterously assuming position of the far right Jobbik (The movement for a better Hungary). In 2010 election, voters were given the choice to send the discredited Socialist Party into the opposition.

Shortly after forming government following 2010 election, Orbán's administration acceded to various unconventional moves limiting constitutional rights in Hungary. As a result of disproportional election law benefiting larger parties in order to simplify the creation of government, 53% vote share of FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Party together with Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP) transformed into 68%o of the seats in parliament guarant eeing constitutional-amendment supermajority consisting of two-thirds of votes. Unleashed supermajority power resulted in twelve amendments during the first year of FIDESZ-led government (Bánkuti, Halmai and Scheppele 2012). National populists in Hungarian parliament managed to amend an article of constitution requiring a four-fifth vote of parliament to set the rules for writing a new constitution, therefore no other obstacle stood in their way to write a new one. Before moving to a new constitution, Orbán had to effectively disable the constitutional court by increasing the number of judges (FIDESZ is given a power to name new judges and ultimately turn the balance in favour of the government). The extra-parliamentary committee consisting of three Fidesz members headed by József Szájer came up with a new constitutional draft. The new constitution went into effect on 1st January 2012, after no relevant discussion in Hungarian parliament with opposition parties refusing to take part in final voting (Westervelt 2012). New constitution presented a breakpoint in terms of relations with the EU and in terms of domestic propaganda. National populist wave had successfully begun. In Orbán's words delivered at the 25th Bálványos summer camp in B&acaron;ile Tuşnad stating that "the new state that we are constructing in Hungary is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state". Liberal democracy supposedly failed in delivering promised, failed in protecting Hungarian nation and its communities and according Orbán it is time "to organize our national state to replace the liberal state", where there are no political activists attempting to enforce foreign interest in Hungary (Orbán 2014). Illusionary external enemy became significantly important for the state propaganda.

As we explained earlier, invoking Horty's regime became in principle acceptable, mainly by highlighting its anti-communist sentiment based on the defeat of Béla Kun's short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic in August 1919. Irredentism became an inherent part of the state doctrine. The Manichean dichotomy gained new international dimension, an external enemy behind Hungarian boarders. Proud Hungarian people betrayed after both world wars, huge chunks of Hungarian soil being cut off and bloody suppression of the 1956 revolution where Hungarian people were once again betrayed by the West. Government led by Viktor Orbán keep rewriting Hungarian history. The Republic of Councils in Hungary arouses anti-Semitic narrative till these days. Communist internationalism lured Jews into the support of leftist ideology. After the defeat of Béla Kun, following "white terror" laid out foundation for the fallacy of Judeo-Bolshevism within the Hungarian society. Adherents of the Arrow Cross, puppet regime founded by the Nazi in 1944, are responsible for tens of thousands of Jew victims and still, subtle antisemitism shapes current political propaganda of Orbán's regime (Kirchick 2017). Antisemitism is usually linked to the fascist-like movements, although not necessarily. Government controlled by FIDESZ utilitarianly promoted image of powerful Jew planning to control the world. George Soros, affluent financier and philanthrope, indirect sponsor of Orbán's studies in the UK, happened to become main target of their anti-Semitic propaganda, with thousands of posters of grinning Soros with the slogan "Let's not allow Soros to have the last laugh!", having been posted around the country on billboards, on the metro, and on the floors of Budapest's trams (Echikson 2019). Statues and Memorials of regent Horty are being unveiled in Hungary, statues of man who is famous for saying "I have been an anti-Samite my whole life". After the party came to power (2010), according the Holocaust Remembrance Project, dr. Gal got to be appointed to direct the Holocaust Memorial and Documentation Centre in Budapest and one of his first steps was to eliminate mentions of Miklos Horty's alliance with Adolf Hitler and to sanitise the record of regime participation in the deportation of the country's Jews (Owen-Jones 2019).

