Evaluating the roles and reach of philanthropic foundations in sustainability efforts for tuna

Abstract

Tuna fisheries provide over 5 million tonnes of seafood annually to the global market but have historically raised conservation concerns due to weak management measures and impacts on non-target wildlife. The focus of the first environmental awareness campaigns in seafood focused on dolphin bycatch in tuna fisheries in the 1980s. Since then, the sustainable seafood movement has evolved considerably, with philanthropic foundations playing a key role as agenda-setters and funders of work carried out by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Here, we used tuna as a case study and investigated how three US foundations and associated NGOs have affected tuna fisheries reform through two primary pathways: advocacy for improved fishery management at intergovernmental meetings, and engagement with fishing companies in fishery improvement projects (FIPs). We found a total of USD 28.65 million was allocated to tuna-related work from 2013 to 2021. While each foundation had different funding profiles, 65% of all grant funds were directed to two key priority areas: market leverage and RFMO advocacy. Further, almost 60% of all funding was allocated to only three NGOs, all of which are central actors at RFMO meetings, and which are collectively engaged in over 85% of all tuna FIPs (by volume). We reflect on how this concentrated funding relates to the overarching sustainable seafood agenda of these foundations and provide recommendations to ensure financial support and objectives remain transparent and do not perpetuate inequities between tuna fishing countries.

INTRODUCTION Origins of foundation involvement in sustainable seafood campaigns

In 1988, the North American public first became aware of conservation issues in global tuna fisheries when biologist Sam LaBudde's video of dolphins drowning in tuna fishing nets aired on US television. This clip sparked a national boycott of canned tuna and led to major American brands announcing the end of sourcing tuna caught with “dolphin set” purse seine methods (Time Magazine, 1991; Wright, 2000). These brands also turned to a new public-facing “Dolphin Safe” eco-label developed by the non-governmental organization (NGO) Earth Island Institute to show seafood buyers that their canned tuna was from dolphin-free fisheries. Having this eco-label helped protect these brands against further boycotts in a time when NGOs were increasingly turning to the market to name and shame key companies in natural resource sectors (e.g., forestry, coffee) to make them adopt more environmentally responsible practices (Auld, 2014; Baron & Diermeier, 2007).

Such NGO tactics corresponded with neoliberal ideas that consumer purchasing power could address conservation and sustainability challenges (Bernstein, 2001). The broadening interest in this vision included support from philanthropic foundations: private, wealthy, non-profit grant-makers (Jung & Harrow, 2015), which began providing coordinated funding for the naming and shaming campaigns and eco-certification solutions (Bartley, 2007). The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) was born during this time. Formed in 1997 as a partnership between environmental NGO, World Wide Fund for Nature (in North America: “World Wildlife Fund”; WWF) and the world's largest seafood retailer at the time, Unilever, the founding aim of the MSC was to “create market-led economic incentives for sustainable fishing” (The Press Association, 2017a). To do this, a “client group” (i.e., a fishing company or a group with fishing interests) could pay to be assessed by a third-party auditor against the MSC's sustainability standard. If it passed, the client group would be MSC-certified and could buy the rights to use the MSC eco-label on products containing their fish. According to the MSC's original Theory of Change, the increased demand for sustainable seafood would result in a price premium for these products. From the outset, philanthropic foundations supported the MSC's mission. From 2004 to 2005, American foundations provided half of MSC's total funding (The Press Association, 2017b); in particular, the David and Lucile Packard Foundation (hereafter: “Packard”) and the Walton Family Foundation (hereafter: “Walton”) have been the largest financial supporters of the MSC over time (The Press Association, 2017b), helping it become the world's leading sustainable seafood eco-certification program.

Transitioning to foundations as key funders and field-builders in the sustainable seafood movement

Concurrent to their support for the MSC, foundations gained further prominence as powerful agents (as defined in Betsill et al., 2021) in fisheries governance through their vision and strategic investments to develop the sustainable seafood movement at scale (Figure 1). Although price premiums for MSC-certified products did not emerge as envisioned (Roheim et al., 2018), the last decade has seen an increasing number of commitments by seafood supply chain companies to source and sell MSC-certified products as part of their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) strategies, which mitigate reputational risk and negative publicity (Packer et al., 2019). The spread of such sourcing commitments was greatly aided by foundation agenda-setting (Packer et al., 2019; Roheim et al., 2018) with the subsequent groundwork carried out by foundation-funded NGOs, in particular: Sustainable Fisheries Partnership (SFP) and other NGOs in the Conservation Alliance for Seafood Solutions, a group established by Packard and Walton in 2008 (CASS, 2021). These NGO efforts resulted in sustainability commitments from some of the largest retailers in the United States and the United Kingdom, including Walmart, Costco, Tesco, Aldi, and McDonalds (Roheim et al., 2018).

