Content area
Abstrak
The dissertation explores ethical nihilism, ethical intuitionism, and ethical absolutism, their relations and acceptability. Toward that end I begin in Chapter 1 with a discussion of the related notions of ethical relativism and skepticism. Chapter 2 offers an account of what an ethic is "supposed to do" and uses this account to give content to the claim that nihilism is the thesis that no ethic can do what an ethic is supposed to do. Chapter 3 examines the notion of ethical absolutism and the related claims that (a) an adequate ethic would have to be absolutistic and (b) that only an ethical intuitionism offers the promise of absolutistic ethics. Chapter 4 distinguishes between non-absolutistic and absolutistic ethical non-naturalisms, takes intuitionism to be the latter, considers the central features and options of ethical intuitionism, and examines the suggestion that ethical intuitionism will not offer an adequate ethic. Chapter 5 is a brief summary and conclusion.
