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Abstract
In terms of both geographic range of impact and severity of impact, one of the greatest threats to United States security is radiological or nuclear attacks. About 95% of cargo entering the United States enters through containerized maritime cargo pathways. While various legislation has passed on the issue of improving security for these vital pathways, such as the SAFE Port Act of 2006 and the Trade Act of 2002, the regulations entailed in these laws have not been completely successful in eliminating the potential for smuggled nuclear material. This paper presents current practices and legislation aimed at the reduction of smuggled nuclear material entering the country and examines some tradeoffs of such practices and programs. Based on publicly available data, this paper presents the main phases of smuggling pathways, based on the vulnerability in the maritime containerized cargo systems and the accessibility of nuclear materials. Through a comprehensive analysis of historical orphan source incident data and current practices, points of vulnerability in the containerized shipping pathway can be identified.
Keywords
Nuclear Detection; U.S. Customs and Border Patrol; Homeland Security
1.Introduction
1.1 Agencies and Offices Responsible for Regulatory Controls
In 1998, the Department of Energy (DoE) established the Second Line of Defense (SLD) to provide detection equipment, maintenance, technical support, and training to foreign personnel at land border crossings, rail crossings, airports, and strategic seaports in Russia. In 2000, SLD and other DoE nonproliferation operations were transferred to the new National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). NNSA forms global partnerships in the interest of the creation and expansion of a global multilayered security network for nuclear smuggling deterrence. Following the 9/11 attacks, SLD expanded its reach into Eastern Europe and former Soviet countries. Radiation detection systems are integrated with existing border security measures at the border crossing of partner countries to prevent smuggling. The NNSA also has mobile detection tools for sites in which a full radiation detection system (RDS) installation would be impractical. At the end of 2014, Russia cut its cooperation with the U.S. on nuclear security matters. NNSA reorganization began in the next months, and the SLD program became the Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence Program (NSDD). NNSA also formed the Global Material Security program during this period, with the intent of...