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By centering Ganda Koy's efforts toward political legitimacy through attempts to demonstrate its knowledge of weaponry ("the rifle") as well as to undermine other militias' supposed intellectual elitism ("the pen"), . . . its more popular and grassroots orientation simultaneously substantiates its representative claims and opens it to local and national critiques.
In response to the occupation of northern Mali in 2012, Ganda Koy, a primarily Songhay militia, has attempted to increase its political legitimacy within and beyond Mali, in part through more formalized integration within the Malian army. To justify such integration, many of its leaders have highlighted its combat and surveillance prowess while portraying it as supportive of a racially and ethnically unified Mali, thereby contrasting it with more Tuareg- or Arab-separatist militias based in the Sahara Desert. It has presented itself as a grassroots organization; however, many in its ranks publicly argue for a more Songhay- and Blacknationalist approach to Malian politics. While such an attitude might privately resonate among much of the political elite in Bamako, it contrasts with Mali's postcolonial myth as a harmonious ethnic melting pot and serves to undermine Ganda Koy's integration in more formal state institutions.
Introduction
"Ganda Koy means 'Our Land' in Koira Chiini [Songhay]," Mahmane,2 a Songhay friend, emphasized via a Skype conversation in December 2020: "It means 'Your Land.' Or it means 'The land where you and your ancestors were born.' If it's our land, why would Ganda Koy need a strategy to attract new members?"
The phrase Ganda Koy-also known as Ganda Iso and Ganda Izo- means "sons of the land" or "masters of the land" in Songhay (Boisvert 2015, 277). Despite the name, both in the 1990s and today, the group has had militant members from numerous Black groups, including Bamana, Fulani, Bellah, and Bozo (Lecocq 2005). Nevertheless, as its primary membership has been and continues to be Songhay, it is perceived to be a Songhay organization, locally and nationally. Mahmane's almost cavalier assessment of its recruitment efforts-or lack thereof-following the Bamako-based coup d'état in August 2020 reflects his and many other Songhay youths' attitudes toward it, concerning both its cohesiveness and its general importance within and beyond Mali.
In this article, I build on my previous examinations of the sociopolitical...