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The success of national efforts to revive securitization in various jurisdictions is dependent on the post-crisis regulatory responses to securitization. The perceived shortcoming of the originate-to-distribute model of securitization during the 2007/ 2008 global financial crisis has occasioned significant regulatory responses that can undermine the revival of securitization. This article seeks to provoke a rethink of the premise underlying these inhibitive regulatory responses by arguing that despite the originate-to-distribute model of securitization and its contribution to the US subprime mortgage crisis, the deterioration of underwriting standards would not have reached its unprecedented heights nor would the subprime mortgage crisis have ensued, if not for the role played by the US government housing policies during the 15-year period after the passage of the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 . The article also demonstrates that the US subprime mortgage crisis was more complex than the originate-to-distribute model by itself could account for. It advises on the need for caution in using the fallout from the financial crisis as a basis to initiate regulatory reforms that could undermine global efforts to revive securitization.
Le succes des demarches nationales entreprises pour relancer la titrisation dans diverses juridictions depend des mesures prises apres la crise par les autorites reglementaires en reponse aux transactions de titrisation. Les lacunes du modele de titrisation « octroi puis cession du credit » (originate-to-distribute) qui sont devenues evidentes pendant la crise financiere mondiale de 2007 et 2008 ont donne lieu a des mesures robustes des autorites de reglementation qui peuvent nuire au retour de la titrisation. L'auteur cherche a provoquer une reevaluation de la premisse sur laquelle se sont appuyees les autorites de reglementation pour adopter ces mesures en faisant valoir que malgre le modele d'« octroi puis cession du credit » et son role dans la crise des prets hypothecaires a risque aux Etats Unis, le relâchement des normes de souscription n'aurait pas atteint les sommets sans precedent et la crise des prets hypothecates a risque n'en aurait pas resulte si ce n'etait du role des politiques americaines relatives aux logements au cours de la periode de quinze ans qui a suivi l'adoption du Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992. L'auteur fait egalement la...