India's Quest for Hegemony in the Indian Ocean

Abstract

With India believing Indian Ocean as the Indian lake, Pakistan cannot stay oblivious to the advancements occurring in the region due to its India centric threat perception. Indian strategists today use a term "Modi Doctrine for the Indo-Pacific region". The purpose of this doctrine is to project that Indian interests lie not only in the Western Pacific but also in the Indian Ocean region. Indian policy makers support the idea that India is not just a South Asian nation rather it is an international power that can manage the ascent of China in the global politics. Additionally, India continues to proceed with its antiPakistan arrangements and countering its vital nexus with China. Driven by extraordinary force development goals and competition with China, India is extending its naval military capability and security connections throughout the Indian Ocean. India is keen on building new alliances all over the globe. This study provides an analysis of India's sea based aspirations and arrangements in the Indian Ocean and finds that augmented Indian power in the Indian Ocean will be perilous for Pakistan's national security interests.

Headnote

Abstract

With India believing Indian Ocean as the Indian lake, Pakistan cannot stay oblivious to the advancements occurring in the region due to its India centric threat perception. Indian strategists today use a term "Modi Doctrine for the Indo-Pacific region". The purpose of this doctrine is to project that Indian interests lie not only in the Western Pacific but also in the Indian Ocean region. Indian policy makers support the idea that India is not just a South Asian nation rather it is an international power that can manage the ascent of China in the global politics. Additionally, India continues to proceed with its antiPakistan arrangements and countering its vital nexus with China. Driven by extraordinary force development goals and competition with China, India is extending its naval military capability and security connections throughout the Indian Ocean. India is keen on building new alliances all over the globe. This study provides an analysis of India's sea based aspirations and arrangements in the Indian Ocean and finds that augmented Indian power in the Indian Ocean will be perilous for Pakistan's national security interests.

Key words: Indian Ocean, Hegemony, Security, Sea Line of Communications, Second Strike Capability.

Introduction

Geologically, India exercises sufficient control over Indian Ocean and carries the potential to turn into a dictating power in the region over the long run. India considers that supremacy over Indian Ocean is a fundamental part of India's desire to achieve a great power status, as it has gigantic population, an enormous military/maritime power, and is making rapid progress to be one of the world's biggest economies. Many Indians think that India ought to be the sole authority in the Indian Ocean as the ocean and the state share the same nomenclature.1

During the colonial period, India was the focus of British Empire2 and following the huge gap of sixty years since independence, India is now gradually trying to develop itself as the major power of the world. Its ever growing worldwide financial and military force is driving it to look towards an extended strategic role in the region on the world stage. Indian Prime Minister Modi's government sees control over the Indian Ocean as fundamental to keeping the strategic circle of India over unfriendly powers.3

C. Raja Mohan in his article "Revealed: India's Master Plan for the Indian Ocean" has expressed as to how India views Indian prominence in the Indian Ocean region fundamental to its global power ambition, which is also India's long-term aspiration.4 In any case, most Indians would unequivocally dismiss the thought that India has any hegemonic desire in the Indian Ocean. They rather consider India as a well-disposed police man that can manage security to the region and keep the undesirable external powers at bay.

The Indian Ocean was given its name by old and medieval geographers not because of Indian mariners ruled it but rather in light of the fact that it gave pathway to mariners from the Arabian Peninsula and from different nations towards the coast of India and to its wealth.5 India's yearnings to be a dominant power in the Indian Ocean can be traced back to the US' verdict in 2005 by the Bush administration to make India a global power and a strategic stabilizer against China's ascent.6 In the course of the most recent decade or so, India has effectively introduced itself as a cooperative security supplier in the Indian Ocean. However, India additionally has a tendency to have a hierarchical view of the global framework, which might have negative consequential results for the region. The rise of India as a noteworthy monetary and military power now can possibly change the whole character of the Indian Ocean. In the event of India being successful in its aspirations, it will be a historical achievement where a littoral state will be the dominating force for the first time.

There is also a critical probability that the Indian Ocean will turn into a theater of keen importance for world powers due to disagreements between India and China, the two rising powers of Asia. India's goal to emerge as a major power in the Indian Ocean may not be compatible with China's key objectives particularly, which indeed is to secure its Sea Line of Communications (SLOC) to the Middle East.7 It is believed that Indian Ocean is going to be the focal point of security dilemma in which any action by China and India to improve their own security will create greater insecurity for the others. The US, which has been the transcendent force in the Indian Ocean and will probably remain so for the coming decades, will progressively influence the balance between the two rising forces. The tussle between these three powers, both inside and outside the Indian Ocean will determine the strategic stability in Indian Ocean in the near future.

