Content area
Abstract
This study provides an analysis of foreign policy formulation by the western democracies towards Bulgaria from 1935–1938. It contends that Bulgaria's decision to join the Axis powers in 1941 was the result of German economic and political domination, developed over the 1930s. This penetration met little challenge from Britain and the other western democracies and eventually left Bulgaria with no diplomatic options but to enter the war on the Nazi side. One reason for this lack of action on the part of the West was the memory of Bulgaria as an ex-enemy state and a deeply held cultural bias which both became engrained in the Foreign Office structures, informing and influencing decisions on the major issues of the period. Utilizing analytical tools from contemporary organization theory, the study examines the operation of organizational memory and cultural bias in this decision making process to shed new light on foreign policy in Southeastern Europe in the latter half of the 1930s.