FIGURE 1. Conceptualization of top-down roles and associated relevant outcomes of philanthropic agency in the sustainable seafood movement for tuna. Certain foundations have supported the MSC since its origin and continue to provide financial backing and/or strategic guidance. To achieve their overarching vision of increasing demand for sustainable seafood in key markets, philanthropic foundations originally directed their funding to NGOs working with large seafood retailers to get them to commit to selling products that were Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) certified. Once these commitments gained traction, foundations began funding NGOs focused on two interconnected areas to ensure volumes of sustainable tuna entering the seafood supply chain were high enough to meet new sustainability-based retailer demands: (i) partnering with fishing companies in Fishery Improvement Projects (FIPs; pink box), many of which also seek MSC certification (blue box), and (ii) advocating improved management at Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO) meetings (orange box). Currently, tuna products that are either MSC-certified or from a FIP are deemed sufficiently sustainable to meet most retailer commitments. However, all MSC-certified fisheries require long-term sustainable catch limits (i.e., harvest control rules) for the tuna they catch and these measures can only be decided by government policymakers at RFMO meetings (purple). The MSC has multiple advisory boards, which include current and former foundation advisors, scientists, representatives from fishing, and supply chain companies, as well as NGOs. Sources: CEA Consulting 2021; 2020, Ross Strategic et al. 2020, Schiller & Bailey, 2021, Schiller et al., 2021, and the MSC website (https://www.msc.org/about-the-msc/our-governance)

However, getting commitments from high volume retailers is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, demands from powerful corporations can exert strong pressure on fisheries to meet these companies' sustainability commitments and, therefore, reforms to unsustainable fishing practices can happen faster and at larger scales. Indeed, MSC-certification has become a basic requirement for fishing companies to retain access to markets due to retailer commitments, rather than a means to product-differentiate and secure price premiums (Auld & Cashore, 2013; Foley & Hébert, 2013; Schiller & Bailey, 2021). On the other hand, the MSC is an expensive and time-consuming standard to meet, privileging larger operations and leading to the exclusion of less well-resourced client groups even if their fishing practices may also be considered environmentally sustainable (Bush et al., 2013; Jacquet & Pauly, 2008). Moreover, high volume retailers that commit to selling MSC-certified seafood products also require a consistent supply of it—in high volumes. Thus, ensuring such volumes could be supplied to meet increasing retailer demands was a key impetus for the creation of Fishery Improvement Projects (FIPs), especially in the case of species from large fisheries and with high commercial importance (Cannon et al. 2018).

FIPs are partnerships between environmental NGOs (ENGOs), industry NGOs (INGOs), fishing companies, and/or other stakeholders with the goal of improving fishing practices so they can eventually be MSC-certified (Crona et al., 2019; Sampson et al., 2015). The NGO Sustainable Fisheries Partnership pioneered FIPs and, since 2006, FIPs have been a key leverage point for fisheries reform from the perspective of both Packard and Walton, which were Sustainable Fisheries Partnership's first two funders (SFP, 2021). To date, there have been 290 FIPs globally and these projects cover an estimated 25 million tonnes (mt) of fish and marine invertebrates caught annually (~25% of total reported capture fisheries landings; SFP, 2021). The decisions of large retailers (e.g., Walmart) to accept seafood sourced from FIPs as part of their commitments to sustainability does potentially open the sustainability market to fisheries that have thus far been excluded. But this also raises concerns about the erosion of incentives to continue improving practices to meet the MSC standard and lessening of market benefits for those fisheries already certified. As such, understanding how fishing operations access resources to implement FIPs, and under what conditions, can help illuminate relationships between retailers' certification commitments and factors shaping equity in market access.

Case study: Assessing the reach of foundations in international fisheries

In 2015, philanthropic contributions for marine-related issues totaled USD 399 million, exceeding reported government aid for marine conservation for the first time (Berger et al. 2019). Today, foundations continue to be key funders and agenda-setters of the sustainable seafood movement, contributing increasing funds to international fisheries management and conservation. In addition to serving in an advisory role for the MSC by having ongoing representation on the MSC's Board of Trustees (Renckens & Auld 2019), foundations provide grants to NGOs whose work relates to their overarching Theory of Change: increasing demand for sustainable seafood in key markets (CEA Consulting 2012, 2020; Ross Strategic et al. 2020). These observations suggest that foundation funding initiatives are poised to have a potentially major effect on how fishing—and fisheries conservation—currently takes place and by whom.

Here, we evaluate how foundation funding influences the activities of NGOs in the context of tuna fishing and tuna fisheries management (Figure 1). We focus on tuna given their history as the founding fish of the sustainable seafood movement, and because canned tuna is one of the most ubiquitous seafood products globally. There are 23 distinct tuna stocks globally and reported catch of these species increased from around 450,000 mt in 1950 to 5.2 million mt in 2016 (Coulter et al. 2020). Today, roughly 75% of the annual tuna catch is canned (primarily skipjack and albacore) while the rest (larger species: yellowfin, bigeye, bluefin) enters the fresh/frozen market for sashimi and other high-end products (McKinney et al. 2020). Over half the global catch comes from the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, yet fleets from over 80 countries fish for tuna in their national waters and/or international waters (i.e., the high seas). Currently, Indonesian fisheries provide 15% of the world's tuna catch, more than any country (Sunoko & Huang 2014). Tuna fishing gears vary substantially in terms of their size and the scale at which they are used. About two-thirds of the global tuna catch is caught by purse seines (large nets that encircle fish) and a further 11% by longlines (lines with baited hooks left at sea for a set time) (McKinney et al. 2020); both gears are typically employed by industrial vessels, often operating far offshore. At the same time, a variety of small-scale or artisanal gears are also used to catch tuna coastally (e.g., pole-and-line, handline, gillnet). These gears are typically more labor intensive for fishers and bring in substantially smaller catches per vessel relative to purse seines and longlines. The United States and the European Union are the world's top importers of canned tuna (over 50% combined), and these countries are also key markets for retailer-focused sustainable seafood commitments.