Maritime rivalry with China has been a vital component in driving India's key desires in the Indian Ocean. While the Indian Navy's quick targets include countering Pakistan and achieving control over India's selective maritime zone, China's potential to extend maritime force into the Indian Ocean has turned into its main long term wellspring of concern. In the course of most recent decade, India has extended its security associations with numerous states throughout the Indian Ocean, with specific spotlight on the choke points of the Mozambique Channel in the southwest Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf in the northwest and the Malacca Strait in the upper east.8

The progressions in financial approaches, political mindset, and effective discretion have empowered India's articulation towards its desire for ruling the Indian Ocean. Besides, its maritime development has likewise been bolstered by the globalization.9 Moreover, the enhancing Indo-US relationship since 9/11 has empowered India to jump forward; establishing more friendly economic, political and security association with the US in the Indian Ocean and additionally in Asia Pacific region. India also wishes to fortify its regional/worldwide status, owing to its huge populace, the economic development and strategic force modernization. Therefore, it highlights the attributes of being the largest democratic government, secularism, rapid improvement/modernization and peaceful concurrence as the reasons. However, above mentioned Indian attributes are challenged widely by a range of variables; the population explosion, the ethnic, religious and federal level tribulations, immense human security issues and the rise of China at one end and arch rival Pakistan on the other end of the power struggle. With a specific goal to accomplish its great power policy and huge financial development, it considers Indian Ocean as exceptionally basic and essential to its national interests.10

India's Security Concern in Indian Ocean

Since India enjoys a focal position in the Indian Ocean due to its large naval force in the region, this reality has a significant impact on India's maritime security environment. According to K .M Oannikar, "India's life line is packed within the Indian Ocean, India's sovereignty relies upon the autonomy of the water surface and no mechanical advancement, no business development, and no stable political structure is feasible for India unless her shores are secured"^

A recent report by India's Defence Ministry stated, "India s geostrategic location is present both in mainland Asia and additionally in the Indian Ocean locale."^ From India's point of view, key security contemplations incorporate an easy access to the Indian Ocean for the navies of the world's most powerful states; the huge Islamic populaces around the coastline of the Ocean and in its neighbourhood; the oil abundance of the Persian Gulf; the proliferation of conventional military force and atomic weapons among the region's states; the significance of major straits for Indian Ocean security; and the historical inclination of mainland Asians

Geographically, India thinks that its security will be best guaranteed by improving its security perimeter that includes the Indian Ocean as well. No doubt, New Delhi sees the Indian Ocean as its own territory, the world's only area and sea named after a solitary state. That helps India pose a dominating role in the region.13 It is similar to what the US set out to do in North America and the Western Hemisphere at an early time during the US rise of power™ The US' foreign policy all through the nineteenth century had only one significant objective: accomplishing authority in the Western half of the globe.™

Majority of the Indians believe that the security perimeter of India ought to reach from the Strait of Malacca to the Strait of Hormuz and from the African coast to the Australian Western coast.™ For some Indians, the emphasis is on the Northern Indian Ocean, yet for others the domain incorporates even the Indian Ocean shorelines of Antarctica.17 An Indian researcher claims that a rising India will attempt to set up its dominance simply like the other rising forces have done subsequent to Napoleonic times, with long haul objective of accomplishing dominant power status.18 Moreover, with the US endowment, Modi Government now has the boldness to project itself as a challenger to China's advancements into the Indian Ocean and hedge the long-standing dispute on Sino-Indian border rivalry.

Nonetheless, during Modi's visit to Indian Ocean states, he has carefully avoided both naming China and Gwadar port to enhance better relations with the other littoral states.19

India's uneasiness about the threats postured by Pakistan in the Indian Ocean, is one of the significant worries of the region. India's naval doctrine highlights that the developing fundamentalist religious/jhadi militancy is going to influence the general security environment in the Indian Ocean Region.20 In the same vein, Lal Krishna Advani, senior leader of BJP proclaimed that the epicentre of the world terrorism lies in India's immediate neighbourhoods

Pakistan's View of Security in the Indian Ocean

One could contend that a noteworthy geographic development of Indian influence can anytime occur in the Indian oceanic area. As Rajiv Sikri, a former Secretary in the India's Foreign Ministry remarked, "If India tries to be a dominant power, then the main bearing in which India's key impact can spread is over the oceans. In each other bearing there are formidable constraints.'^ India remains to be the most crowded state in the Indian Ocean area and its focal position in the northern Indian Ocean has further added to its convictions about India's desire to control its eponymous sea. As indicated by a few, there is presently an entrenched conviction among the Indian vital groups that the Indian Ocean is, or ought to be, "India's Ocean." 23

The impression given by the Indian Navy is as it is the only security granter not only in the territory surrounding India but also from Red Sea to the coasts of Singapore.24 As indicated by one spectator: New Delhi views the Indian Ocean as its patio and hopes it to add to an overall Indian capacity, making it the pioneer and the dominating force in the region.25

Pakistan being one of the key states in the Indian Ocean littoral area has relied on the sea access for its trade and economic activities. Pakistan's port city (Karachi) is very vulnerable to the dangers emanating from the Indian Ocean until the Gwadar port becomes operational. However, significance of the sea segment has never been acknowledged in Pakistan and there is an absence of foresight in Pakistan's sea precept. There has not been given much priority to the seaboard, as more stress is dedicated to Pakistan's land based borders, which is the main concern of the Pakistani leadership for the security and economic prosperity of the nation. Pakistan's ninety-five percent international trade and greater part of petroleum oil imports are done through sea.26 The region has wealth of financial possibilities such as fishery, minerals/hydrocarbons and other seabed assets.27 Gwadar carries the potential to turn up as a noteworthy business centre and transhipment port for the locale. It is therefore to Pakistan's greatest concern that no danger radiates from the Indian Ocean and it remains a zone of peace. Gwadar port's centrality to the arranged China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will further transform the power dynamics of the Indian Ocean that has raised apprehensions in the US, India, and even Iran's strategic circles.

