China policy on Capitol Hill: An analysis of trade, Taiwan, and human rights

This is a detailed study of Congress's China policy, with a view toward building a theory of congressional policymaking. I argue that committees, bicameralism, and presidential veto have severely constrained Congress's ability to legislate on China policy. I analyze China bills introduced between 1973 and 2006. I report evidence that committees as gatekeepers have killed most China bills; that the Senate has served as a check on House activism; and that presidential veto has made it virtually impossible for Congress to challenge the president's China policy. These findings are not unique to China, but represent the general patterns of congressional policymaking.

Negative binomial regression results indicate that the Tiananmen Incident and early 1st session consideration led to more China bills in both chambers. A Republican majority in the House facing a Democratic president increased the number of House China bills. The results also indicate the existence of a gap between congressional attitudes and public opinion in the Senate.

Several important findings emerge from logit analysis of roll call votes on China-related issues. The ideological ends were almost always united against trade with China but for a tough human rights policy toward China. Republicans demonstrated much stronger loyalty to their president on China policy than Democrats. Constituency influence was generally weak, except farm interests and exports to China, which were positively associated with support for trade with China but negatively associated with support for strong U.S.-Taiwan relations and a tough human rights policy.

I also compare China with six similar countries on trade and human rights. On trade involving Japan, Canada, and Mexico, liberals and conservatives rarely formed a coalition. Constituency interests, particularly Union Strength, performed better in votes on the three countries. Members of the president's party almost always rallied around the president's position on human rights votes involving Romania, Hungary, and Vietnam. These findings suggest political regime and constituency interests are two key variables for a theory of congressional policymaking.

I conclude the dissertation by assessing Congress's influence in China policy and discussing the implications of my findings for public policy and for understanding congressional behavior.