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This paper proposes a parallel between the theories of pictorial representation put forward by Edmund Husserl and Richard Wollheim. By doing so, it aims to facilitate a dialogue that can provide some new elements for an appropriate understanding of threefold seeing-in. The first section offers a comprehensive interpretation of Husserl's theory of image-consciousness. This experience is considered a threefold perceptual phantasy, different from perception and sign-consciousness. The second section presents a review of Wollheim's theory of twofold seeing-in and addresses a possible ambiguity in his notion of thing represented. Finally, the third section discusses two topics that result from this parallel: first, the characteristics of the configurational and recognitional folds in a seeing-in experience, and second, the possibility of their 'mixture' with phantasy. As a result, I propose a different account of threefold seeing-in: I suggest that the configurational and the recognitional folds should be considered aspects or intentions of seeing-in, and that the configurational aspect corresponds to the intention to the image-object.
1.Edmund Husserl's image-consciousness theory: threefold perceptual phantasy
Image-consciousness (Bildbewusstsein) is the term that the German philosopher Edmund Husserl used to describe the experience that one has in front of pictures. Even though this was not a central topic of Husserl's philosophy, which was more concerned from the beginning with epistemological issues, it appeared recurrently as he was considering other problems, such as the phenomenological method1, the structure of the acts of memory2, or the nature of intentionality3. Regarding this last topic, the discussion of image-consciousness determined the methodological parameters for an analysis of pictorial representations starting with defining the kind of experience that renders it possible. I will begin by briefly discussing this.
1.1Intentionality first
Husserl's professor, Franz Brentano, proposed that mental experiences are characterised by being intentional, i.e. being directed towards an object. Because of intentionality, mental phenomena, such as the acts of perceiving, judging or valuing, are always the experience of something; they are presentations (Vorstellungen).4 However, this definition caused some problems when considering experiences that address contradictory objects (a priori or a posteriori), for example when we assume that there cannot be square circles, or when we imagine the appearance of a golden mountain. If representations are representations of something, how can there be acts involving imaginary or...