India even went to the extent of helping Iran in upgrading/advancement of Chabahar port to undermine financial capability of Gwadar port.28 The US is specifically weary of China developing CPEC around the Indian Ocean. Therefore, Pakistan shall face extensive challenges while it chooses to work in its national interests residing in the Indian Ocean. Simultaneously, keeping a balanced foreign policy and relafi'ons with other states and internafi'onal powers will be important as Pakistan continues to reap maximum economic benefits at the same fime ensuring its marifime security.

Historically, Pakistan has been ignoring its sea security area and has not given much thought to the marifime capability of its 1050 km coastline situated in the Indian Ocean.29 Pakistan totally relies on the ocean courses for its exchange/economy and depends on foreign/shipping for both its imports and exports. Pakistan's publically owned Nafional Shipping Corporafion supports only 5% out of the total trade carried out by Pakistan.30 This makes Pakistan helpless and vulnerable to aggressive move against the Sea Lines of Communicafion (SLOC) to disturb the movement of carrier ships and sea acfivity in the region. The defence of Pakistan's economy, exchange on sea course, and dependence on external transporters/shipments might be jeopardized by plunging into a financial decline in a very short fime. The nafional decision makers unequivocally consider that the marifime/coastal defence has been and would be a fringe to any Indo-Pak struggle. The overwhelming perspecfive was that the desfiny of the war would be chosen over land and to accomplish a stalemate. Additionally it was likewise trusted that clashes between India and-Pakistan would not linger on because of the pressure from the global powers , which will wipe out the risk of Indian coastal attack and hence the maritime barricade by the Indians was not considered too genuine.31 However, naval planners constantly have been pointing at Pakistan's vulnerability as Pakistan's all assets were housed at Karachi port, in such circumstance a small port at Ormara 120 nautical miles west of Karachi has given some relief to Pakistan.

The Pakistan's administration knew that India could battle an extended fight to stifle Pakistan's sea movement along these lines undermining the whole war effort. The Indian Navy, despite the fact that they, in the initial phases of development compared to other countries already existing in Indian Ocean, has been progressing in terms of its capability compared to Pakistan^2 Kargil denoted the first geologically a limited crisis since the last conflicts, which saw India organizing a maritime barricade of Karachi.33 The proposition ought to be selfevident; India had understood that its naval force had the quality to exploit the vulnerability of its Pakistani counterpart to keep its only port safe. Kargil issue hinted that if nuclear deterrence has improved the probability of constrained war; Pakistan might utilize the space short of nuclear threshold of India and in this manner India may be tempted to abuse its maritime predominance that would kill Pakistani advantages at an early phase of conflict. The latest naval weapon systems and technological advancements, which are vital for a sea based nuclear capability, are beyond Pakistan's technical and financial capacity and thus are not been addressed seriously.34

Strategic Implications for Pakistan in Indian Ocean

External military danger and security recognitions for Pakistan are essentially connected to Indiai5 Dominance of India over Pakistan in the maritime aspect might bring about a barricade of Karachi port, which could severely affect Pakistan's economy and with that the war-fighting ability in constrained time. Keeping in perspective the given role of Pakistan Navy, one can without much of a stretch deduce the security sensitivities of Pakistan's economy/vitality/prerequisites. Owing to the increased conventional disparity between India and Pakistan, the nuclear deterrence in South Asia is greatly stressed^6 This is all the more so in light of the fact that between the two naval forces the equation tilts towards India.37 Whatever subjective edge Pakistan Navy had in the past has dissolved fundamentally because of its stagnated advancement since mid 1990s.38 Owing to the US sanctions and the drop in the financial development during that period, the Indian Navy has advanced quickly in quantity and quality due to consistent monetary development and the resulting increment in defence spending.39

The goals behind the India's maritime advancement are obvious; it seeks to be the sea power in the Indian Ocean because of its hegemonic plans. With its economy turning out to be steadier and the increase in demand of resources because of population explosion, India will move towards a notable maritime presence.40 Even more imperative to notice is the way India is advancing to accomplish a sea based second-strike ability, apparently to seek independent foreign policy.41 This development will have a destabilizing impact on the military balance and will have strategic ramifications due to the lack of equal advancements by Pakistan. Considering the speculation that a conventional war between India and Pakistan cannot be completely precluded in the future, an overwhelming conventional asymmetry between the two naval forces can be a very destabilizing variable^2 For Pakistan, this may become instrumental in decreasing the capacity to retain/support a traditional blow and may even bring down the atomic threshold. That is to say that a conventionally weaker side would arrive at the atomic threshold sooner than its foe would. This might likewise bring about genuine ramifications for Pakistani leaders who might be tempted to employ atomic weapon. In addition, an atomic power, equipped with deterrence capabilities must have the capacity to survive a first strike intended to keep the other power/ nuclear state from striking back. India has achieved a dependable second-strike capability, which has destabilized the nuclear equation of the region and has tilted the deterrence equilibrium towards the Indian side.43 In such a situation Pakistan has to work on acquiring a dependable sea based capability. Absence of a comparable ability by Pakistan might make pre-emption more probable; leaving Pakistan with the only option to gain a sea based second-strike capacity keeping in mind the end goal i.e. to keep up a reliable / credible nuclear deterrence.

