Building Energy Sovereignty through Community-Based Projects in Nunavik

Abstract

Inuit communities in Canada are overwhelmingly dependent on expensive and polluting local diesel-powered generators for electricity production. This article seeks to understand the legal and political obstacles relative to the development of renewable energy in Nunavik, Québec’s Inuit territory. After an analysis of the legal regimes, political configurations, and policies affecting energy production in Nunavik, we present two case studies of renewable energy projects in the communities of Kuujjuaq and Inukjuak. This allows us to demonstrate that the development of alternative energy projects is not only determined by technical and economic issues but is also inseparable from the asymmetrical post-colonial power relations between Quebec institutions and the Inuit people. Our results not only illustrate the value of community ownership and leadership for sustainable northern development but also the ambiguous attitude of public authorities regarding the political and financial support for such projects.

1. Introduction

On 2 April 2015, a fire broke out at a diesel power plant from which the Inuit community of Pangnirtung entirely depends upon its electricity supply. Located in Qikiqtaaluk (formerly known as Baffin Island) in Nunavut where temperatures in early April 2015 hover between −17 °C and −26 °C, the hamlet of 1600 inhabitants was forced to declare a state of emergency. Qulliq, the territory’s energy provider, was only able to restore power in four-hour intervals. That was enough time to warm homes, open stores, and kept the airport running even though the Government of Nunavut was calling on residents to limit their electricity use to basic needs. Two mobile generators from the Northwest Territories Power Corporation and some stand-alone generators from the territorial government were being flown in to relieve the emergency generators and to support the local health center, which had to evacuate 14 of its patients to Iqaluit, which is 300 km to the south. The power outages also affected the long-distance telephone network and threatened coordination among hamlet utility workers who had to rely on portable radios and satellite phones. An emergency shelter was set up at a high school with the material support of the military, who also embarked on a tour of homes to warn people about carbon monoxide poisoning from the use of alternative heaters and the freezing pipes. Unfortunately, the damage caused by the fire was too extensive to consider a complete restart of the plant. On 13 April, four generator units were flown to the community from Iqaluit by a heavy-lift Sikorsky S-64F Skycrane helicopter. The helicopter was itself delivered to the Nunavut capital by a massive Antonov 124 cargo aircraft chartered from the Russian company Volga-Dnepr. It was not until 1 May that the state of emergency was lifted, and it took two more years for the new power plant to open.

This event illustrates how energy security can be a major issue for remote Indigenous communities in Canada. Of the 250 isolated communities in the country that are not connected to the North American integrated electricity grid or natural gas infrastructure, 170 are Indigenous communities [1]. Most of these communities rely on local diesel-powered microgrids for heat and power generation operated by the public sector. While provincial and territorial legislation ensure that communities have a relatively safe and reliable power supply, transporting the fuel requires expensive logistics, with significant environmental, health, and economic costs at the local level. The development of alternatives to diesel power plants in isolated Indigenous communities is even more urgent as most of these infrastructures are old or even at the end of their lifespan. Several northern actors also perceive the energy transition as a tool to enable Indigenous communities to increase their energy security and sovereignty, thereby contributing positively to their aspirations for self-determination and sustainable economic development, as well as substantial improvements in their individual and community well-being [2]. Thus, in recent years, significant progress has been made in reducing this dependence on diesel. According to the Pembina Institute report released in 2020 [3], projects to reduce diesel consumption in remote communities have increased by 85% since 2015, whether through energy efficiency or renewable energy projects. Over the past two years, most of the progress has been supported by federal funding programs combined with provincial and territorial funding programs. However, driven by population growth, total diesel consumption has continued to increase from 655 million liters in 2015 to approximately 682 million liters in 2020. Thus, the efforts to advance the energy transition remain crucial, particularly in Northern Canada.

Indeed, with the relative exception of the Northwest Territories, most projects aimed at reducing diesel dependency in isolated Indigenous communities are located in the south of the country, notably in Ontario and British Columbia. Conversely, all 53 Inuit communities in Canada still rely on diesel for their energy needs. In terms of energy security, the peculiar situation of the Inuit is further reinforced by the climate and geographical characteristics of their vast territories, the diversity of their legal and political regimes, and the significant weight of socio-economic inequalities. Such reminders seem to be an essential step in any discussion about human development in the Inuit Nunangat. They highlight the structural inequalities and challenges faced by Canada’s Inuit populations, which, as we will see later, impact their ability to mobilize political, technical, and financial resources for renewable energy development and diffusion.