Another enemy of the Hungarian people are supposed to be the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and media, allegedly supporting the mandatory resettlement quotas, imposed by the European union. In June 2014, police raided offices of three NGOs that had received funding from Norwegian Civic Fund established to endorse open society projects in Hungry. Hungarian authorities accused Oslo of political meddling, after they declined to finance NGOs through channels, which are controlled by the Hungarian government, in order to avoid the funding of anti-government initiatives (Kirchick 2017, 57-58). Having outlined the anti-Semitic nuance of Orban's propaganda, it is no surprise that he considers the NGOs to be just an extended secret service of an external enemy. Orbán did not hesitate to say that "in every country effort will be made to push Soros out. You can already see this in Europe at the moment. The sources of funding are being revealed, as are the secret service links, and which NGOs represent which interest. The coming year will be about displacing Soros and the forces he symbolizes" (Cabinet Office of The Prime Minister 2016).

Soros system, or a plot of liberal financial elite and foreign intelligence agencies trying to undermine Hungarian way of life by imposing forced immigration and LGBT agenda became a status quo of Hungarian politics. The strategy of finding scapegoats reached its peak by passing through parliament a law affecting NGOs that receive foreign financial support of over 24 000 EUR. After the bill was signed by president János Áder, NGOs not fulfilling this requirement were obliged to register themselves as if they were foreign lobbies or agents (Lendvai 2018, 101). The campaign against NGOs (mainly Open Society Foundation) launched by FIDESZ peaked with an amendment to Higher Education Law, fast-tracked through parliament on 4th April 2017, destined to close the Central European University (CEU) founded in 1991 with an endowment form George Soros. The amendment requires universities to have operations in their home countries in order to award degrees in Hungary, making it impossible for the "Soros university" to function properly within the Hungarian law (Central European University 2017). One of the best universities in the region was effectively banned due to national populism.

Another channel through which anti-FIDESZ enemies propagating illegal immigration operated in Hungary, at least according state propaganda, were the media. Government of Viktor Orbán forced hundreds of private media owners to donate their outlets under the control of a single, state-friendly entity led by a former lawmaker from FIDESZ (Kingsley 2018). Eventually, this move did not mean any significant change in the trajectory in freedom of press. Since FIDESZ (re)raised to power in 2010, constant assaults on the freedom of expression were present. Reporters without Borders do not hesitate to make comments such as "The ownership of Hungary's media has continued to become increasingly concentrated in the hands of oligarchs allied with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's ultra-nationalist government" or "Level of media control in Hungary is unprecedented in an EU member state", needless to say, drastic decline in the World Press Freedom Index (87th place in 2019 in comparison with 56th just five years ago) signifies that Hungary places behind countries like Timor-Leste, Niger or Kyrgyzstan when it comes to freedom of press (Reporters without Borders 2020a). Independent media outlets have been constantly accused of their antigovernmental positions favoured by the liberals, activists and illegal immigrants (Cabinet Office of The Prime Minister 2019a), challenging the people's way of life by world governance and globalized open society (Cabinet Office of The Prime Minister 2017). Their stance is completely elitist, allegedly targeted against the common folk.

National populism became an official "Orbán's doctrine" of illiberal Hungary. Nationalization of media outlets, effective pacification of NGOs and schools financed from abroad and subtle anti-Semitism keep moving Hungary eastward, closer to political systems of Russia or Turkey. Hungarian people dissatisfied with the failures of the MSzP-led governments came to believe the populist Zeitgeist, the "Redeemer fallacy" of Orbán's propaganda. The 100th anniversary of the Trianon treaty (2020) might be ground-breaking. Just recently, Orbán declared that "one hundred years of Hungarian solitude (with reference to Trianon) has come to an end" calmly adding "day by day our economic, cultural and military strength is visibly growing. The time has come for us to use it. The only question is for what purpose" (Cabinet Office of The Prime Minister 2019b). Former Slovak ambassador in Budapest Rastislav Káčer did not hesitate to state, "we are three steps from Orbán's Hungary territorial claims" (Aktuality 2019). On top of that, constant formal and informal struggles between Budapest and the representatives of the EU is driving a wedge to European integration. Quite recently, Political Assembly of the European People's Party (EPP) decided to suspend FIDESZ membership within the EPP political family, due to breach of its values (European People's Party 2019). Very similar development is being spotted in Poland.