India would have the capacity to bring about monetary strangulation of Pakistan by essentially blocking sea courses/ports and consequently modifying the results of the war on land. In this manner, the security ashore and in the air will be traded off by the shortcomings of Pakistan Navy to dissuade Indian naval force's hostile stance. From 2129 June 1999, India deployed its naval war machines in a forward stance. Expecting economic barricade, the Pakistan Navy escorted national oil tankers and initiated observation forays along the coast&acaron;

Pakistan's hope with the Gwadar port would help solves its security dilemma while providing an extremely lucrative economic opportunity but should not imply that the process is likely to be straightforward. By bringing China in the Indian Ocean, Pakistan has activated balance of power politics that will prompt other relevant states to pursue contradictory policies. Numerous existing relationship equations will be effected due to the Gwadar port. The China-Indian equation, their improved ties, and the Indian quest for a blue water naval force are in clash with China's intentions to deny anyone hegemony in the Indian Ocean.45 Therefore, India expressing its discomfort with China's presence and acknowledging that the Gwadar port presents strategic challenges to its naval ambitions, should not come as a surprise.

In spite of the fact that India might have lost its capacity to undermine Pakistan's naval capability both because of Pakistan's port at Gwadar and China's presence in the vicinity, it appears as if India is resolved to keep a check on China-Pakistan understanding.46 With a specific end goal to undermine the financial prospects of the Gwadar port, India is helping Iran in renovating its Chabahar port.47 Chabahar presents the quickest route for the Central Asian republics (CARs) to the sea; now that the US sanctions towards Iran have been relaxed, Chabahar could out shadow Gwadar to some degree. Pakistan is envisioning Gwadar port as the transit point from CARs, the Gulf, and in addition to the East, however, Chabahar port might influence overwhelming economic advantages to Pakistan if it comes in competition with Gwadar Port. As for India, it has expanded its presence in Afghanistan as well and is playing a big role by developing and advancing the infrastructure in Afghanistan^8 The aim is to sidestep Pakistan and build a connection up with the Western and the Central Asian states. From Pakistan's points of view, this sums up as de-facto encirclement by India to setup an alternate path to access the Western and Central Asian states for itself. Furthermore, India will urge all its allies to utilize Chabahar port instead of Gwadar and subsequently hose Chinese financial enthusiasm for the area.

The US has shown distress over China-Pakistan relationship and China's presence in the Indian Ocean as the US has always intrigued to build up its own power in the region. On the contrary, pentagon has as of now thrown questions over Chinese goals and claims that Beijing is spying from Gwadar to monitor the ship activity through the Strait of Hormouz and the Arabian Sea.49 The US is additionally seeking aggressive polices towards CARs in an offer to get hold of oil resources. China is likewise concerned about the US position in the region as China has shown its dismay when Pakistan provided an air base to the US close to the Gwadar at a time the port's deal was being agreed upon.50 The China -US relationship has also perplexed Pakistan, where on one hand it tends to favour China but at the same time cannot stand to disengage itself from the US totally.

Pakistan also has to prepare itself for the possible response if in case the US asked to set up a maritime base or listening post at Gwadar. On one hand, by keeping China in its camp, Pakistan could feel tempted to deny US any favours while on the other hand, it may disturb China by Pakistan committ'ng and acceding to the US demands. Thus, deft discretion will be required to adjust the Sino-US enthusiasm at Gwadar. The circumstances get further complicated because of Afghanistan factor. The US' presence in the region and Pakistan's security vis-a-vis Afghanistan has added to the many-sided consequences. From Pakistan's perspective, it is vital that Afghanistan permits exchange with CARS through Gwadar, as opposed to Chabahar in Iran. Gwadar's monetary advantages are dependent on Afghanistan's stability since it provides the main route to CARs.51 Pakistan knows that if Afghanistan stays troubled for long, it will largely undermine China's financial stakes and its efforts to protect Pakistan's vital and monetary interests.

Economic Interest of Pakistan in the Indian Ocean

The sea lines of communication from the Far East and the Red Sea may bolster Pakistan's sea exchange. The Persian Gulf, where much of Pakistan's oil passes through, serves as Pakistan's energy lifesaver. Twothird of Pakistan's oil imports, approximating US $10 billion begins from the Gulf district and flows right across the Indian Ocean.52 More than 95 percent of Pakistan's exchange by volume and 88 percent by worth are transported via oceani3 Because of the peculiar location of Indian Ocean and the predominant geo-political environment, reliance on the routes through the ocean, for the exchange of goods and trade, is of utmost importance for the survival of Pakistan. With the culmination of Gwadar deep-sea port soon, Pakistan's exchange volume in coming years is liable to rise.54

The imperative sea borne exchange must be secured against larger maritime threat of a growing and developing Indian Navy. Keeping in mind the end goal to flourish, create and secure Pakistan's trading lines, in such circumstances Pakistan's ports and sea routes must remain operational, secure and serene. Interruption of seaborne trade in any future conflict with India, which as an unambiguous operation imagined by the Indian Navy can have negative influence on the delicate economy of Pakistan. The financial strangulation of Pakistan by India has been characterized as one of the limits that would or could prompt Pakistani nuclear reprisal, yet there is something, which justifies watchful contemplations. Without very well developed trading ships under national banner, which in the event that Pakistan undertakes just 5 percent of the aggregate trade volume, in such a circumstance Pakistan will face serious challenges.