However, the issue is not only about energy security but we also need to consider the concept of energy sovereignty that “centers the rights of communities and individuals to make their own choices regarding the forms, scales, and sources of energy as well as the patterning and organization of energy usage” [4]. Indeed, the Inuit of Canada have initiated a decolonization process through the signing of modern treaties and the creation of regional institutions of governance in the four Inuit regions of Nunavik, Nunavut, the Inuvialuit Region, and Nunatsiavut [5]. This decolonization process has barely been initiated in the energy sector. However, with the rise of alternative energy sources that communities can more easily mobilize, there is a push toward energy security and, in some cases, really aiming at energy sovereignty.

2. Materials and Methods

In this paper, we investigate the efforts of the Inuit of Nunavik in implementing renewable energy projects in Nunavik, and we identify the obstacles to energy security/sovereignty in Nunavik. Indeed, as Schelly et al. noted, most energy policies do not prioritize energy sovereignty and often work against it [6].

First, we present a literature review on renewable energy in Canada’s remote Indigenous communities that will allow us to identify the main barrier to these projects. In the second section, we focus on the implementation of renewable energy technology (RET) in Nunavik through two case studies. After a description of the legal and political context of energy production and distribution in Nunavik, we present an analysis of the power relations between the actors of the energy sector and the political actors of Nunavik. Finally, we will present two case studies on the implementation of renewable energy in Nunavik, the replacement of the diesel generator in Kuujjuaq, and the Innavik hydro-project in Inukjuak. We rely on four data sources: participant observation by one of the authors, who is from Inukjuak and has been involved in the Innavik project, as well as interviews with key players in the project (Hydro-Québec, KRG, Makivik Corporation, and Pituvik Land-holding Corporation). Finally, we have analyzed the transcripts of the public hearings about the project and the previous studies on both projects.

3. Literature Review

Most studies on the diffusion of renewable energy in isolated Indigenous communities in Canada are techno-economic studies that aim, above all, to test these projects’ technical viability and profitability. A smaller body of work approaches the subject through social sciences and law, which is primarily concerned with the social acceptability of RET projects and the factors that stimulate or prevent their dissemination.

However, most of these studies don’t make a clear distinction between First Nations, Métis, and Inuit peoples. Thus, the literature on the socio-political factors that hinder or stimulate renewable energy technologies in Inuit communities in Canada is still very limited to date. Nevertheless, a literature review enables us to identify a certain number of barriers to RET development in Inuit territories. If many of them can be found in non-Inuit and even non-indigenous communities, the specific context of the Inuit Nunangat often adds additional layers, dynamics, and challenges. We chose to sort these barriers between those originating at the community level and those arising at the political and institutional level. As many of these can be intertwined, such division is mainly meant to provide a comprehensive picture of our context.

At the community level, the social acceptability of RET projects is impacted by numerous elements linked with the social and economic context of the Inuit Nunangat. Perceptions that RETs are not suitable for northern climates and are unable to produce economies of scale due to the remote and dispersed nature of the Inuit energy landscape [7,8] may translate into a negative, skeptical, or indifferent perception of these technologies. Such dynamics are reinforced by past project failures and familiarity with diesel systems which represent a reliable supply infrastructure despite negative externalities, thus contributing to a “reluctant acceptance” by communities [2,9]. RET development is also hampered by a lack of capacity at the community level related to education and public health issues. This lack of capacity negatively impacts the communities’ ability to engage in a sustainable and local transition through the training of skilled local workers, which impacts local enthusiasm and interest in such technologies. Adding to the lack of capacity is the state of current infrastructures. Geographic remoteness makes it difficult to transport, install, and maintain technologies that are not produced locally.

Furthermore, the very configuration of real estate in Inuit territories, characterized by overcrowded and deteriorated housing, means that there is often not enough space to shelter new energy infrastructure. Local concerns that RET might have negative impacts on local wildlife and animal migration patterns also represent a challenge to the diffusion of RET [9]. Many Indigenous northern communities rely on a mixed economy where wage-earning activities are used to finance traditional hunting and fishing activities. The food collected through these activities represents substantial savings for households in a context where a significant portion of the fresh food available in stores is imported from the south, rendering it very expensive [10]. If the attention given to the impacts of RET on local ecosystems can be found in various non-indigenous contexts, here, it is not just related to recreational or conservation interests; it is a matter of food and cultural security.

