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ABSTRACT: Xinfang, as a major participation channel in China, sets social stability as its most important objective. The way it seeks to balance the participation-institutionalisation dynamic is thus key to understanding its function. Drawing on detailed interviews and archival sources, this study clarifies the practice and rationale of the new and important online xinfang channel which has not, to date, been amply examined. By integrating offline communication methods with the new online format, it achieves a subtler form of participation through field diversion, standardised settlement, and balanced evaluation, and thus partly corrects the offline xinfang channel's heavy reliance on non-institutionalised tactics to maintain stability. However, as long as xinfang still operates at the intersection of law and politics, the question of how to balance citizens' desire for participation and an appropriate level of institutionalisation remains a noteworthy issue, since stability is only achieved when these two elements are in equilibrium.
KEYWORDS: Online xinfang channel, public participation, political instability, social grievance, institutionalisation.
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Xinfang" (..., literally "letters and visits") can be described broadly as a method of "appealing to those at the top to clear up problems left unresolved by local authorities" (Li, Liu, and O'Brien 2012: 315). The practice has a long history in China and remains a popular channel for Chinese citizens to redress injustice (Cai 2004). However, the xinfang system seeks to achieve its function mainly through the intervention of Party leaders, rather than the authority of legal norms (Minzner 2006). Due to time and resource limitations, such intervention is often used selectively to settle more serious troublemaking situations rather than moderate appeals (Cai 2010). This may ultimately result in the escalation of citizen complaints and deeply entrap the system in a vicious circle: the more it is obsessed with social stability, the less it will have of it. Our elucidation of the "online xinfang channel" (wangshang xinfang xitong ... is presented against this exact background. Relying on information and communication technologies (ICTs), the Chinese government is committed to establishing an online platform to accomplish xinfang collection, settlement, and evaluation in a more accessible, effective, and accountable manner. With this type of performance, it hopes to deliver an improved state-society interaction in the digital era.1 Could this...