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Abstract
A punitive desert-claim should be understood as a claim about the intrinsic value of punishment, where this value is grounded in an act or feature of the person to be punished. The purpose of my project is to explore the structure and justification of such punitive desert-claims.
I argue that a true punitive desert-claim takes the form (P1) and (P2), and that belief in these principles is justified on the basis of our considered moral judgments. (P1) The Principle of Deserved Punishment. A person who deserves punishment deserves it because, and only because, she has performed a culpable wrongdoing. (P2) The Principle of the Proportionality of Deserved Punishment. A person receives the punishments she deserves if and only if the punishment she receives is proportional to her culpable wrongdoing.
My analysis proceeds as follows. In chapter two, I argue in favor of the claim that a culpable wrongdoing is the sole basis for deserved punishment.
In chapter three, I put forth an account of the structure of a punitive desert-claim and argue that deserved punishment is not justified via the consequences that result from punishment. Having clarified the basis and structure of deserved punishment, I then set out to provide the justification for it.
In chapter four, I argue that deserved punishment cannot be justified by an appeal to more general moral principles. My argument here rests on the criticism of different types of theory that attempt to justify deserved punishment on the grounds of more general principles. Here I criticize those theories that attempt to justify (P1) and (P2) on the grounds of: the culpable wrongdoer's choice, the culpable wrongdoer's hypothetical consent, the state's promise to punish, the demands of a justified institution, and distributive justice.
In the last chapter I argue that (P1) and (P2) best account for our considered moral judgments about specific cases. From this, I conclude that our belief in both principles is justified.