The first large (~850,000 mt) MSC certification for tuna occurred in 2012 (Banks et al., 2012). Notably, the client group was a group of eight small island developing states—the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA)—which have among the lowest per-capita incomes in the world and a near absolute dependence on revenue made from leasing access to their national waters to foreign tuna fishing companies (Adolf, 2019; Bell et al., 2021). The number of tuna fishing companies seeking MSC-certification has increased exponentially in the last decade (Schiller & Bailey, 2021) and tuna now account for almost 20% of all MSC “engaged catch” (i.e., fish caught by client groups that are MSC-certified or under assessment)(MSC, 2021).

Despite this trajectory, the management of tuna remains a transboundary governance challenge since these fish are highly migratory and cannot be managed unilaterally (e.g., Barkin & DeSombre, 2013; Haas et al., 2020; Song et al., 2017)(Figure 1). All 23 tuna stocks are managed internationally through five Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs), which means tuna fishing companies cannot meet the MSC standard only by improving their own fishing practices. These companies also require strong management measures (e.g., sustainable catch limits), which are negotiated and decided at RFMO meetings by government policymakers, and then implemented by member countries within their own domestic management regimes.

Advocacy undertaken by NGOs at these meetings is increasingly related to the sustainable seafood movement since specific RFMO measures are needed for fishing companies to gain and maintain their MSC-certification (Schiller et al., 2021). Yet, RFMO policymakers have raised concerns around the involvement of NGOs in this capacity, citing a lack of transparency regarding NGO funders, and, by extension, opacity around the underlying incentives for their participation and advocacy (Schiller et al., 2021; Sinan et al., 2021). Such apprehensions are especially true for policymakers representing the interests of small island developing states. This perspective corroborates existing concerns in academic literature related to the influence philanthropic organizations can have on state-level decision-making processes, while facing no obligations to disclose information about their funding streams (or Theories of Change ), to state citizens (Betsill et al., 2021; Betsill & Milkoreit, 2020).

Recent work by Betsill et al. (2021) highlights the prominent role foundations can play as agents of environmental governance through agenda-setting and field-building activities. Equally, these authors highlight many research gaps related to the roles, outcomes, and legitimacy of foundation involvement in this capacity, and call for further research investigating how foundations engage, and to what effect their involvement has on environmental governance processes. Thus, the goal of our analysis is to understand the role foundations play and the outcomes they have affected in the governance of tuna fisheries. First, to better understand the scale and scope of foundation funding for tuna fisheries reform, we ask: (i) how much funding has been directed to tuna-related sustainability efforts by these foundations; (ii) to which areas of reform do foundations direct most of their spending; and (iii) which NGOs receive the most funding from these foundations? Second, we investigate where NGOs direct their efforts as part of the RFMO advocacy and market agendas set out by the foundations. We ask: (iv) which NGOs are most prevalent at RFMO meetings? (v) what is the overarching landscape of tuna FIPs, and which NGOs are most engaged with these efforts? We situate our results in the broader context of foundations' market-based sustainability efforts and focus our discussion on the potential consequences foundation funds and priorities may have on perpetuating social and economic inequalities within the tuna fishing industry. We conclude by highlighting where future efforts could be directed to remedy this challenge.

METHODS Foundation grant analysis

We analyzed the funding records of three American philanthropic foundations: Walton, Packard, and the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (hereafter: “Moore”). We focused on these three foundations as they were the top three American foundations for marine-related grants from 2010 to 2016 (CEA Consulting, 2018). We collected grant records from existing foundation websites, archived websites, and charity registries for the relevant tax return information (e.g., 990 Forms) for all “Conservation and Science” grants for Packard, “Environmental Conservation” grants for Moore, and “Environment” grants for Walton (see Supporting Information for details). We term these environment-related grants. The completed data set provides funding information from 2001–2021 for Moore, 2001–2020 for Walton, and 2012–2021 for Packard. Using keyword searches for tuna and tuna RFMOs, we searched these data along with the foundation websites, archived websites (i.e., www.wffhome.com, www.packfound.org), and tax returns to identify tuna-related funding. We also checked if any MSC-related grants focused on tuna issues.

Each foundation differed in their approach to reporting, but we were able to consistently collect information on the organization funded and the amount received from 2012 to October 2021 (excluding Walton, which only had data available through 2020.) Obtained grants (n = 61) were coded into one of seven categories based on the description provided: market leverage (i.e., promotion and/or targeted marketing of sustainable tuna products; n = 10), RFMO advocacy (n = 8), fishing transparency (n = 6), NGO collaboration (n = 5), Indonesian fisheries (n = 26), research (n = 3), and other (n = 4). Notably, while some grants were directed toward efforts in specific geographic regions (e.g., “in the eastern Pacific Ocean”) only two countries were explicitly mentioned in available grant descriptions: Indonesia and Palau. Multiple grants mentioned Indonesia but only one grant was related to Palau “to support the domestication of fisheries.” Thus, given the prominence of Indonesia in our data set, we chose to code “Indonesian fisheries” as a separate category for analysis (the grant for Palau was coded as “other”). Notably, almost all grants for Indonesia focused on some aspect of managing or developing its tuna fisheries but two grants focused exclusively on promoting Indonesian tuna products in the market (e.g., “to support an initiative to transform Indonesia's pole-and-line and handline tuna sector into an internationally recognized source of sustainable fish”). For consistency in geography, we coded these as “Indonesian fisheries” rather than “market leverage.” The final coded data set (see Table S1) was used to analyze foundation funding patterns over time.

