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Abstract
Cooperation within and across borders is of paramount importance for the provision of public goods. Parochialism – the tendency to cooperate more with ingroup than outgroup members – limits contributions to global public goods. National parochialism (i.e., greater cooperation among members of the same nation) could vary across nations and has been hypothesized to be associated with rule of law, exposure to world religions, relational mobility and pathogen stress. We conduct an experiment in participants from 42 nations (N = 18,411), and observe cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma with ingroup, outgroup, and unidentified partners. We observe that national parochialism is a ubiquitous phenomenon: it is present to a similar degree across the nations studied here, is independent of cultural distance, and occurs both when decisions are private or public. These findings inform existing theories of parochialism and suggest it may be an obstacle to the provision of global public goods.
National parochialism is the tendency to cooperate more with people of the same nation. In a 42-nations study, the authors show that national parochialism is a pervasive phenomenon, present to a similar degree across all the studied nations, and occurs both when decisions are private or public.
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1 Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Experimental Economics Group, Bonn, Germany (GRID:grid.461813.9) (ISNI:0000 0001 2322 9797); Leiden University, Social, Economic and Organizational Psychology, Leiden, The Netherlands (GRID:grid.5132.5) (ISNI:0000 0001 2312 1970)
2 Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Experimental Economics Group, Bonn, Germany (GRID:grid.461813.9) (ISNI:0000 0001 2322 9797); University of Cologne, Department of Economics, Cologne, Germany (GRID:grid.6190.e) (ISNI:0000 0000 8580 3777); University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Finance, Innsbruck, Austria (GRID:grid.5771.4) (ISNI:0000 0001 2151 8122)
3 Massey University, School of Psychology, Auckland, New Zealand (GRID:grid.148374.d) (ISNI:0000 0001 0696 9806)
4 Hitotsubashi University, Graduate School of International Corporate Straegy, Tokyo, Japan (GRID:grid.412160.0) (ISNI:0000 0001 2347 9884)
5 Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology, Amsterdam, The Netherlands (GRID:grid.12380.38) (ISNI:0000 0004 1754 9227); Institute of Brain and Behavior (IBBA), Amsterdam, The Netherlands (GRID:grid.12380.38)