Content area
Full text
Looking at future operating concepts through the lens of past battles
"For those who fight for it, life has a flavor the sheltered will never know. " This quote, often attributed to Theodore Roosevelt, was reportedly posted on a handmade sign at the Khe Sanh Marine Base, Vietnam in 1968.
Battles may be shaped deep, but they are decided up close. The two Marine Corps operational concepts most touted today as visionary {Force Design 2030 and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations) are almost exclusively focused on long-range, precision rockets and missiles to win future battles. Marine infantry and the close and rear battles are virtually ignored.
The neglect of the close and rear battles is baffling for anyone who knows and appreciates Marine Corps history. The dogma that long-range, precision rockets and missiles can win future battles by themselves is even more perplexing. The conviction that Marines need only watch computer screens and push buttons to dominate the enemy, while appealing to some, will not survive first contact. It is an illusion based on a fundamental misunderstanding of warfighting. It is dangerous.
The emphasis on long-range, precision rockets and missiles and new organizations, such as Marine Littoral Regiments and Stand-in Forces, to win future battles has stripped Marine infantry of the armor and cannon artillery needed to win the close and rear fight. Force Design 2030 (FD 2030) and the FD 2030 Annual Update of May 2022 are leaving Marine infantry dangerously exposed. With apparently little or no appreciation for close combat, Marine Corps leadership has jettisoned all tanks and emasculated direct support cannon artillery. Plans are also underway to deactivate two attack helicopter squadrons and two amphibious assault companies and cut the number of fixed wing aircraft. If this was not bad enough, three infantry battalions and an infantry regimental headquarters have already been deactivated and the number of Marines in the remaining infantry battalions are being reduced. The toolbox of Marine Corps capabilities needed to support Marine infantry in the close and rear battles is being dangerously emptied to self-fund new operational concepts that are experimental and lack proper validation.
Unless you have experienced prolonged close combat against a significantly larger and determined enemy, at times hand-to-hand and under almost constant artillery and...