Participation by NGOs in RFMO meetings and tuna Fishery Improvement Projects

Many NGOs attend annual RFMO meetings as official observers (hereafter: “observers”) and attempt to influence policymakers' decisions by advocating management measures consistent with their organization's priorities and goals (Petersson et al. 2019). Often, such advocacy not only takes the form of written policy briefs or position statements submitted at the start of meetings but may also include meeting directly with policymakers on specific delegations and/or providing a spoken intervention to the entire delegation floor during meetings (see Schiller et al., 2021 for a comprehensive overview of such engagement).

To capture foundations' financial support for each NGO as their work relates to RFMO policy goals, we obtained a list of all observer organizations in attendance at tuna RFMO annual meetings from 2012 to 2019 from publicly available RFMO meeting lists and paired this with our tuna funding data set (above). We chose this time frame as it reflects the time frame for which we have complete funding information from all three foundations from our first analysis (above) through the last year of in-person RFMO meetings prior to the COVID-19 pandemic (i.e., reflective of current NGO participation in a “business as usual” scenario). We used Gephi to map the network position of observers in relation to the five tuna RFMOs. Observers are central in the network if they attended several different RFMO meetings in more than one year (i.e., a node's weighted degree). The most central observers therefore attended all RFMO meetings in all the years we collected data for. Observers that received funding have nodes scaled proportionally to the value of tuna funding received from one or more of the funders.

Data for tuna FIPs were collected from the world's leading Fishery Improvement Project database (fisheryprogress.org). Information was available for 55 tuna FIPs—both “in progress” (n = 45) and “completed” (n = 10) and we recorded total volume covered (mt), fishing region(s), fishing country(ies), participating NGO(s), project budget, and additional funder(s) for each. We analyzed these data to identify patterns in NGO collaboration and participation as well as broader FIP demographics (i.e., size, cost, global coverage, and location). See Supporting Information for detailed methodology.

RESULTS Foundation funding for tuna-related work

Based on the granting information we could access and analyze, a total of USD 28.65 million in tuna-related grant funding was provided by the three foundations between 2012 and 2021. Moore contributed the most (65%), followed by Packard (18%) and Walton (17%) although we found high inter-annual variability for all foundations (Figure 2a). These grants amount to less than 1% of all environment-related funding (USD 3 billion) awarded by these groups over the same time.

FIGURE 2. Tuna-related grant funding profiles for Moore, Walton, and Packard as part of the sustainable seafood movement, 2013–2021. (a) Foundations exhibit high inter-annual variation and unique patterns in funding over time as well as (b) differences in the average value of grants awarded across the period of study. Overall, (c) the number of grants awarded annually (all foundations combined) peaked in 2018 although the relative value of grants has increased since this time. (d) Relative to each other, foundations exhibit diversity in grant focus and recipients, with each foundation concentrating on specific issues and consistently channeling funds to the same recipients over time; almost all recipient organizations received funding related to only one category and were supported by only one foundation. (analyses pertain from 2012 to October 2021; no data for Walton available in 2021)

We found extreme spread in the value of individual grants awarded by each foundation (ranging from USD 15,000 to USD 5 million per grant; Table S1) but, on average, Moore's grants were worth more than those provided by Walton and Packard (Figure 2b). The total number of grants awarded each year increased through 2018 but has declined in recent years, although the average annual value of grants has shown the inverse trend (Figure 2c). Collectively, The Nature Conservancy, ISSF, and WWF have received nearly 60% of total funding provided by these foundations (Figure 2d).

We found that each foundation had a noticeably different funding profile—only one focus was supported by all three foundations: Indonesian fisheries (Figure 2d). Moore contributed over USD 10 million toward RFMO advocacy, and a further USD 7.3 million to market leverage (e.g., “[t]o increase sustainability in tuna fisheries through certification, transparency and stakeholder engagement”)—collectively 94% of its grants by value. Conversely, Walton has invested heavily (USD 4.3 million; 87% of its funding) in NGO work to improve Indonesian tuna fisheries management and market access, the most of all foundations for this country-specific work. Packard had the most diverse funding profile, with no discernable trend, although half of its grants (totaling USD 2.2 million) have focused on NGO collaboration and bycatch monitoring (included in “other”; Figure 2b). Notably, Packard was the only foundation to have a tuna-specific grant related to these issues, as well as one targeting human rights issues (i.e., “[t]o pilot digital employment and recruitment technologies as a solution to significantly reduce forced labor and exploitation of workers in tuna fisheries”).

Over 90% of funds awarded to both ISSF and WWF were related to RFMO advocacy (USD 5.96 million and USD 2.4 million, respectively), while 75% of funds for the Nature Conservancy were related to market leverage (USD 5.4 million) and improving Indonesian tuna fisheries (USD 1.6 million) (Figure 2d). The Nature Conservancy also received the largest single grant awarded—USD 5 million from Moore in 2021—to “support the launch of the Pacific Island Tuna Provisions, a new tuna supply company seeking to shift industry norms in the production and procurement of seafood.” The value of this grant is over twice that of the next largest (i.e., a 2015 Moore grant to ISSF worth USD 2.2 million for RFMO advocacy). Of the 23 total organizations, universities, and companies that received tuna-related grants, 18 were funded exclusively by one foundation (although, most of these groups received multiple grants from that foundation over time).