It also can seriously influence the national economy while keeping the onus of progress in the existing status quo on Pakistan.

Pakistan's Nuclear Program and Pakistan Navy

Pakistan's threat perception stems from India and that is why Pakistan's atomic strategy is completely India-driven.55 Pakistan's nuclear deterrence is coordinated against a conceivable Indian nuclear attack but also a conventional one too. Pakistan's nuclear strategy highlights the support of an atomic deterrence, preservation of a first strike option, and dependence on land and air strategic forces implied. Notwithstanding, essential sea based conveyance means are absent in this strategy.56

In August 1999, India unequivocally expresses its expectation to build up a triad of atomic strengths.57 The Indian triad is not only alarming for the Pakistan Navy, it likewise served as an indication of concern for land based conventional forces. For sure, the strongest argument here is that an Indian triad would require a coordinated reaction by Pakistan to keep its own particular deterrence reliable. For Pakistan, it was clear that both land and air based capability would not suffice and naval force must be taken aboard to guarantee deterrence against Indian animosity. In the year 2001, Pakistan announced four broad conditions under which it may turn to the threat of atomic weapons as portrayed by Lieutenant General Kidwai of the Strategic Planning Division: a 'space threshold', should India attack Pakistan and overcome vast piece of its territory; a "military edge" if India demolishes major portion of Pakistan's territory or air force; a "financial edge" if India pushes Pakistan into political destabilization or huge scale inner subversion.58

The "military threshold" in Pakistan's atomic judgment implies the decimation of an extensive segment of Pakistan's -aviation based armed forces as an instigation to go atomic. Nevertheless, the devastation of maritime strengths remains unstipulated.59 In that manner, it can be concluded that national security policy gives low priority to the naval forces or perhaps the obliteration of maritime strengths is considered as monetary strangulation. In the present environment, the financial strangulation of Pakistan can be brought easy via sea. There also was non-appearance of any resistance/worry or remarks by US/worldwide groups towards the Russian help to India in the advancement of sea based atomic potential.60 The late Indo-US nuclear deal has likewise not brought about any mayhem in the Nuclear Supplier Group and international community. The advancement on the Indian side and consequent hush by the global group gives Pakistan adequate motivation to either secure atomic submarines or build up its own.

Conclusion

The Indian Ocean has been primarily dominated by the US except the close proximity of Indian shores in the past decades. In any case, subsequent to the previous couple of years, the Indian Ocean, which has 30 littoral and hinterland nations, has turned into the most important zone of geopolitical movement. The oceanic routes of the Indian Ocean bore more than 80 percent of the world's oil exchange through its three important choke points particularly Straits of Hormouz, Straits of Malacca and Bab-el-Mandab Strait.61 Pakistan in spite of being key littoral state of Indian Ocean disregarded its significance and concentrated land based defensive policy. Notwithstanding, the scenario has now been changed drasfi'cally and today Pakistan needs to re-evaluate its sea security.

The prescience of prestigious historian and US geostrategic, Admiral Mahan, is turning valid in which he said, whoever has power over the Indian Ocean rules Asia.62 Indian Ocean is the focal point towards Western, Southern and South East Asia. It has great significance with regards to financial and energy network, being communicable to the Gulf and Middle East and other conflict prone zones attracfi'ng both regional and extra regional forces to dominate the Indian Ocean district. As the world is rapidly turning from unipolar to multipolar, no country can stay negligent of the advancement in the Indian Ocean. The whole world's forces have subsequently posifi'oned considerable military powers in the Indian Oceani3

First among the battling forces is the US, as the sole power, it is keen on keeping the SLOC and choke points open, it addifi'onally needs to create an impact on the clashes of the littoral states. In addifi'on to other things, the US is worried over Sino-Indian rivalries, Iran's atomic programme, China-Pak nexus and lastly the CPEC, which visualizes transforming Gwadar into a future trade centre point. Likewise, another constant worry is the ascent of Islamic fanafi'cism, such as, Daesh, apart from already rising conflicts in the Middle East. Essenfi'ally, the US requires that the Indian Ocean's SLOCs remain free and unencumbered. Addifi'onally, from a strategic point of view, the US remains aware of the importance of the choke points that provide access to the Indian Ocean and, finally, is aware that this ocean could be a theatre of compefifion between China and India, two of the largest economic and military powers in Asia.64

China, as Pakistan's partner, wants to project its influence in the Middle East, Africa and Europe and by some scholars, challenge significance of the US in the Indian Ocean region. China is thus working on two super ventures; one is to form a marifime silk route and the other an overland course that connects China with Central Asia and the Caspian Sea bowl.65 Pakistan constitutes the key connecfion in each one of these projects especially the 3000 km undertaking to interface Xingjian area with Gwadar.66 a stable Pakistan guarantees centrality in China's security and monetary point of view. India sees Indian Ocean region basic to its nafional interests. Hence India wants to spread its greater influence over the whole Indian Ocean to be able to turn itself into a prominent power in South Asia. India has shown major gestures to raise blue water naval force as well as building relafions with the littoral states. It considers Pakistan to be a major obstacle in accomplishing its hegemonic desfinafions in the Indian Ocean region.