At the political and institutional level, many barriers seem to constrain the ability of public authorities to push forward RET in Inuit territories. One obvious barrier has to do with funding. Due to the limited financial resources of Indigenous governments and the importance of social and economic issues to be addressed, the development of RETs struggles to be considered a political priority [11]. Debt ceilings compound the difficulty in establishing and financing an ambitious energy transition policy and the consequences of a managerial approach to public policy overly focused on cost control [7]. Thus, government budget constraints and insufficient financial incentives suggest that the low development of renewable energy in Inuit territories is not simply due to technology costs alone. Blockages not only occur from the lack of creativity, initiative, and support from the federal and territorial governments [9], state-owned energy companies [12,13] but also from local public authorities [14]. These barriers are related to the financial capacity of the public authorities and competent organizations within said territories and their shortcomings in terms of communication and vision. Indeed, the literature point to the lack of a shared vision of what the energy transition should be about beyond vague incantatory discourses [15,16]. These communication gaps encourage an uncooperative environment where residents, local government, and territorial government too often work independently rather than in concert [7]. The high turnover of civil servants from Southern Canada, partly due to reluctance to move to the north, contributes to a lack of personal continuity, further complicating this situation [7]. Poor communication from public authorities regarding RETs contributes to a general lack of information sharing and a lack of interest in renewable energies both within local and supra-local political institutions and communities [2].

Thus, the various barriers to the diffusion of RET in Inuit territories extend far beyond the sole economic and technical barriers. Such barriers cannot be considered without understanding colonial legacies on governance, energy infrastructures, and other socio-economic factors, as well as the ongoing power dynamics of which we will further reflect on in our two case studies.

Identifying the sources of these barriers enabled the researchers to describe numerous ways to overcome them and develop RET in Inuit communities. The literature confers a significant role to the different levels of government in developing RETs. This role seems particularly important for initiating and accompanying this development, whether through public policy development, regulation, financing, regulation of energy costs, support for research and community involvement, training, public awareness, or infrastructure [17,18]. However, some authors point out that this does not mean that more bureaucracy is needed in the north but rather that access to public resources should be simplified [11] and that the end-goal of governmental support should be to ensure an energy transition that empowers the community through the full involvement of locals at every stage of the project [6]. Others also emphasize the potential of partnerships with non-state actors such as universities, industries, and NGOs [6], as well as the role of indigenous entrepreneurship [13].

A review of the literature on the causes of the underdevelopment of renewable energies in the Inuit Nunangat allows us to make several critical interpretations regarding their links with Canada’s colonial heritage and the way public policies, in general, are approached today. Indeed, the constraints of limited financial resources and debt ceilings are part of managerial approaches to public policy that prevent the various levels of government from having the latitude necessary to implement a clear and transformative vision through ambitious planning and investment policy. Planning is a concept that resonates culturally with the principles of Aboriginal governance based not only on a concern for the long term but also with their aspirations for maintaining a culturally relevant livelihood. The current approach to public governance does not seem to empower indigenous communities to exercise their rights to self-determination, including the development of local and sustainable energy and environmental security strategy. Similarly, the pressing lists of priorities (education, health, electricity, etc.) that prevent adequate time and resources to be allocated to RET as well as the numerous social issues that impact the communities’ capacities to take hold of the RETs are strongly linked to colonial legacies and the persistence of systemic inequalities. As such, many of the factors that impede the development of RETs do not appear to be directly related to the technologies themselves. In the case of RET, planning is not only about the technology itself but also about housing renovation, training, education, and infrastructure. This calls for a systemic transformation of the relationship between the governments and indigenous communities in Canada that seeks to properly target the past and current capacities and interactions failures. Thus, the transformation of the Inuit energy landscape in Canada cannot be dissociated from broader social-economic issues [18].

4. The Context of Energy Production and Distribution in Nunavik

Nunavik is one of the four Inuit regions; it is in the northernmost part of Québec. Nunavik has 14 communities ranging from 200 inhabitants in Aupaluk to 2700 in Kuujjuaq, with a total population of 11,000. The Inuit make up 95% of the population of the region. Each community is supplied by a diesel generator operated by Hydro-Québec, the Québec public energy company. This is an autonomous system that is not linked to the Québec energy grid. This situation creates energy insecurity on two counts: First, there is only one source of energy. In the case of a malfunction, the community would be threatened, as was the case in Pangnirtung. The electricity cost is much higher in Nunavik and is, therefore, subsidized for the households to render it affordable, but the electricity prices quadruple due to daily consumption of over 30 kWh. Furthermore, for businesses, Hydro-Québec charges the real production cost to the company, which means that the energy costs of a business are four times higher than in Southern Québec [13]. That creates a barrier to creating private businesses in a region where the activity rates are very low. This constitutes a limiting factor for many community projects such as bakeries, greenhouses, fish hatching and nursery facilities, or indoor housing construction plants. There is also limited power supply that is reflected in the specific pricing we have just observed, and electricity consumption in Nunavik is three times lower per capita than in the rest of Québec [19].