4BUILDING BUDAPEST IN WARSAW

The leader of Poland's ruling party Prawo i Sprawiedliwość - PiS (Law and Justice), although not a prime minister Jarosław Kaczyński, is a long-time admirer of Viktor Orbán's vision of the illiberal state. After FIDESZ secured a twothirds parliamentary majority (2010), the most powerful persona in Poland stated, "the day will come when we will succeed, and we will have Budapest in Warsaw" (Buckley and Foy 2016). Why is it though, that Jarosław Kaczyński is so prone to follow the development of enfant terrible of the EU, Viktor Orbán? But even more important question is, why is the Polish people so eager to assume features of Orbánomics developing in Hungary ultimately leading to the Marx's prophecy? Tragedy of illiberal state has already been unveiled in Budapest. Warsaw inclines to finish up with the farce. Quite similar to FIDESZ in Hungary, Polish right-wing populists from PiS spent relatively dispute-free two years in government (2005-2007) before staying two terms in opposition fulfilling its populist-prone metamorphosis.

Centre-right liberal Civic Platform (PO) led by Donald Tusk had been ruling Poland for eight years. During the time in opposition, Kaczyński slightly morphed PiS from Christian and conservative, although still very right-wing oriented party, toward a national populism a la FIDESZ. Party shifted focus on voters who begun to criticize the existing system, mainly those socially and economically excluded voters who expressed their dissatisfaction with liberal democracy and voters who wanted to replace post-1989 third Polish Republic with a new one, illiberal democracy (Kozłowski 2019, 97). In a speech delivered in the lower house of Polish parliament - Sejm, the then prime minister Szydło drew on the populist politics of "ordinary people" proclaiming that "we want to help the people, not the political elites" later adding to a demur that she is the elite - "We are the good elite" (Buštíková and Guasti 2018, 3). Current prime minister of Poland Mateusz Morawiecki's quote "We know perfectly well that we (people of Poland) have a chance to achieve something that has been dreamed of for 500 years" (Law and Justice 2020) reminds us of the similarities between PiS and Hungarian FIDESZ.

Victorious elections in 2015 foreshadowed the "populist metamorphosis". In just two years after PiS got to power, Freedom House organization concluded that "in 2017, Poland's democratic institutions, under the virtually unchecked control of PiS party leader Kaczyński, came close to a point of no return in straying from democratic norms" (Freedom House 2018). It took the government only few months to endanger the rule of law in Poland via a judicial reform that undermines division of power. The Law on the Supreme Court lowers the mandatory retirement age for the Supreme Court judges and establishes a new chamber in the Supreme Court responsible for disciplinary proceedings and overseeing electoral cases, while its members will be elected by the National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ). Unsurprisingly, NCJ is formed indirectly by the PiSdominated parliament (Lyman and Berendt 2016). President of PiS did not mind labelling polish court system as a "sick system" (Law and Justice 2019a) insinuating communist history of selected judges, with a need to "reject everything that arises from the previous system and pathologies that arose after 1989" (Law and Justice 2017). The need for de-communisation of Poland's court system was one of the three reasons (alongside low trust in judiciary and excessive length of proceedings) for judiciary reform demarcated in the White Paper on the Reform of the Polish Judiciary. This document was drafted as a counterargument against the application of the procedure of Article 7 (Treaty of the European Union), potentially leading to a suspension of Poland's voting rights in the Council. Judges involved in the communist court system following law of Polish People's Republic were never held accountable for some of the verdicts they issued (The Chancellery of the Prime Minister 2018). Populist response of PiS, rousing Polish society against the elite judiciary system (communist residuals are the elite) is seriously endangering the division of power in Poland. It might have been a worth discussing issue, had it been a real problem, however it seems to be utterly fabricated conflict serving PiS to gain power over judiciary reluctant to give in. The average judge was a student when communism collapsed in Poland thirty years ago. Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, a body of legal experts issued an unusually direct statement accusing Polish government of "posing a grave threat to the judicial independence" by the reform that "enabled the legislative and executive powers to interfere in a severe and extensive manner in the administration of justice" (Venice Commission 2019, 14). After this harsh allegation, we might have come to a situation of renaming PiS, using the Economist's proposal - The Lawless and Injustice Party (The Economist 2020, 13).

