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Abstract
Recent highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) outbreaks in two Korean cat shelters highlight the need to enhance surveillance for cross-species viral transmission into animal populations kept by humans for non-agricultural or non-conventional livestock farming purposes from a One Health perspective.
In this Comment, the authors describe recent outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza in cat shelters in Seoul, South Korea. They discuss potential routes of transmission and describe implications for surveillance of spillover infections in animals in non-agricultural settings.
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1 Sorbonne Université, INSERM, Institut Pierre Louis d’Épidémiologie et de Santé Publique (IPLESP), Paris, France (GRID:grid.7429.8) (ISNI:0000000121866389); University of Sussex, Department of Ecology and Evolution, School of Life Sciences, Brighton and Hove, UK (GRID:grid.12082.39) (ISNI:0000 0004 1936 7590)
2 Royal Veterinary College, Department of Pathobiology and Population Sciences, London, UK (GRID:grid.20931.39) (ISNI:0000 0004 0425 573X); Université de Lyon, INRAE, VetAgro Sup, UMR EPIA, Marcy l′Etoile, France (GRID:grid.20931.39); Université Clermont Auvergne, INRAE, VetAgro Sup, UMR EPIA, Saint-Gènes-Champanelle, France (GRID:grid.20931.39)
3 Sorbonne Université, INSERM, Institut Pierre Louis d’Épidémiologie et de Santé Publique (IPLESP), Paris, France (GRID:grid.7429.8) (ISNI:0000000121866389)
4 Seoul National University, Department of Veterinary Medicine Virology Laboratory, College of Veterinary Medicine and Research Institute for Veterinary Science, Seoul, Republic of Korea (GRID:grid.31501.36) (ISNI:0000 0004 0470 5905)
5 University of Oxford, Department of Statistics, Oxford, UK (GRID:grid.4991.5) (ISNI:0000 0004 1936 8948); University of Oxford, Pandemic Sciences Institute, Oxford, UK (GRID:grid.4991.5) (ISNI:0000 0004 1936 8948); Imperial College London, MRC Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis and Abdul Latif Jameel Institute for Disease and Emergency Analytics, London, UK (GRID:grid.7445.2) (ISNI:0000 0001 2113 8111)
6 Royal Veterinary College, Department of Pathobiology and Population Sciences, London, UK (GRID:grid.20931.39) (ISNI:0000 0004 0425 573X); City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR, China (GRID:grid.35030.35) (ISNI:0000 0004 1792 6846)
7 University of Sussex, Department of Ecology and Evolution, School of Life Sciences, Brighton and Hove, UK (GRID:grid.12082.39) (ISNI:0000 0004 1936 7590); Imperial College London, MRC Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis and Abdul Latif Jameel Institute for Disease and Emergency Analytics, London, UK (GRID:grid.7445.2) (ISNI:0000 0001 2113 8111)