4.1. Governance in Nunavik

Nunavik is the first Inuit region in Canada to have signed a modern treaty. The James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement (JBNQA) was signed in 1975 to allow Québec to develop a major hydroelectric complex in Northern Québec. The JBNQA provides monetary compensation and property rights on 1.4 percent of the territory (Category I land); exclusive hunting, fishing, and trapping rights on 15 percent of the territory (Category II land); and preferential hunting, fishing, and trapping on the rest (Category III land).

The JBNQA does not allow for self-government, but it has put into place a complex regional governance system with, on the one hand, institutions of public governance and, on the other, Inuit organizations. Public governance is based on three regional public institutions: Kativik Ilisarniliriniq (Nunavik School board), the Nunavik Regional Board of Health and Social Services (NRBHSS), and the Kativik Regional Government (KRG). In the context of energy production and distribution, KRG is the most important of these organizations; it is, in fact, a supra-municipal administration. In addition, each Nunavik community is run by a municipal government called Northern Village that is locally elected but under the jurisdiction of the Québec department of municipal affairs. Each Northern Village appoints a KRG councilor.

The Inuit governance is constituted by the Makivik Corporation which represents the Nunavik Inuit, manages the JBNQA compensation, and protects the rights and interests of the Nunavik Inuit. It is also an economic actor, and Makivik owns two northern airlines and five other subsidiary companies. In 2017, Makivik and the Féderation des Cooperatives du Nouveau Québec (FCNQ) created a jointly owned company, Tarquti Energy Corporation, in order to develop renewable energy projects in Nunavik. Tarquti is a 100% Inuit-owned company. In Nunavik, Makivik is, therefore, a very powerful actor, politically and economically [5]. Finally, each Nunavik community has a Land Holding Corporation in charge of managing Inuit lands as defined in the JBNQA. These Land Holding Corporations own the land, and all land use has to be permitted by them; thus, they are a key player since you need land to build the energy infrastructures. This position allows them to become RET proponents, such as in the case of Pituvik Land-Holding Corporation as we will see in our second case study.

Section 23 of the JBNQA has established a specific social and environmental impact assessment process in Nunavik. This process is managed by the Kativik Environmental Quality Commission (KEQC). The KEQC is a joint board with half the members appointed by the Inuit organization and the other half by the government of Canada and Québec. KEQC has decision-making powers, but its decision can be overturned by governments. The KEQC must assess all energy projects that have environmental or social impacts, and public hearings must be held. The KQEC allows the Inuit to co-manage the impact assessment process.

All these Nunavik institutions create a very fragmented regional governance and does not equate to self-government, and none of these institutions have jurisdiction in energy policies nor on electricity pricing, as we will see in the next section. However, they can support initiatives or even invest in them through the newly created Tarquti corporation.

4.2. The Legal Context of Energy Production and Distribution in Nunavik

According to article 62 of the Act respecting the Régie de l’énergie, Hydro-Québec holds a monopoly on production, transportation, and distribution in the case of independent electric power distribution systems of Nunavik [20].

Its activities are controlled by the Régie de l’énergie (the Régie), the regulation agency in charge of the energy sector in Québec. For example, Hydro-Québec determines the electricity price. For Nunavik, as we have seen above, there is a specific pricing grid that is proposed to the Régie for approval. Makivik and KRG are usually consulted but have no part in the final decision.

In this context, Hydro-Québec “shall prepare and submit to the Régie for approval, according to the form, tenor and intervals fixed by regulation of the Régie, a supply plan describing the characteristics of the contracts the holder intends to enter into in order to meet the needs of Québec markets following the implementation of the energy efficiency measures” [21]. This supply plan has major impacts on the energy system of Nunavik because it contains the main orientations that will be put in place for the next ten years [22]. Since 2005, the Régie asks Hydro-Québec to put in place alternative solutions to fossil power plants in Nunavik [23]. In 2017, the Régie approved the Hydro-Québec plan to partially or totally convert these power plants to cleaner energy sources [24]. Although this decision sounds comparable to good news for the energy transition in Nunavik, two important question remains as to how it will be applied and how the Inuit will be involved in this project.