Pakistan's past clashes with India were convenfional or land based/7 however, today Indian naval force wants to counter Pakistan's supply lines in the Arabian Sea. Pakistan's security targets hence require it to keep Indian naval forces from barricading Pakistan's trade from Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. About 66% of its oil sways comes from the Gulf through the Indian Ocean.68 In addition, Pakistan has a 990kms coastline and an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 240,000sq Kms. Tragically Pakistan's policy makers have demonstrated absence of awareness with Pakistan's vulnerabilities in the Indian Ocean. In spite of its inability to project its maritime force in the Indian Ocean, yet it must procure capability to guarantee its oceanic assets, regional waters and continuous trade. Pakistan's Gwadar port is by design situated in the Indian Ocean area. Pakistan must guarantee that CPEC works regardless of Indian attempts at subverting the process. This China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will resolve Pakistan's endemic security issue. By bringing China specifically into the Indian Ocean through Gwadar, it can be served as a game changer for Pakistan. It would open up boundless trading opportunities as well as help raise Chinese stakes and interests in guaranteeing Pakistan's stability.

Footnote

'David Brewster, "An Indian Sphere of Influence in the Indian Ocean?", Security Challenges, (Spring 2010):p.2, accessed at: http://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Documents/vol6no3Brewster.pdf (June 16, 2016).

2David Brewster, "India's ocean: the story of India's bid for regional leadership", (New York: Routledge, 2014), p.1.

3David Brewster, "Modi builds India's sphere of influence in the Indian", The Interpreter, March 17, 2015, accessed at: http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/17/Modi-builds-Indias-sphere-ofinfluence-in-the-Indian-Ocean.aspx (June 19, 2016).

4C. Raja Mohan, "Revealed: India's Master Plan for the Indian Ocean", The National Interest, accessed at: http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/revealed-indias-masterplan-the-indian-ocean-13198 (June 16, 2016).

5Asif Ezdi, "India's string of pearls",: The News, March 23, 2015, acceseed at : https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/30802-indias-string-of-pearls (June 16,2016).

6Ibid.

7S.A.K. Madanayaka, "China, India and the Balance of Power in South Asia: with Reference to Sri Lanka's Position" Department of Economics, University of Kelaniya, (Spring 2016): p.12, accessed at: http://repository.kln.ac.lk/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/12069/journal1%20(1). 196-199.pdf?sequence=1(June 18, 2016).

8David Michel and Russell Sticklor, "Indian Ocean Rising: Maritime security and policy Changes", Stimson Centre, (Spring 2008): pp .12-16, accessed at: https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/IOR_chapter1_1.pdf ( June 17, 2016).

9A. Z. Hilali, Cold War Politics of Superpowers in South Asia, The Dialogue, accessed at: http://www.qurtuba.edu.pk/thedialogue/The%20Dialogue/1_2/4_Mr.%20Hila li.pdf (June 19,2016).

10Khalid Chandio "Major Powers' Interests in Indian Ocean: Challenges and Options for Pakistan" Islamabad Policy Research Institute, (Autumn 2014): pp. 3-4, accessed at: http://www.ipripak.org/major-powers-interests-in-indian-ocean-chanenges-andoptions-for-pakistan/#sthash.g81TVhok.dpbs (June 17, 2016)

"Foreign Policy Research Centre New Delhi, "India-Nepal Relations", (Autumn 2009): p.9, accessed at: http://www.fprc.in/Pragya-NEPAL-19.pdf (June 17, 2016).

12Donald L Berlin, "India in the Indian Ocean", Naval War College Review, (Spring 2006): pp. 8-10,accessed at: https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/cc7b0300-af3a47be-99c4-4dd3cb9c801a/India-in-the-Indian-Ocean-Berlin,-Donald-L(June 18, 2016).

13Azra Naeem, "The Honeymoon Is Over: Maldives as a Growing Security Threat in the Indian Ocean", Irish Studies in International Affairs, (Spring 2015): pp. 99-119.

14George. Friedman, "The Geopolitics of the United States, Part 1: The Inevitable Empire", Startfor, (2016): p.4 , accessed at: https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/geopolitics-united-states-part-1-inevitable-empire (June 18, 2016).

15Ibid., p. 3.

16Fatima, Qamar, and Asma Jamshed. "The Political and Economic Significance of Indian Ocean: An Analysis." South Asian Studies, (Spring 2015): pp. 19-20, accessed at: http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/csas/PDF/5%20Qamir%20Fatima_30_2.pdf (June 18, 2016)

17"India to commission third research station in Antarctica," The Hindu, November 7, 2011, accessed at: http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/science/india-to-commissionthird-research-station-in-antarctica/article2606767.ece (18 June, 2016).

18David Brewster, "India's ocean: the story of India's bid for regional leadership", (New York: Routledge, 2014), p.1

19Harsh V Pant "Modi's outreach to three Indian Ocean", The Japan Times, March 22, 2015, accessed at: http://wwwjapantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/03/22/commentary/worldcommentary/modis-outreach-to-three-indian-ocean-states/ (June 17, 2016).