RFMO NGO participation and foundation connectivity

Seven of 42 ENGOs (17%) and three of 39 INGOs (8%) that attended RFMO meetings received tuna funding from at least one of the philanthropic foundations in our study, and three of the total 81 NGOs—The Nature Conservancy, International Seafood Sustainability Foundation (ISSF), and the International Pole and Line Foundation (IPNLF)—received tuna funding from all three (Figure 2a). Five NGOs—Birdlife International, WWF, the Pew Charitable Trusts, Greenpeace, the Humane Society International, and MSC—attended meetings of three or more of the five tuna RFMOs, with the first three attending meetings of all five. These three ENGOs received USD 4.51 million in tuna funding according to our data. In the same time period, though not tuna-specific, the MSC received USD 30.63 million from Walton and Packard. Overall, attendance records show that certain funded groups were central observers because they attended meetings in many years for most if not all the RFMOs, while other tuna-funded observers were positioned to influence certain RFMOs more exclusively (e.g., The Nature Conservancy with WCPFC and the Ocean Conservancy with IATTC) (Figure 3). Possibly due to the highly regional focus of the top-funded NGO (The Nature Conservancy), tuna funding overall has a weak insignificant positive correlation with our measure of centrality in the global RFMO network for the organizations that funders support (R(40) = 0.1678, p = .2880).

FIGURE 3. Network of NGO observers in attendance at tuna RFMO meetings (2012–2019). This is a two-mode network of observers (multiple-colored circles) and RFMOs (black circles). Observers are sized proportional to the amount of total tuna-related funding received from Walton, Packard, and/or Moore. All observers that received funding are labeled. Links between nodes are weighted by the number of RFMO meetings attended in the study period

Tuna FIP demographics and NGO participants

As of November 2, 2021, 22 million mt of tuna—almost half the total global catch—was covered by a Fishery Improvement Project. More than half of the total volume of tuna caught in FIPs currently comes from the EEZs of small island developing states in the Western and Central Pacific but most companies involved in FIPs are from high or middle-income countries. The largest FIP—Western and Central Pacific Ocean tuna purse seine (led by global seafood processing giant Thai Union)—covers 847,681 mt, which is nearly the same catch volume as the next eight largest FIPs combined (862,708 mt); 24 of 55 FIPs have volumes exceeding 10,000 mt and collectively these initiatives account for 95% of all FIP-caught tuna (Figure 4a).

FIGURE 4. Attributes of Fishery Improvement Projects for tuna. (a) FIPs exhibit vast range in total size (volume covered), with 24 of 55 total FIPs accounting for 90% of the total volume covered by these project (FIPs asterisked (*) indicate those part of the global FIP Alliance for sustainable tuna (G-FAST) initiative); (b) in-progress and completed tuna FIPs (dark purple, inner ring) collectively total 40% of the total global catch across all tuna fisheries and there is notable concentration in NGO endorsement of tuna FIPs as the Nature Conservancy and WWF collectively oversee 25% of tuna fishing catch globally through these projects. (c) Purse seine FIPs have the largest coverage by average volume across fishing gear types; (d) Longline fisheries are not only the most costly on average but also show the widest range in budget across gears (budgets were not provided for all FIPs); and (e) FIP size (total volume) is significantly negatively correlated (R(33) = −0.8693, p [less than] .001

Two ENGOs—The Nature Conservancy and WWF—are involved in 22 of 55 FIPs (40%) and, combined, are responsible for overseeing efforts to improve fisheries that supply one-quarter of the global annual tuna catch (Figure 4b). The NGOs IPNLF, MDPI, AP2HI work in partnership on a total of seven FIPs (13%)—all of which are based in Indonesia—which cover a combined catch of 75,800 mt (~ 3% of total tuna FIP volume). Funding for FIPs is case specific and may come in part from the NGOs involved, the participating fishing companies and other supply chain stakeholders, as well as governments in Asia, the United States, and the European Union. Thai Union (Thailand) contributes funding to the most FIPs of any company (eight FIPs, totaling 1.29 million mt), followed by Anova Food (USA), which supports six FIPs (18,940 mt) and the vertically integrated company Tri-Marine International (global), which also contributes funding to six FIPs covering 191,086 mt. Supporting four FIPs totaling 305,000 mt, the Spanish purse seine conglomerate, OPAGAC is involved in the second highest volume after Thai Union. The Nature Conservancy primarily partners with companies from Asia, while WWF partners with European companies most often. Only 18 FIPs did not have an explicit NGO partner listed online, including the smallest tuna FIPs (<1000 mt) as well as those in the 1,000–65,000 mt range.

By volume, FIPs for purse seine fisheries are the largest on average relative to all gear types (Figure 4c). For FIPs with explicit budgets available, we found that, by total cost, the most expensive tuna FIP was the Costa Rica large pelagics longline and green stick (USD 2.2 million), and the least expensive (USD 48,000) was the Indian Ocean tuna and large pelagics longline (Afritex). In general, longline FIPs have a substantially higher average cost than all other gear types (Figure 4d). The Costa Rica large pelagics also had the highest per-unit cost (USD 564/mt) while the least expensive was the East Atlantic tuna purse seine (USD 2.69/mt). Overall, we found a significant negative correlation (R(33)= −0.8693, p < .001) between total FIP volume covered and per-unit-cost (Figure 4e).

