Content area
Abstract
This thesis attempts to answer the question "why have Arab armed forces fared so poorly in combat since 1945?" In particular, it focuses on the impact of behavior derived from the dominant Arab culture as an explanation for this pattern of ineffectiveness. It compares this cultural explanation to alternative theories that purport to explain the same phenomenon. Specifically, it compares the influence of Arab culture on Arab military effectiveness to that of underdevelopment, the politicization of Arab militaries, and their frequent reliance on a Soviet-model of military operations.
This thesis employs case studies of the military effectiveness of the armies and air forces of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria between 1945 and 1991. It examines the performance of these Arab militaries in the 1948 War of Israeli Independence, the 1956 Sinai-Suez war, the Iraqi campaigns against the Kurds in 1961-1970 and 1974-1975, the Yemeni Civil War of 1962-1967, the 1967 Six-Day war, the War of Attrition of 1968- 1970, Black September and the 1970 Syrian Invasion of Jordan, the 1973 October War, the 1976 Syrian Invasion of Lebanon, the Iran-Iraq war 1980-1988, the 1982 Israeli Invasion of Lebanon, and the Persian Gulf war of 1990-1991.
This thesis conducts a series of tests to ascertain the explanatory power of the Arabculture theory, both in isolation and relative to that of the alternative explanations. In particular, it compares Arab military effectiveness to that of Angola, Argentina, Chad, China, Cuba, Ethiopia, India, Iran, North and South Korea, Somalia, and Vietnam as a means of establishing the relative influence of the various explanations for limited Arab military effectiveness. It concludes that patterns of behavior derived from the dominant Arab culture are probably the most important of a range of factors that contributed to poor Arab performances in combat. It concludes that underdevelopment also played an important role in Arab military effectiveness, while politicization had a lesser influence. Finally, it concludes that Soviet influence on Arab military operations was not a factor contributing to Arab defeat.