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The International Court of Justice ('ICJ') is the oldest international court in operation, with the authority to adjudicate cases raised by any United Nations member. It has the broadest jurisdiction of any international court, since states can designate or seize the ICJ to resolve disputes involving a broad range of interstate or international matters. The ICJ also has an advisory function, which can be used to clarify questions of international law. The potential for the ICJ to hear cases involving so many countries, treaties and issues means that the relative paucity of cases adjudicated across the ICJ's nearly 75 years in operation is noteworthy. The traditional explanation for this paucity is that the ICJ lacks compulsory jurisdiction and that only states can initiate litigation. This article argues instead that the greatest limitation of the ICJ is its interstate nature. Part II provides an empirical overview that compares the ICJ's docket to other international courts, and it explains why the dearth of ICJ litigation is consequential. Part III considers the ICJ through the lens of influencing state behaviour. Part IV moves beyond a state-centric focus to consider how international courts build authority vis-á-vis different audiences, including potential future litigants, the larger legal field and the public. Part V suggests that the ICJ's limited influence is actually its greatest asset, since its very limits make the ICJ politically palatable. I therefore conclude that despite or perhaps because of its limitations, the ICJ is an indispensable international adjudicatory body, meaning that if it did not exist today, we would probably want to recreate its limited form anew.
I INTRODUCTION
This study uses the lens of comparing the International Court of Justice ('ICJ') to other international courts ('ICs') to gain insight into the ICJ's strengths and limitations as an IC. A typical legal analysis focuses on formal competences and legal possibilities, examining constitutional texts, the larger organisational architecture or a small number of decisions. My research, by contrast, uses variation in the design, activation and influence of the world's permanent ICs to understand when and how ICs influence domestic politics, state behaviour and international relations. I take an empirical rather than a legal or normative approach. Moreover, my approach is informed by social science understandings of when and...