Another allegedly flawed element of the polish society are the mainstream media under the control of "post-communist elite" (Dziennik Gazeta Prawna 2016). It was not long after PiS came to power in October 2015 that the state media coverage has swung to the right (right-wing conservativism) and noticeably started to back the government. Study conducted in 2019 by the Council for the Protection of the Polish Language, affiliate of the Polish Academy of Sciences, found that the national media TVP was systematically portraying the opposition parties with attributes as "shocking", "scandalous", "provocation" or "putsch", whereas governing PiS was regularly connected to words like "reform", "sovereign", "strong", "heroic" or "patriotic" (Davies 2019). Partisan involvement of the state media (private media as well, but to a lesser extent) skyrocketed as a result of state advertisement funds being redistributed by PiS. The Law and Justice government did not hesitate to divert money from the liberal to the rightwing conservative press (Dzięciołowski 2017). In the party manifesto dedicated to 2019 parliamentary election, Kaczynski's ruling party pledged to establish a "new media order" (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość 2019). Since the PiS came to power in 2015, World Press Freedom index dropped to 59th place from being 18th in the world in 2015. This sudden shift can be explained by the populist polarizing thincentred ideology preaching "re-foundation of Poland" while "making the media Polish again" (Reporters without Boarders 2020b). It might be the beginning of the media "Repolonization", so succinctly declared by PiS president (Kania 2016), implicitly undermining the position of German publishers.

Anti-German, along with anti-Russian sentiment, represent a defining piece within the national populism containing Polish features. Both aversions result from World War II. tragic experience. Germans are constantly being reminded of the importance "that the German authorities do not forget about the crimes committed during World War II" (Law and Justice 2019b). The "German card" was even utilized during the 2019 election promise that "Poland will not pay for German crimes of World War II" (see the implicit irredentism calling for PiS as a defender against foreign enemy), under the government led by PiS (Law and Justice 2019c), almost 75 years from the end of bloodiest conflict in the history of mankind. Comments on aggressive policy of Russia are made frequently as well, amply criticizing so called hybrid warfare conducted by secret Russian authorities. Russian political meddling is one of the few issues of agreement between parties across political spectrum. Every attempt of constructive approach toward Russia ultimately results into a label - "Russian agent" while every indication resembling amelioration of Russian-Polish relation might be marked as "falling into Moscow's embrace". After the fall of communism, Warsaw's policy toward Russian Federation was unambiguous - extracting Poland from the sphere of influence of the former Soviet Union and joining the West. It ultimately sought to "build a West in the East" (Pełczyńska-Nałęcz 2019).

