Polar Bears and Bolsheviks: The American Expedition to North Russia and the Impact of Military Operations on National Policy

Abstract

The US intervened into North Russia because of Woodrow Wilson’s belief that the intervention did not contravene his thoughts on self-determination and that by doing so he would placate his exhausted Allies in the final stages of the First World War. Wilson’s purpose for intervention was to ensure that the German Armed Forces were destroyed, his foremost goal for every foreign policy decision made in 1918, and he specifically intended US forces to occupy portions of Russia exclusively for that task. However, almost immediately upon landing in Russia, US Army forces were deliberately used by British leaders beyond Wilson’s intent in an attempt to stifle the growth of Bolshevik power in North Russia. Leaders on the ground in North Russia understood almost immediately upon landing that their task, to prevent the German Army from gaining a decisive foothold in the Arctic and to protect stockpiles of Entente weapons in Murmansk and Archangel, was impossible. Their misuse and a lack of US diplomatic operational direction led to the first conflict between communist and Western armies in the 20th century. The effect of US Army elements actively engaging Bolshevik Red Army units and communist partisans was the wholesale destruction of normal foreign relations between the United States and the Petrograd Soviet, which would become the preeminent political organization within the Communist Party of Soviet Russia after the end of the Russian Civil War. While the event was quickly subsumed under other events in US foreign policy in 1918-1919, key leaders within the Soviet Union, namely Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky, would maximize the propaganda value of the intervention to consolidate power, legitimize the Soviet party, and undermine western liberalism. The events of 1918-1919 in North Russia had a profound impact on the way the Soviet Union internalized US policy towards the communist state throughout the early Cold War, while having almost no historical significance in US foreign policy decision-making during the same time period. This paper seeks to tell the story of the US intervention in North Russia, from the highest levels of government to the individual actions on the ground. To do so, this work will examine, chronologically, three elements of the intervention, each one reliant on the actions of the others. These elements will be explored simultaneously across time, some chapters spanning days, some spanning months. Each chapter will include an overview of the diplomatic and military situation, focused on providing background and context for the decisions made by each key figure. Then the Wilson administration’s public and private comments are explored, to find the rationale the President used to justify an armed intervention into a sovereign nation while espousing firmly held beliefs in democracy and self-determination. The impact of their decisions will be explored by following alongside the 339th Infantry Regiment, the unit chosen to implement Wilson’s policies above the Arctic Circle. Using the 339th as a case study, this paper also seeks to determine how implementation of foreign policy on the ground impacts foreign policy itself. Finally, each section will conclude with the Soviet reaction to Wilson’s decisions and the 339th’s presence in North Russia. At each turn, the work will attempt to address several questions, in some cases by finding answers and in others finding only more questions. Was anti-Bolshevism a key element of Wilson’s decision-making? Why did Wilson steadfastly refuse British and French requests to intervene for months only to reverse course in the summer of 1918? Who were the men implementing Wilsonian policy in Russia? Were they even fully aware of Wilson’s intentions? What was the 339th doing in North Russia? Why were they kept in Russia fighting Bolsheviks and their allies for nine months after the armistice with the Central Powers? How did their actions on the ground reshape US foreign policy and US-USSR foreign relations? How did the Russians perceive US intentions? What impact did this relatively small, relatively short expedition have on the 20th century’s two greatest powers? What can be learned today about foreign intervention during a civil war? Can perception be more powerful than truth in foreign policy?