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Abstract
In this dissertation I examine the relationship between voter turnout and legislative representation in the United States Congress. My main contention is that political elites react to electoral participation in formulating public policies. I posit that the institutional advantages of incumbency in the House of Representative reduces turnout in congressional elections. This relationship, in turn, affects the ideological composition of the electorate and ultimately the legislative behavior of elected representatives. I begin by measuring the ideological differences between voters and non-voters using the results of a wide range of public opinion surveys taken over the past thirty years. I then analyze House election results from 1972 to 2000 to determine whether certain institutional characteristics, such as the incumbency advantage and longer tenure length in Congress, affect voter turnout and electoral outcomes. Drawing on the same empirical material, I also assess the influence of political participation on legislative behavior by measuring how turnout rates and electoral competition appear to influence the roll-call votes of members of the House of Representatives. I draw from these analyses the conclusion that higher levels of voter participation tend to move both Republican and Democratic lawmakers to the left, in the sense that Republicans become less conservative and more centrist, while Democrats become more liberal and less centrist. These findings lead me to conclude that a surge in turnout will induce lawmakers to be more responsive to the needs of constituents with lower socioeconomic status. Overall, my dissertation broadens our understanding of the link between electoral participation and democratic governance in the United States.
