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Abstract
This is a study of the formation and performance of minority governments in parliamentary democracies. The existing literature on minority governments is sparse, but conventionally their formation has been attributed to political crises, instability, fragmentation, and polarization. As an alternative explanation, this dissertation presents a theory of minority governments as rational cabinet solutions under certain structural conditions. It is argued that minority cabinets form when party leaders have incentives to defer the gratification of holding office. This will most likely be the case when even the parliamentary opposition has opportunities to influence parliamentary legislation, and when future elections are expected to be competitive and decisive for subsequent government participation.
These competing explanations of minority government formation are tested statistically against data on 323 governments in 15 parliamentary democracies, as well as in intensive case studies of Italy and Norway. The findings support the theory advanced here over the conventional explanations. The same rational choice theory is used to derive criteria of government performance for the analysis of minority governments in office. Conventionally, minority governments have been portrayed as ineffective and unviable. The data give scant support to this argument. Whereas minority governments are somewhat less durable than majority coalitions, they perform considerably better at subsequent elections, and the case studies reveal no significant difference in legislative effectiveness. The same structural conditions that are conducive to minority government formation also promote strong government performance in office. It is concluded that minority governments are a legitimate and viable cabinet option, which may enhance the responsiveness and competitiveness of democratic party systems and counteract political polarization.