Concretely, two options are available to Hydro-Québec in order to concretize this target. The first is to perform the job by itself; the second is by concluding electric power supply contracts with third parties such as Inuit suppliers, with or without a tender solicitation and contract awarding procedure [25]. Hydro-Québec opted for the second option and detailed four orientations for these projects, which include the following: technically feasible, economically profitable, environmentally acceptable, and be welcomed by the community [26]. The Régie adds that good communication and consultation with relevant communities are key elements for the success of this plan [27]. To this end, Hydro-Québec deployed a new business model based on a global awarding procedure and centered on local requirements such as geographical situation, the type of partnership, local benefits, and social acceptability [28]. These criteria open a path for energy projects developed by the Inuit community. The two following case studies illustrate how complex it is for the Inuit to develop projects in this context.

However, it remains clear that Québec institutions control energy policies and energy production, distribution, and pricing. Therefore, the Nunavik energy sector is still very much based on a colonial setting where Southern Québec civil servants make the decisions for Nunavik.

5. Cases Studies

5.1. Missed Opportunity in Kuujjuaq

Kuujjuaq is the most populous community in Nunavik, with close to 3000 inhabitants. Until the end of the 2000s, electricity was supplied by an old diesel power plant located within the village for which its pollution and noise were sources of inconvenience for the residents. Hydro-Québec, which bought the plant from the federal government in 1981, was considering building a new one in the early 1990s. A first construction site located 500 m from the village was designated by Hydro-Québec, who then moved it to 1 km from the village following discussions with the municipality of Kuujjuaq and the Nayumivik Landholding Corporation. In 2006, two public information sessions were organized, bringing together close to 1000 people. While the community was eager to replace the old plant and did not massively oppose the Hydro-Québec project, local authorities and residents expressed several concerns and disagreements regarding the creation of local jobs as well as the potential environmental, social, and fiscal impacts associated with the project’s location [29]. Nevertheless, at the end of the discussions, Hydro-Québec reported that local authorities and the community welcomed the project in its application for authorization to the Québec Energy Board (Régie de l’énergie) [30]. According to the public utility company, the growth in local energy demand, the plant’s antiquated nature, and its problematic location in the middle of a residential area were central arguments to justify the project.

Following the authorization from the Régie in September 2007, the Kativik Environmental Quality Commission (KEQC) organized an additional public consultation at the local radio station in Kuujjuaq, which only 20 people attended. According to the KEQC’s report, the participants stated that they had received sufficient information on the project and supported it. Some participants, however, reaffirmed their desire to see the village connected to the Hydro-Québec network or to develop wind power, an opinion that will persist in the years to come [31]. Indeed, the connection to the Hydro-Québec integrated network had been considered in 2001 but was abandoned because of its cost despite the wide community support [32]. Following the submission of its report, the KEQC issued a certificate of authorization for the power plant project in 2008, which became operational at the end of 2010.

The Kuujjuaq thermal power plant project was not imposed in a strictly authoritarian and vertical manner by Hydro-Québec. The story of its development demonstrates a certain sensitivity to the social acceptability of the local community in which the company’s facilities are located and particular attention to the opinions of local authorities. This situation is created by the land ownership of the landholding corporations resulting from the JBNQA, which tends to redress the balance of power with Hydro-Québec.

Nonetheless, an examination of the elements missing from the assessments and consultations carried out in the context of the Kuujjuaq plant project, as well as the power dynamics underlying the project, suggest that this first analysis should be tempered.

Due to its hegemonic position in the Quebec energy sector, Hydro-Québec possesses significant power in determining the energy needs of communities and the appropriate technologies to meet them. This is particularly obvious in the case of off-grid systems, where Hydro-Québec’s technical and financial expertise gives it a scientific and political authority that is difficult to contest. For example, in its application to the Québec Energy Board, Hydro-Québec conducted a brief evaluation of alternatives to its power plant project, containing both the construction of a hydroelectric dam and the connection to the general power-grid, all of which were rejected on the grounds that they were too costly and unable to adequately meet all the community’s energy needs, particularly in the event of an emergency.

