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Abstract
This work argued for the viability of contextualism as a world view for cognitive psychology. Jenkins (1974) and Sarbin (1977) espoused contextualism as a fruitful view for psychology; however, a review of the literature indicated this claim and its implications had not been extensively evaluated. Because contextualism had only recently been introduced as an alternative to mechanism, a world view long dominant in psychology, this work drew together and examined several theories from the areas of perception and memory and found evidence of a substantial movement toward contextualism in cognitive psychology. In particular, an analysis of research by ecological realists (in event perception) and constructivists (in memory for events) showed dependence on contextualist assumptions.
Applying Stephen Pepper's World Hypotheses (1942/1961), this work reviewed the limitations of mechanism in traditional investigations of perception and memory and in information-processing approaches and explored the strengths of contextualism. It discussed such critical theoretical problems as the nature of information available in perception, the conceptualizations of organism-environment relationships, the ways in which past experience enters present experience, and the role of representation in cognition. Mechanism was shown to resolve problems such as these very differently from contextualism. Moreover, Pepper's framework clarified several key theoretical debates which these contextualist-oriented theories have provoked.
A concluding chapter extended the analysis to problem solving, a cognitive function in which perception and memory interrelate. Within Pepper's system no one world view is ever completely adequate; thus, the weaknesses of contextualism and the implications of holding a tolerant metaphysical view were also discussed. Throughout, the development of an alternative metatheory to mechanism was judged a viable endeavor for cognitive psychology salutary for psychology as a whole.