Besides rigorous mentions of Germany and Russia, the European Union is also considered to be a threat to Polish national identity. Prime minister Morawiecki believes that "European project needs a new opening" (Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki 2018). Although Kaczyński's party is not so openly hostile toward the EU in comparison with FIDESZ for instance, they portray themselves as a representative of the people against the European elite. One of the main frictions, except the judiciary system reform, is a position towards refugees. Albeit it is not considered to be a Jewish conspiracy like in Hungary, refugees from Middle East and Africa are still viewed as creatures "bringing in all kinds of parasite, which are not dangerous in their own countries, but which could prove dangerous for the local populations" (Eyre and Goillandeau 2019). Illegal migration allegedly poses a threat to Christian and white Europe and only PiS-led government secures safety of Polish culture and heritage. During a famous speech in the lower house of Polish parliament (2015), Kaczyński expressed a determination to fight external enemies by asking whether "the government does have the right to act under foreign, external pressure and with no explicit agreement of the nation", referring to Germany as responsible for economic migration into Europe. He continued with Sharia law areas under no control in Sweden and France and churches being treated as toilets (Krzyżanowski 2018, 85). PiS later helped to escalate the tension by drumming up fears about Islamic "intruders" who have arrived en masse and who are ready to "invade" Christian Poland (Krzyzanowska and Krzyzanowski 2018, 615). The then prime minister Beata Szydło, in the context of refugee crisis 2015-2016, kept continually reminding public that "we will never agree to endanger Poles' security" and that "every state's obligation is to protect its citizens, thereby I see no option of allowing migrants into Poland at this time" (Potyrała 2016). In this context, Krzyżanowski (2018) considers PiS to be an isolationist, Eurosceptic and ethno-nationalist party. He even draws a comparison between Hungarian latent anti-Semitism and Polish populist opportunism.

Even though we view national populism in Hungary and Poland to be quite similar, there are few differences resulting from different historical perspective. Albeit both populist regimes are founded on the anti-Communist sentiment, they differ in their perception of Western values along with relations with Russia and the United States. Part of Poland was being occupied by the Soviet Union following the advent of the Second World War, not to mention the Katyn massacre (1940), while Hungary suffered a tremendous disgrace after the suppression of 1956 popular uprising. Following the fall of Iron Curtain and the dissolution of Soviet Union, Russian-Polish and Russian-Hungarian relation started to improve. Why is it so, that Russia became n.1 external enemy of PiSled government, whereas Orbán systematically fawns over Moscow?

After FIDESZ came to power, Hungary proclaimed its Eastern Opening aiming to enhance economic cooperation with countries like China, Russia, Turkey and Azerbaijan. Orbán continually undermines the position of the EU by condemning EU sanctions on Russia, as a result of Crimea annexation in 2014. He describes sanctions measures like "shooting oneself in the foot" (BBC 2014). Albeit not the only one criticizing EU sanctions, Prime Minister Orbán seems to have utilitarian incentives. On 10th of May, 2015, Viktor Orbán gave his inaugural speech after being re-elected and sworn in as prime minister, asking for "territorial autonomy for Transcarpathia, the western Ukrainian region historically inhabited by a substantial Hungarian minority", what may have been perceived as an attempt to undermine territorial integrity of Ukraine alongside Russia (Hegedus 2016, 2). This attitude drove a wedge into Polish-Hungarian relations. Polish people, historically cautious of unlawful claims to their territory, naturally refuse this approach. Polish explicit support for Ukrainian pro-European stance stem from ever-present fears regarding Russia's expansionism (Stokłosa 2017).

Attitude towards United States is miscellaneous as well. By standards of U.S. Department of State, "Poland is a stalwart ally in Central Europe and one of the United States' strongest Continental partners in fostering security and prosperity regionally, throughout Europe, and the world", while keep hosting the NATO Multinational Corps and Division Northeast Headquarters (U.S. Department of State 2019). It is no secret that Warsaw willingly contributed to operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Kosovo, and never doubted the commitment of 2% of GDP to spend on defence. Hungary's position towards U.S. is rather schizophrenic praising Russia's illiberal tendencies as explained above, while at the same time portraying itself as a reliable NATO ally (Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2019). Prime minister Orbán labelled Hungarian-US relations as having its highs and lows, good and bad time however, "United States can ultimately always count on US, both in meeting rooms and on battlefields" (Hungary Today 2019).