The choices of the alternatives evaluated and the calculation of their costs were entirely determined by Hydro-Québec. This approach leaves almost no room for Inuit preference in energy development. The lack of innovation on the part of Hydro-Québec regarding consultation and participation of the population contributes in further limiting the community’s capacity to propose alternatives to the proposed project [29]. Similarly, the choice of the appropriate solution seems to be justified solely based on financial cost, without taking other aspects into account. While the reliability of RET is mentioned, the main alternative considered by Hydro-Québec, hydroelectricity, was not a cause for concern as the company had extensive experience with the implementation of this technology in northern environments. The detailed argument on alternative energies by Hydro-Québec has not been made public, which underlines shortcomings in terms of communication and transparency.

All these elements reflect a certain path dependency of Hydro-Québec regarding energy, which pushes the public utility company to favor options in which it is comfortable from a financial, technical, and political point of view due to its complete control over the energy facilities and their governance, which is a situation that seems to hinder the replacement of diesel power plants by renewable energies within the off-grid networks.

Thus, the case of the diesel power plant is part of an old paradigm of energy governance in Québec in which only community input is sought and where Hydro-Québec is both judge and jury. Several obstacles to the diffusion of renewable energy in Inuit territories that were identified in the literature can be found in this case. Barriers related to the knowledge and capacities of local and regional actors are manifested here by the difficulty of producing counter-expertise. Familiarity with diesel systems is also present and might explain the relatively low opposition to the power plant project by the community. However, in the case of Kuujjuaq, the greatest obstacles to the development of renewable energy were undoubtedly the institutional and political obstacles related to the dominant position of Hydro-Québec. The evaluation of alternative solutions by Hydro-Québec also reflects a managerial approach to energy governance based solely on cost control, which hinders an investment policy in renewable energy. This approach was further encouraged by the weak support for RETs transition by the public authorities at the time.

5.2. A Community-Driven Project: The Innavik Hydroelectric Dam

Our second case is the Innavik hydroelectric project located in Inukjuak, a community of 1700 people located on Hudson Bay. Similarly, to all Nunavik communities, electricity is produced by a diesel power plant, while heating needs are provided by oil-fired boilers installed in each home. It means that in order to completely switch to renewable energy systems, the heating systems would have to be changed. Inukjuak is located in the tundra and, therefore, has no firewood for heating purposes and is entirely dependent on fossil fuels.

In addition, the high cost of energy for businesses prevented any economic development for a community with one of the highest unemployment rates in Nunavik. This explains why the Pituvik Land Holding Corporation decided to explore alternative energy sources. This project, unlike Kuujjuaq, is essentially based on a local initiative. Furthermore, as we have seen above, Hydro-Québec was asked by the Régie to explore alternative energy sources for Nunavik; therefore, the circumstances seemed quite favorable.

Pituvik decided to explore hydroelectric energy because the community of Inukjuak is located near two rivers. With funding from Hydro-Québec, they conducted a pre-feasibility study of the potential of the Kongut River and the Inukjuak River. The Inukjuak River was finally chosen as it is closer to the community and never freezes, allowing for year-round power generation. However, the Inukjuak River is also the community’s source of drinking water, which raised concerns among the population. Furthermore, in the past, the James Bay hydroelectric project proposed by the Québec government was strongly opposed by the Cree and the Inuit and resulted in the signature of the JBNQA [33]. However, in the case of Innavik, the project originated from the community and not from a distant colonial power.

In spring 2008, the prefeasibility study results were presented to the population of Inukjuak, who then approved, after discussions, continuing to the next phase. During this public consultation where all the people had the opportunity to express their concerns and suggestions, the main discussions revolved around three central themes: (1) the environment, (2) Inuit culture, and (3) the local economy.

The environmental and social impact study report estimated that the project would avoid the production of nearly 15,000 tons of CO₂ as early as 2012 and more than 32,000 tons of CO₂ in 2022, considering the anticipated increase in energy demand [34].

The Feasibility Study was published in 2009, and the Pituvik board organized call-in sessions on the local radio to share the results and discuss the project with the population. A 3D model of the project was on display at the school for the local population to observe how it would look after the construction. A few municipal councilors and other people repeated their concerns about the water quality since the project would directly impact the drinking source of the community, which is located downriver of the project. Out of all the discussions, eight conditions would have to be met for the project to be acceptable:

• Built 10.3 km upriver from Inukjuak: ‘Katattukallak’ site, Inukjuak River;

• No impact on water quality, wildlife, and fish habitat;

• Include a Power Purchase Agreement with Hydro-Québec;

• Be implemented through a Public-Private Partnership;

• Request project support from Canada, Québec, and KRG;

• Be economically viable: based on revenues covering all costs;

• Offer a range of economic and social benefits for Inukjuak and residents;

• Distribute financial earnings to community needs, youth education, and economic development.

