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Abstract
A budget is a quantified, financial plan covering a specified period of time. The budget, a key element of the organization's control system, should be designed so that managers take actions that are in the best interest of themselves and the firm. Behavioral scientists are most concerned when the budget is used to evaluate performance. Budgets may act as disincentives, adversely affecting goal congruence. Undesirable behavior can manifest itself in several ways, including the creation of excessive budgetary slack. This study sought to understand what factors contribute to a manager's decision to request excess resources when submitting budget request. The focus is on the "public manager", specifically those employed by municipalities.
This study examined how selected contingent and expectant variables impact budgetary behavior, and took the investigation of slack behavior from the laboratory to a "real life" setting. By utilizing field settings, external validity is enhanced. Also, previous studies concentrated on profit-seeking managers. Often results from one setting is extended to other situations. This, as the results of this study has shown, should not be done.
A survey was taken utilizing 902 managers from eighty different municipalities. The cities ranged in size from populations of 20,000 to 220,000. Each manager was asked about his/her attitude about selected aspects of budgeting. It was found that public-sector managers viewed their budgeting process differently from their private-sector counterparts.
The results of this study provide a foundation for a municipal budgeting behavioral model. Several variables were found to be significantly associated with a manager's decision to include budgetary slack in his/her budget request. A better understanding of slack causes should allow for a more equitable distribution of excess resources in municipalities.
