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Abstract
This study examines the theory of freedom that can be found in Hegel's mature social, ethical and political thought. Its aims are, first, to reconstruct that theory in a way which is faithful to the original texts but also clear and precise and, second, to show that the theory is more coherent, better connected with some of our everyday judgements and intuitions, and less vulnerable to certain obvious objections than is commonly supposed.
I examine five central elements in Hegel's theory of freedom. The first is Hegel's conception of freedom as rational self-determination. Against interpretations emphasising Hegel's differences with Kant, I argue that Hegel opposes freedom to acting on one's given desires and identifies it with acting on pure reason alone. By relating this conception to Hegel's idea of a conflict between freedom and authority, I show it to be more intuitive and less vulnerable to standard objections, than is generally believed. Secondly, I explore Hegel's claim that the duties of Sittlichkeit provide content for rational freedom. Challenging certain standard interpretations of this claim, I show it to be grounded in the idea of an end-the end of preserving and promoting one's own freedom-that is implicit in the structure of a rational agent's practical reasoning. The third issue is Hegel's suggestion that freedom is the foundation of his social and political philosophy. By interpreting this suggestion in terms of Hegel's notions of Bildung and recognition, I show that his critique of social contract theory is more powerful than is sometimes thought and I clarify the basic aims, structure and methods of his political philosophy. (D191,703)