DISCUSSION

Moore, Packard, and Walton had diverse funding profiles but, overall, 65% of all grant funds were directed to two key priority areas: market leverage and RFMO advocacy. Further, almost 60% of total funding was allocated to only three NGOs: The Nature Conservancy, ISSF, and WWF, all of which are prominent actors at RFMO meetings and are collectively engaged in over 85% of all tuna FIPs (by volume). The exponential growth of tuna fisheries engaging with the MSC and FIPs is a measure of the success of these efforts. But the pursuit of scale has other consequences, including for equity. We reflect on these issues in discussing our findings and point to three paths foundations might take to better leverage their influence to advance both equity and sustainability. Indeed, there is a growing consensus on the importance of consuming seafood that is not only environmentally sustainable but also socially responsible and ethical (Kittinger et al., 2017) and the need for prioritizing local benefits as part of global sustainable development objectives for ocean sectors (Cisneros-Montemayor et al., 2021).

Seeking scale and the challenges for states with high-resource dependence

Our results suggest that the overarching vision of foundations involved in the sustainable seafood movement is being implemented at scale through their financial support and agenda-setting activities. FIP partnerships between the top foundation-funded NGOs and some of the largest fishing and seafood companies in the world (e.g., Thai Union, Dongwon, OPAGAC) support the outlook of Moore, Packard, and Walton that beneficial conservation outcomes can be driven by reforms to large fishing companies and seafood retailers in an international market (Moore Foundation, 2016; CEA Consulting, 2020). These findings provide additional context for previous work showing that tuna fisheries are increasingly meeting the environmental sustainability requirements of the MSC standard (Schiller & Bailey, 2021) and speak to the transformative potential of keystone actors in ocean-related sectors (Osterblom et al., 2015; Virdin et al., 2021). Our work further corroborates research showing grant-makers will consistently concentrate funds for project-based environmental work, sometimes over long time periods, toward top-tier NGOs (Jenkins et al., 2017).

Equally, in addition to the transformative nature of foundation investments discussed above, our findings also support the notion that investments by philanthropic foundations may merely maintain the status quo of mainstream capitalism (Betsill et al., 2021) and “carefully avoid challenging the power structures and relationships that have the most profound environmental impacts” (Dowie, 2001, pp. 89). The focus on large scale efforts raises particular questions around the unintended social consequences of market-based efforts for tuna fisheries reform, given the highly migratory nature of these fishes and how access to catch tuna in the Western and Central Pacific is regulated by small island developing states. Although the period for which we had data extended back to 2000, it was not until after the 2012 MSC-certification of the PNA fishery that Moore, Packard, and Walton began funding NGOs for tuna-related sustainable seafood efforts. Notably, ISSF—an INGO that represents the interests of traders and brands supplying 75% of the global canned tuna supply and is the primary recipient of grants from Moore (Figure 2d)—submitted a formal objection to the original MSC-certification of the PNA fishery, as did OPAGAC, the Spanish syndicate of 47 purse seiners that land roughly 8% of the global tuna catch (Banks et al., 2012). OPAGAC only became involved in FIPs with WWF (Figure 4a), and ISSF involved in FIPs and RFMO advocacy (Figures 4b and 3) after the PNA fishery had been certified, likely as a response to new competition from PNA in a market where their affiliated companies had previously been primary actors (Adolf, 2019). Greater certified supply can lessen opportunities for product-differentiation (Auld, 2014). Thus, in this regard, foundation grants allocated to NGOs working on large FIPs in the Western and Central Pacific may have unintentionally undermined the aspirations of the PNA and the benefits of market access these small island states could have retained from unilaterally holding MSC eco-certification. This likely explains why some island state policymakers are skeptical of foreign NGOs and their funders.

Stop, start, and continue: Recommendations for future foundation investment and divestment

While philanthropic foundations appear to be increasingly attuned to addressing unintended social impacts of the sustainable seafood movement agenda (CEA Consulting, 2020; Ross Strategic et al. 2020), awareness of this problem is not new. Concerns related to a lack of socio-economic considerations (e.g., importance of a given fishery for food security and/or local livelihoods) for market-based fisheries sustainability programs dates back over a decade (Leadbitter & Ward, 2007) and problems of social inequity were highlighted for FIPs as they gained traction in the 2010s (Sampson et al., 2015). Nonetheless, based on our results, we provide three forward-looking suggestions for philanthropic foundation executives and employees to implement to help alleviate the concerns identified above.

Restructure goals to address existing power imbalances in tuna fishery dependency

Foundation metrics of success and associated NGO efforts prioritize volume-related targets, for example, “by 2030, at least 75% of global seafood production is environmentally sustainable or making verifiable improvement and safeguards are in place to ensure social responsibility” (CASS, 2021). The MSC standard is also exclusively about environmental sustainability of fisheries. Thus, we emphasize that incorporating multiple and alternative dimensions of “sustainability” (Bailey et al., 2018; Kittinger et al., 2017; Tlusty et al., 2019) that are beyond the MSC construct will be key to meeting any goals associated with human wellbeing.

Progress in this realm is underway. For instance, the largest tuna grant awarded in our study—USD 5 million provided by Moore to the Nature Conservancy in 2021—was allocated to launch Pacific Islands Tuna Provisions, a company that “is intended to give Pacific islanders the ability to benefit from their tuna resources by directing 100 percent of long-term net profits back to them while utilizing a sustainable model of fishing and production” (Carreon, 2021). This venture includes canned tuna coming from existing MSC-certified fisheries operating in the Marshall Islands EEZ (part of the PNA), and Walmart recently committed to supporting this project by sourcing these products. This project highlights the environmental sustainability of these tuna products (through their MSC certification) and directs its benefits back to island states, which is important since both MSC-certified fisheries and FIPs have been shown to generate limited (if any) economic benefits for local fishers and communities (CEA Consulting, 2020; Crona et al., 2019).