Direction of foreign affairs might differ in certain aspect nevertheless, government in both countries based on the national populists' values have more in common than any other examples in the EU. Both populists' governments face a possibility to be confronted with the Art. 7 proceedings (Treaty on European Union), eventually leading to the suspension of voting rights in the case of serious violations of the EU rules and values (Ágh 2018, 40-43). Populist thin-centred ideology in Hungary and Poland divides society on the issue of communism, postcommunist elite and opposition (internal enemy), deterioration of indigenous Christian values as a result of immigration, NGOs or media (external enemy). False indications are being made, that there is only one trustworthy redeemer - the bearer of the populist thought itself, Orbán's FIDESZ and Kaczynski's PiS. In accordance with our definition of populism, the newly formed government essentially becoming the elite gets to label who is the true and only "people" (or rather who is not - media, NGOs, EU etc.). Both redeemers have to persevere in false illusion, that it is not them who became the elite, but they are the only one capable of defending the people. Eventually, unheard of enemy (the elite) needs to be created.

Ultimately, it does not matter whether the Budapest is built in Warsaw, or Warsaw in Budapest, the only pertinent issue consists of the question, whether the Orbán's illiberal doctrine is going to take roots and expand to other countries, or it will eventually subside and be forgotten. To some extent, Orbán's illiberal doctrine is an embodiment of deeper dialectical struggle, between what Milanović calls a "liberal meritocratic" form of capitalism and a "state-led" form of political capitalism (Milanović 2020, 11-12). This "Clash of Capitalisms" is taking place in both Poland and Hungary in form of the vision articulated through "Orbán's illiberal doctrine". Central-Eastern Europe became a battlefield between a system (Europe and Northern America) that concentrates the vast majority of production in the private sector and allows talent to rise and guarantee freedom of opportunity (at least officially) and between a system (China and Russia) focusing primarily on the high economic growth and limiting individual, political and civic rights though some sort of implicit social contract. National populism articulated within the Orbán's illiberal doctrine being propagated around Budapest-Warsaw axis is just one half of the V4 attitude towards the populism. Czech Republic and Slovakia represent the second half.

5CONCLUSION

The aim of this article has been to make a contribution to the field of sociopolitical study assessing the concept of populism, by adjusting it to specificities of the V4 countries. Initially, we presented our take on the populism, reflecting specificities of the central European region. Populism is in our view a thincentred ideology having four basis features: (1) dialectical antagonism considering the society to be inherently divided between the people and the elite, (2) only the moral, uncorrupted and hard-working people have a say in where should the society be heading, (3) the politics is just a means to achieve the will of people and ultimately (4) it is up to the anti-establishment, newly-formed populist elite to decide who is the people.

By excluding various types of right-wing populism (radical-right, extreme right or authoritarian right) we managed to select the most suitable one, linking together populism with its right-wing aspect of identity - national populism. We were able then to divide V4 into two ideological blocks considering populism. One represented by Poland and Hungary adopted what we call the "Orbán's illiberal doctrine", propagating state-led, illiberal and authoritarian capitalism, essentially driving a wedge into the Fukuyama's dichotomic end of the history - the victory of liberal democracy and human rights (Fukuyama 1992) embodied in the EU. The notion of "Orbán's illiberal doctrine" oscillates around BudapestWarsaw axis laying the foundation for the "Clash of Capitalism" taking place in the V4. On the other hand, there is a heterogeneous Czech-Slovak cohabitation of limited populism. Slovak-born Czech prime minister Babiš's vision of what can be labelled "technocratic populism" lacks basic nationalistic appropriateness, thereby cannot be considered a national populism. We do find his vision implicitly and even possibly treacherous however, Czech Republic still tends to defend the liberal version of capitalism. Slovak Smer-SD, "social-democratic paradox" is a quasi-populist entity sui generis adapting nationalistic rhetoric in combination with redistribution policies (leftist inclination) (Szabó 2019). Even though governments led by Smer succeeded in escalating nationalistic tensions, they managed to stay within the democratic boundaries and never attempted to take over the media. Both Slovak and Czech stance towards Budapest-Warsaw axis is rather erratic, not attempting to publicly undermine the unity of the V4 group meanwhile trying to stay away from the accusation of the rule of law disruption. We conclude that Czech Republic and Slovakia represent competing bloc against Poland and Budapest in the "Clash of Capitalisms", at least for now.

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