A local referendum stating those conditions was held during a one week election in March 2010. The population gave strong support to the project (72% participation; 82.6% in favor and 16.7% opposed), providing the Pituvik board the mandate to go ahead with the project. The municipality, aware of the need to create local jobs, also gave its support to the Innavik project. This lengthy consultation process ensured that the project was widely supported by the community, ensuring, therefore, its social acceptability.

The next step was to secure the funding of the project. Around 20–25% of the overall budget was financed by Pituvik’s funds and 75–80% by loans and public financing. The project was supposed to be implemented through a Public-Private Partnership (P3). The P3 Canada Funding Program was to support 25% of the startup costs, with the condition that P3 Québec or the Provincial Government of Québec would support the project. The Québec government had to decide on their level of support but first wanted Pituvik to negotiate a Power Purchasing Agreement (PPA) with Hydro-Québec since it has a monopoly on electricity distribution. Without collaboration between the Québec Government and Hydro-Québec with Pituvik, P3 Canada would withdraw its support. Hence the PPA was a crucial element.

However, Pituvik and Hydro-Québec were not able to agree on a Power Purchasing Agreement (PPA). The reasons vary according to the actors interviewed. For Hydro-Québec, the project was not mature enough to sign a PPA with Pituvik, which was still in the process of gathering funding for the project [29,34]. Hydro-Québec stated that they were willing to reconsider the offer once the community has secured funding [35].

According to Harbour-Marsan [29], Hydro-Québec was interested in the project. She explains this failure by the limitations of the legal system and the JBNQA, which did not foresee that local populations would ever be interested in exploiting the natural resources of their territory to produce energy. Until then, these projects had always been initiated and operated by Hydro-Québec or the private sector. This situation would explain the difficulties in reaching an agreement [29]. However, according to the Inuit negotiators, the funding was not the issue; during a meeting in July 2010 with Hydro-Québec, they were told that the project should be handed down to Hydro-Québec, which was an unacceptable condition for Pituvik since they wanted to own and control their project [36]. This disagreement over the project ownership was at the heart of the project failure since it made it impossible for Pituvik to sign the PPA [13,37]. Without the PPA, the federal funding fell through, and the project had to be abandoned in the fall of 2012. Whatever the exact reason, the problem is related either to institutional barriers or/and neocolonial attitudes.

The election of a liberal government in Québec with an agenda promoting sustainable northern development in April 2014 [38] created an opportunity for Pituvik to resuscitate the project by partnering with Innergex Development Corp, a company specialized in small hydroelectric projects. At the same period, Hydro-Québec submitted to the Régie a plan to partially or totally convert the Nunavik diesel power plants to cleaner energy sources.

On 4 and 5 July 2017, a delegation from Hydro-Québec met with Pituvik in Inukjuak and thoroughly analyzed the project. In a letter addressed to Pituvik on 3 August 2017, Hydro-Québec encourages Pituvik to pursue the environmental assessment process and the search for funding sources.

The public hearings were organized in Inukjuak in March 2019 by the Kativik Environmental Quality Commission, which is the organization in charge of impact assessment in Nunavik. Most of the Nunavik institutions with interest in the energy sector were present at the hearings [39]. In addition, forty local people participated in the hearings (almost as many men as women): 39% were for the project, 39% were against, and 22% were undecided [39].

Finally, Pituvik and Innergex signed on 27 May 2019 a power purchase agreement (PPA) with Hydro-Québec [40]. In this case, Hydro-Québec based its decision on four criteria (supply reliability, social acceptability, reduction in supply costs, and reduction in GHG emission) [41]. Hydro-Québec declared that it was pleased with the agreement and stated that the project will result in a 20% decrease in its local operating costs.

On 23 August 2019, the Quebec Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change authorized, in accordance with the decision of the Kativik Environmental Quality Commission, the Innavik project with 13 conditions [42]. Finally, on 17 December 2019, the Régie de l’énergie approved the PPA between Innavik Hydro and Hydro-Québec. However, the Régie essentially approved the contract with Innavik Hydro because the profitability analysis was “sufficiently robust” and “conservative” [42] (free translation).

Pituvik secured a $92.8 million loan in 2020 through Manufacturers Life Insurance Company for the construction and term financing of the facility, which is now estimated to cost a total of $128 million [43]. The remaining $35 million, or about 20% of the project cost, will be jointly funded by Innergex and Pituvik. According to the Pituvik Chairman, Mr. Atagotaaluk, “Pituvik is still lobbying the federal government to cover our 10%” [43].