Beyond efforts like Pacific Island Tuna Provisions that bring market differentiation benefits to a specific small island developing state (or group thereof), the recently developed Social Responsibility Assessment (SRA) tool, which was supported in part by members of the Conservation Alliance for Seafood Solutions, can help ensure that the design and activities of a given FIP protect human rights and minimize unintended negative consequences to local communities (Conservation International 2021). In addition to bolstering market-based projects, we suggest that foundations should also think more broadly about the kinds of initiatives to push for with RFMO policymakers—particularly: initiatives that are specifically designed to address equity challenges at scale across the world's tuna fisheries independent of the market. One such initiative would be strong advocacy and support for equitable RFMO catch allocation frameworks.

At present, no tuna RFMO has a functional rights-based allocation framework (Seto et al., 2019)—a pre-agreed formula for distributing total annual tuna catch quotas equitably to all RFMO member states. Where allocation frameworks do exist, the current distribution of catch is rooted in historical power structures: states with industrial fisheries and/or high-income states receive the largest catch share leaving tuna-dependent and low-income states limited capacity to develop their fisheries and assert their sovereign rights to fish (Sinan et al., 2021). The establishment of equitable, systematic allocation frameworks in each RFMO would improve tuna governance at a global scale by ensuring the rights of those states most dependent on tuna fisheries for food and livelihood security are recognized (Seto et al., 2019; Sinan & Bailey, 2020).

ISSF was one of the first NGOs to focus on the access rights of coastal states in tuna fisheries over a decade ago (ISSF 2011) and a global fisheries landscape report commissioned in 2012 by Moore, Packard, Walton (and The Oak Foundation) states that ISSF has, “begun discussions on the application of a rights-based management system in a tuna fishery, which would be an ideal outcome…” (CEA Consulting 2012). Progress in this realm was also supported by WWF in 2011, when it facilitated a capacity-building workshop for rights-based management in Indian Ocean tuna fisheries (G16 2011), and in its 2014 position statement to the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (The RFMO in the Eastern Pacific Ocean) (WWF 2014). This advocacy may in part have led to a 2017 grant from Walton, that supports a WWF initiative to “put in place rights-based management strategies” for bigeye tuna in this region (Table S1). Based on available information, IPNLF has contributed the most recent support to assist like-minded developing coastal states (i.e., the G16) to formulate a rights-based allocation framework for the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) (IPNLF 2019), but our results suggest this work did is not financially supported by the three foundations in our study. Overall, advocacy for equitable allocation and other aspects of rights-based management has not been a top priority for most NGOs engaging with RFMO policymakers in the last decade (Schiller et al., 2021). Equally, direct opposition toward the PNA MSC certification (see preceding section) suggests a disconnect between certain group's visions of equity and the current reality of their engagement, at least in the Western and Central Pacific.

Re-focusing and amplifying attention on fair allocation processes in RFMOs would provide foundations and NGOs with an opportunity to ensure the fisheries they support through MSC and FIPs are managed in a way that ensures socio-economic considerations are paramount. A potential added benefit is this may provide such groups with opportunities to diversify their sourcing commitments to new or emerging tuna fisheries. Such support would also tie into broader global initiatives, such as Sustainable Development Goals 2.3 (doubling the income of small-scale producers, including fishers by 2030), 14b (providing access to resources and the market access for small-scale artisanal fishers), and 14.7 (increasing benefits to small island developing states and least developed countries from sustainable use of marine resources). A shift in focus that incorporates more than growing volumes of MSC-certified products has the potential to incur systemic change in tuna fisheries governance with lasting social results.

Provide a finer resolution of grant information

A recent landscape review of Packard and Walton's contributions to the sustainable seafood movement reports USD 211 million in grants between 2012 and 2019 (Ross Strategic et al. 2020). Based on our results, this suggests that tuna-specific grants make up less than 5% of total sustainable seafood funding. In particular, between 2017 and 2019, Packard and Walton reportedly spent USD 12 million combined on FIPs (and their aquaculture equivalent: Aquaculture Improvement Projects) (Ross Strategic et al. 2020). However, none of the grants we analyzed explicitly mentioned any of the tuna FIPs. This discrepancy may be because many of the largest tuna FIPs are funded by the participating fishing company rather than their partner NGO. Alternatively, it may be the result of how grants are reported.

It was not possible to deduce from publicly available foundation records any funding for tuna work if it was included in broader sustainable seafood grants. For example, a noticeable absence from the grants we analyzed was the Global FIP Alliance for Sustainable Tuna (G-FAST), a collection of ten tuna FIPs (960,000 mt) partnered with WWF (Figure 4d). Although G-FAST includes one-fifth of the world's industrial purse seine vessels and promotional material states it is “supported under the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation's Ocean and Seafood Markets Initiative (OSMI)” (WWF, 2021), it was not captured by our search since OSMI did not mention tuna or RFMOs in the grant title or description. Thus, it is unclear what proportion of Moore's USD 43 million OSMI grant was for G-FAST relative to other sustainable seafood projects. As a result, the total value of funds allocated by these foundations for tuna-related initiatives we calculated may be substantially under-estimated.