20V. Adm Khan Hasham Bin Saddique , "Pakistan Navy as a Stabilizing Force in Indian Ocean", Hilal Magazine., (2015): pp. 35-37, accessed at: http://hilal.gov.pk/index.php/layouts/item/670-pakistan-navy-as-a-stabilizing-forcein-indian-ocean (June 19, 2016).

21The Daily Star: "Pakistan Epicentre of global terror: Advani", The Daily Star, June 12, 2003, accessed at : http://archive.thedailystar.net/2003/06/13/d30613430270.htm (June 19, 2016).

22Rajiv Sikri, "Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India's Foreign Policy", (SAGE Publications: New Dehli, 2009), p. 250.

22David Brewster, "An Indian Sphere of Influence in the Indian Ocean?" Security Challenges., (Spring 2009): p. 2, accessed at:

24http://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Documents/vol6no3Brewster.pdf (June 16, 2016)

. David. Scott, "India's Grand Strategy for the Indian Ocean: Mahanian visions." Asia-Pacific Review, (Spring 2010): Pp 97-129, accessed at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13439000601029048 (June 19, 2016).

25Ibid., pp. 97-129.

26Sajid Hussain, Dr. Muhammad Ayaz Khan, "Role of Maritime Sector in Pakistan's Economic and Security and Development", Pakistan Annual Research Journal, (Spring 2014): p.17, accessed at: http://www.pscpesh.org/PDFs/PJ/Volume_50/05_Hussain.pdf (June 19, 2016)

27Ibid., pp. 10-12.

28 "PM Modi in Iran: India signs pact to develop Chabahar Port," The Times of India, March 23, 2016, accessed at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/PM-Modi-inIran-India-signs-pact-to-develop-Chabahar-port/artideshow/52398453.cms (June 19, 2016).

29Khalid Chandio "Major Powers' Interests in Indian Ocean: Challenges and Options for Pakistan" Islamabad Policy Research Institute, March 2, 2015, accessed at: http://www.ipripak.org/major-powers-interests-in-indian-ocean-challenges-andoptions-for-pakistan/#sthash.g81TVhok.dpbs (June 17, 2016).

30Garofano, John, and Andrea J. Dew, eds. "Deep currents and rising tides: The Indian Ocean and international security," (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2013), p. 234.

31Mishra, Sitakanta. "Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia", Strategic Analysis, (Autumn 2014): pp. 755-757, accessed at: http://www.idsa.in/strategicanalysis/38_5/DeterrenceStabilityandEscalationControl (June 20, 2016).

32Franz-Stefan Gady, "Does Pakistan Have a Sea-Based Second-Strike Capability?", The Diplomat, March 13, 2015, accessed at :http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/doespakistan-have-a-sea-based-second-strike-capability/ (June 19, 2016).

33Global Security, "1999 Kargil Conflict", Global Security, November 7, 2015, accessed at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/kargil-99.htm (June 20, 2016).

34Michael Krepon, "Pakistan's Nuclear Strategy and Deterrence Stability", Spearhead Research, (Spring 2012): p.19, accessed at: http://spearheadresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/12/Pakistan_Nuclear_Strategy_ and_Deterrence_Stability.pdf (June 20, 2016).

35Mian Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, "Pak-India Relations: Security Dynamics and Future Scenario", Institute of Policy Studies, (Spring 2009): p. 23, accessed at: http://www.ips.org.pk/security-and-foreign-policy/1056-pak-india-relations-securitydynamics-and-future-scenario (June 19, 2016)

36Shafei Moiz Hali "Indian Military Expansion 2020 - Implications for Pakistan's National Security",: CQ Criterion Quarterly, March 4, 2013, accessed at: http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/indian-military-expansion-2020-implications-forpakistan%E2%80%99s-national-security/ (June 20, 2016).

37Shafei Moiz Hali "Indian Military Expansion 2020 - Implications for Pakistan's National Security",: CQ Criterion Quarterly, March 4, 2013, accessed at: http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/indian-military-expansion-2020-implications-forpakistan%E2%80%99s-national-security/ (June 20, 2016).

38Ibid., p. 7.

39Ibid., p. 8.

40IPS Study "Pak-China relations in the 21st Century: Regional situation, Security, Economic & Trade Cooperation", Institute of Policy Studies, (2014): pp. 2-6, accessed at: http://www.ips.org.pk/global-issues-and-politics/182-pak-chinarelations-in-the-21st-century-regional-situation-security-economic-a-tradecooperation (June 18, 2016).

41Dawn, "Pakistan has second-strike capability against India", Dawn, September 17, 2015, accessed at: http://www.dawn.com/news/1207494 (June 20, 2016).

42Sitakanta Mishra, "Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia," Strategic Analysis, (Spring 2014): Pp, 755-757, accessed at: http://www.academia.edu/8355275/Deterrence_Stability_and_Escalation_Control_in _South_Asia_Book_Review (June 18, 2016).

43"Pakistan has second-strike capability against India", Dawn, September 17, 2015, accessed at: http://www.dawn.com/news/1207494 (June 20, 2016).

44Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "The Indo-US Strategic Relationship and Pakistan Security", South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, (Autumn 2007): p.10, accessed at: http://www.sassi.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/RP-9-Zafar-Nawaz-Jaspal-TheIndo-US-Strategic-Relationship-Pakistans-Security-Dec-2007.pdf (June 19, 2016).

45Dan Blumenthal. "Will India Be a Better Strategic Partner than China", China File, (2007): pp. 327-366, accessed at: http://www.chinafile.com/library/reports/will-indiabe-better-strategic-partner-china (June 19, 2016).

46Munir Akram, "India's Great Power Game", Dawn, September 28,2014, accessed at: http://www.dawn.com/news/1134772 (June 20, 2016).

"Ibid.

48Garofano, John, and Andrea J. Dew, eds., "Deep currents and rising tides: The Indian Ocean and international security", (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2013), p.141.

49"China Builds up Strategic Sea Lanes" The Washington Times, accessed at: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/jan/17/20050n7-n5550-1929r/ (June 20, 2016).

50Garofano, John, and Andrea J. Dew, eds. "Deep currents and rising tides: The Indian Ocean and international security", (Washington: Georgetown University Press), p.54.

51Saima Perveen and Jehanzeb Khalil, "Gwadar-Kashgar Economic Corridor: Challenges and Imperatives for Pakistan and China." Journal of Political Studies, (Winter 2015), p.351, accessed at: http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/pols/pdffilesn%20-%20SAIMA_v22_2_wint2015.pdf (June 19, 2016).

52Qamar Fatima, and Asma Jamshed. "The Political and Economic Significance of Indian Ocean: An Analysis." South Asian Studies, (Spring 2001): p. 73, accessed at: http://pu.edu.pk/images/joumal/csas/PDF/5%20Qamir%20Fatima_30_2.pdf (June 19, 2016).

53Ibid., p. 10.

54"Pakistan's Exports will Increase After Completion of Gwadar Port: Ahsan", Daily Times, March 26, 2016, accessed at: http://dailytimes.com.pk/pakistan/25-May16/pakistans-exports-will-increase-after-completion-of-gwadar-port-ahsan (June 23, 2016).

55Pervez Hoodbhoy , "Win Pak-India nuke war?", Dawn, October 31, 2015, accessed at: http://www.dawn.com/news/1216449 (June 21, 2016).

56Ibid.

57Rizwana Abbasi, "A Strategic Shift in Indo-Pak Nuclear Strategy: Implications for Regional Stability", IPRIJournal, (Summer 2015): p.23, accessed at: http://www.ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/1-art-s-151.pdf (June 17, 2016).

ss Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "A Conversation with Gen. Khalid Kidwai", March 23, 2013, accessed at: http://camegieendowment.org/2015/03/23/conversation-with-gen.-khalid-kidwaipub-58885 (June 20, 2016).

5?bid.,

60Petr Topychkanov, "Indo-Russian naval cooperation: Sailing high seas", Russia and India Report, July 15, 2015, accessed at: http://in.rbth.com/blogs/2015/07/15/indorussian_naval_cooperation_sailing_high_seas_44243 (June 19, 2016).

"Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe, "Why Indian Ocean Matters", The Diplomat, March 2, 2011, accessed at: http://thediplomat.com/2011/03/why-the-indian-ocean-matters/ (June 19, 2016).

62Khalid Chandio "Major Powers' Interests in Indian Ocean: Challenges and Options for Pakistan" Islamabad Policy Research Institute, March 2, 2015, accessed at: http://www.ipripak.org/major-powers-interests-in-indian-ocean-challenges-andoptions-for-pakistan/#sthash.g81TVhok.dpbs (June 19, 2016).

63Nilanthi Samaranayake, "The Indian Ocean: A Great-Power Danger Zone?", The National Interest, March 30, 2014, accessed at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/theindian-ocean-great-power-danger-zone-10568 (June 18, 2016).

64"The United States and the Indian Ocean Region: A Case of Growing Interests", Future Direction international, June 16, 2015, accessed at: http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/united-states-indian-ocean-regioncase-growing-interests/ (June 19, 2016).

65Clarke, Michael. "China's Integration of Xinjiang with Central Asia: Securing a "Silk Road" to Great Power Status." China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, (Spring 2006): pp. 89-111, accessed at: http://www98.griffith.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/handle/10072/22347/50986_1.pdf7seq uence=1. pp. 89-111 (June 20, 2016)

66Riaz Haq "Will Pakistan's Gwadar Become "Hong Kong West"?', Haq's Musings, March 1, 2015, accessed at: http://www.riazhaq.com/2015/05/will-pakistans-gwadarbecome-hong-kong.html (June 20, 2016).

67Christopher Clary, "What Might an India-Pakistan War Look Like?", MIT Centre For International Studies, (Spring 2012): p. 12, accessed at: http://web.mit.edu/cis/precis/2012spring/india_pakistan.html#.V5cqn9J97IU (June 21, 2016).

68Fatima, Qamar and Asma Jamshed. "The Political and Economic Significance of Indian Ocean: An Analysis.", South Asian Studies, (Autumn 2015): pp. 23-24, accessed at: http://pu.edu.pk/images/joumal/csas/PDF/5%20Qamir%20Fatima_30_2.pdf (June 21, 2016).