ACCOUNTING INFORMATION AND OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS IN A MULTI-OBJECTIVE SETTING (UNCERTAINTY, PLANNING, DECISION-MAKING) - ProQuest

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ACCOUNTING INFORMATION AND OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS IN A MULTI-OBJECTIVE SETTING (UNCERTAINTY, PLANNING, DECISION-MAKING)

NAMAZI, MOHAMMAD. The University of Nebraska - Lincoln ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 1983. 8412315.