Construction of the Innavik project finally began in July 2020, delayed by two months due to the COVID-19 pandemic [44]. Health protocols in place made it impossible to employ local workers at the same site as the workers from the south. In order to limit the risk of community contagion, Pituvik temporarily forewent employing the 18 local workers as advertised [44]. The issue of local employment has been addressed through a strategy implemented by CRT Construction and the Village of Inukjuak by rotating and isolating local workers on the job site and in the community [44].

The Innavik project is a community-driven project that has created social acceptability as the community has been consulted numerous times. This is also an effort towards energy sovereignty in order to address the limits placed on community development by the high cost of energy.

If we look at the barriers to the development that we identified in the literature, the Institutional and political obstacles have been very present in this case. Despite Hydro-Québec’s public commitment to energy transition in the arctic, the demand for the project ownership (or lack of interest) by Hydro-Québec has caused the first project to be abandoned; this could be seen as an instance of energy colonialism. Still, the project was revived when a newly elected Québec government needed to showcase sustainable development projects in the north and asked HQ to support the project; at the same time, HQ had also drafted a conversion plan in order to produce more renewable energy in Nunavik. Access to funding has also been an issue that has not yet been totally resolved, and it shows that energy sovereignty is limited by the need to secure outside funding, although it should be noted that private funding is a key part of the project. The critical element in facilitating the Innavik project has been the extensive consultations that have been conducted in the community. This engagement did not eliminate all the opposition, but it has kept it at a manageable level.

6. Conclusions

These two cases illustrate that the principal obstacle to implementing renewable energy technologies in Nunavik is the institutional context; the fact that Hydro-Québec has a monopoly on energy distribution makes it difficult to develop community-based projects without the active support of Hydro-Québec. As we have observed, Hydro-Québec has been quite reluctant in implementing the energy transition even if it has been in its mandate since 2005. In the case of Kuujjuaq, the issues were mainly related to the lack of consideration for RETs created by a path dependency towards known technologies; the Hydro-Québec autonomous network division has relied on diesel generators for years and moving to new energy modes produced more effort than following the beaten path. In the case of Innavik, it was the inability to negotiate a PPA with Pituvik that blocked the project. Since the funding was secured and that the issue was a lack of trust from Hydro-Québec, we could suspect a form of colonialism in the form of questioning the capacity of Indigenous people to implement an ambitious hydroelectric project. Finally, some key Nunavik institutions, such as the FCNQ, have a vested interest in maintaining the dependency on diesel generators since this institution is the main distributor of fuel in Nunavik.

The second obstacle relates to the capacity to raise the funding necessary to finance these projects that were present in both cases; however, there is nowadays more interest in funding such projects. Thus, governments and the private sector are now willing to funds such projects as we have in observed in the Innavik project. The two other obstacles mentioned in the literature, negative perceptions and lack of capacity of the local actors, were not present in those two cases. In the case of Innavik, the local actors showed strong resilience and were able to successfully implement their project despite the resistance of the state actors. In fact, community-driven projects (CDP) have many advantages: CDP ensure the social acceptability of the project. CDP proves to be very resilient since it is carried out by a community and not only by some individuals. Most importantly, CDP provide energy sovereignty to the local community, and that would not have been possible with a more top-down model. The Innavik project also showcases the importance of energy sovereignty in the decolonization process. The Inuit of Inukjuak will soon be producing their own source of energy like they used to before the governments took control of their life.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, T.R.; formal analysis, T.R., L.N., C.K. and T.P.; writing—review and editing, T.R., L.N. and C.K. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research was funded by the SSHRC New Frontiers in Research Fund, grant number NFRFE-00568 and by the INQ-Sentinelle Nord Research fund.

Institutional Review Board Statement

This project was approved by the Comité d’éthique de la recherche avec des êtres humains de l’INRS: Ethic certificate CER-19-531.

Informed Consent Statement

Informed consent was obtained from all subjects involved in the study according to the ethic certificate.

Data Availability Statement

The data presented in this study are available on request from the corresponding author. The data are not publicly available due to confidentiality stemming from the the ethical board requirement.

Acknowledgments

We want to acknowledge the contribution of Tanya Giberyen, who conducted the early research on the Innavik case, as well as the Nunavimiut, who provided some background information on the project and the negotiation with Hydro-Québec. We also want to thank the Quebec civil servants who agreed to being interviewed or provided key information. However, all the interpretations, as well as the factual errors, are ours.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

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