In addition to the opacity that occurs when related projects are combined in large grants, deferring to other organizations to allocate funds also limits transparency and trends in funding flows. We found ambiguity within the tuna-specific grants we reviewed in cases where grants were allocated to fiscal sponsors before they were re-distributed to NGOs to fulfill the grant objective. For example, the NGO Tuna Forum is a group of over a dozen NGOs from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, strategically convened by Packard to align their messaging and advocate the same management measures at RFMO meetings (Schiller et al., 2021). However, only one 2018 Packard grant to Aria Strategic Communications Inc. (USD 168,000) explicitly mentioned the NGO Tuna Forum. A series of more ambiguous grants totaling USD 1.05 million to this company from 2019 to 2021 for the purpose of “bring[ing] together NGOs and other individuals and organizations that work comprehensively on tuna sustainability issues globally” also encompass their advocacy work. However, it is unclear which NGOs were convened and for what activities. Similarly, Moore's OSMI grant was awarded to the fiscal sponsor New Venture Fund (Moore Foundation, 2016), yet clearly WWF is a beneficiary.

There is a clear level of transparency that exists already around the work and priorities of US foundations. However, general disclosure without an eye to the needs and capacities of outside audiences can make disclosed information ineffective. Broad grant descriptions make it challenging to tease apart funding objectives and end recipients. This means the real-world outcomes of these funds are also obscured for those without inside access. The challenges uncovered in our work reinforce the concerns of RFMO policymakers who are at times suspicious of which national and/or private interests are being represented by NGOs participating in RFMO meetings. Much of this comes back to the Theory of Change that funders have, and that ostensibly guide their decision making around who gets what, but a lack of transparency in sharing flows of money to particular projects and project types makes it hard for outsiders to understand, interrogate, work to improve, or learn from the Theory of Change. Given the large amount of money coming from foundations toward  tuna sustainability, and seafood sustainability more broadly, accountability related to sustainability outcomes is warranted.

Continue focusing on improving Indonesian and small-scale fisheries by funding local NGOs and a diversity of projects

Although the overall monetary amount provided to Indonesian tuna fisheries reform was lower than other grant categories (i.e., 16% of total foundation funding; Figure 2), the number of grants awarded to NGOs focusing on Indonesian tuna fisheries was higher than any other category (i.e., 26 of 61 grants analyzed; 39%). This suggests foundations understand the importance of retaining this country's substantial tuna exports for the global market. Still, regulation and enforcement throughout the country remains fragmented, and sustainability gains in one fishery or one fisheries management area do not always translate into country-wide improvements in management.

The funder investment model for Indonesia seems to be about providing grants to multiple NGOs whose activities focus on improving the fishing practices of artisanal gears (namely handlines), strengthening national fisheries regulations and management frameworks, and ensuring eco-certified Indonesian fisheries retain market access. Some of this investment pays off and is communicated as such. For example, a handline fishery for yellowfin tuna in the Ambon area of Indonesia became the world's first Fair Trade USA certified fishery (Bailey et al., 2016; Duggan & Kochen, 2016), arguably a better fit than MSC for some of the country's small-scale fisheries (Borland & Bailey, 2019). Similarly, major projects to improve fisheries traceability and transparency for specific tuna fisheries have also found success (Duggan & Kochen, 2016). The current challenge is determining how to amplify these successes into something more transformative across the country.

Although no other country has the same fishery and market profile as Indonesia, this model also suggests that investing in small FIPs with local NGOs should not be overlooked, especially since we find a strong negative correlation between FIP volume and cost (Figure 4e) and almost all of the small (<10,000 mt) FIPs outside of Indonesia lack NGO support at present. Benefits of NGO involvement in FIPs extends not only to on-the-water support and financial contributions but also in the promotion and facilitation of market-access through Memorandum-Of-Understanding (MOU) agreements between FIP partners. For example, FIP MOUs between the International Pole-and-Line Foundation and the Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries state, “as a clear commitment to improving Indonesia's market competitiveness, the following companies as members of IPNLF agree to preferentially source MSC-certified tuna over non-certified tuna from Indonesia, once MSC-certified: [list of 14 companies]” (IPNLF & MMAF, 2018). Given criticisms associated with how small-scale fisheries are pushed out of the sustainable seafood market and a lack of fisher participation in FIPs (Crona et al., 2019), a crucial focus of future grants should be ensuring FIP partners have the logistical support needed to access retailers and, more importantly, that the people and communities directly involved in fishing are adequately supported by these projects.

CONCLUSIONS

Our work supports the view that large, US-based philanthropic foundations play a prominent role as financial supporters and agenda-setters in the global sustainable seafood movement. These groups contribute primarily by funding NGOs engaged in on-water Fishery Improvement Projects as well as groups involved in RFMO advocacy for improved tuna fishery management. To better understand and remediate unintended social consequences associated with their vision of scale, foundations should strive to support both market-related seafood sourcing efforts and market-independent governance strategies that ensure the fisheries reform they support is both environmentally and socially responsible.

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

Laurenne Schiller and Graeme Auld conceived the study and conducted the analyses with feedback from Megan Bailey, Hekia Bodwitch, and Hussain Sinan. Laurenne Schiller wrote the manuscript with support and contributions from all co-authors.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors thank the two anonymous reviewers of this piece for their thoughtful and constructive feedback. Laurenne Schiller acknowledges support from the Liber Ero Fellowship Program and Megan Bailey, Hekia Bodwitch, and Hussain Sinan acknowledge support from the Nippon Foundation Ocean Nexus Center.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

Hussain Sinan received financial support from International Pole and Line Foundation (IPNLF) for previous research. The authors declare no other potential conflicts of interest.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Data used for the funding and FIP analyses are all publicly available through the websites and other sources listed in the Methods and Supplementary Materials.